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Scientific and technical mission targeted to insure technical systems reliability occupies 
central place in all systems life cycle stages and comprises a wide range of designing, techno­
logical, physical, chemical, mathematical, modeling, experimental, organizational, economic 
and other research areas in various fields of science and technology. The level of systems 
reliability may serve as an integral feature of their operation. Reliability problems were, are 
and will be relevant and important in the process of technical systems development. Special 
problems of reliability are important at the present stage of technical systems evolution, 
which, after the industrial stage of development today is considered as informational, taking 
into account the described below facts:
-  now it was enlarged the integral complexity of engineering systems, herewith such 
systems are basically hardware-software or rather apparatus-information complexes,
-  expanded range of executable functions, significantly increased their role in various 
domains of systems use, including the field of economy, science and technologies,
-  extensive use of computer technology, modem information technology has contributed 
into significant enhancing the potential of modem hardware and information systems, 
for solving various tasks,
-  in publications on reliability were expanded, along with the traditional, multitudes of 
reliability characteristics, such as devices metrological reliability measurement charac­
teristics etc.,
-  in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first century it was accumulated 
vast experience in technical systems reliability research, especially at hardware systems 
reliability study,
-  research regarding the reliability of “soft equipment” hardware and information systems 
-  information, including mathematical and software systems has began to be conducted 
intensively in the late twentieth and early twenty first century, and there were obtained 
important results,
-  despite the increasing role of the technical systems reliability issue, today, due to various 
reasons, primarily due to the lack of adequate funding, the number of publications on the 
reliability and the corresponding dynamic implementation of its results into practice for 
the creation of highly reliable systems has decreased in comparison with the preceding 
periods.
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Fundamentals of reliability lay in examining the quantitative characteristics (criteria) of 
information systems reliability, in exploring the relationship between indexes of economy, 
efficiency and reliability and are based on the development of methods:
-  tests on reliability, methods of its conducting and results evaluation,
-  reliability and optimal regimes of preventive (routine) activities control at the systems 
operation, methods and rules grounding items replacement norms,
-  setting of modes and selection of functions that provide optimal reliability, methods for 
optimal designs and patterns selecting, that provide required components and elements 
reliability, best practices for failures identifying in systems.
Reliability is a property of a system to retain its basic characteristics in time and space 
within the preset modes and conditions of use, maintenance, storage and transportation. De­
pending on the purpose and the conditions of facilities operation the reliability items include 
failure-free operation, durability and maintainability preservation and as the major reliability 
characteristics -  probability of time between failures appearing, technical resource lifetime.
It provides the basics of information systems reliability, which is the major class of 
technical systems as of apparatus-informational systems. Presented in this book material 
reflects the implementation of the following objectives:
-  fundamentals substantiating of technical systems reliability as of science,
-  put in use the accumulated during significant time intervals results of technical systems 
reliability performance research at all stages of systems life cycle,
-  to adapt the major directions of information systems reliability research as of hardware- 
information systems to the stages of systems life cycle.
Publications on the systems reliability can be distinguished onto two following groups:
-  the content and the materials of the first group reflect the specifics of studies on reliability 
calculation, reliability characteristics of typical elements, modules and subsystems at 
different stages of their life cycle,
-  the second reflects the reliability research methodology regarding modem hardware and 
information systems at all stages of their life cycle.
This paper can be attributed to a greater extent to the second group of research publica­
tions.
The book is intended for researchers, professionals and university students who study 
the field of “Security of Information and Communication Systems” within discipline “Reli­
ability of hardware-software systems.”
1. General issues 
of technical systems reliability
Below are considered the original concepts, terminology and definitions regarding the 
technical systems reliability as of science. In the materials on mathematical apparatus reli­
ability principles are currently covered only the basic scientific and technical research areas 
of natural and engineering sciences and are given the reliability theory axioms.
There are shown also the major provisions of modem scientific and technical problems 
in research of reliability at all stages of technical systems life cycle, the basic class of which 
is a class of information systems [1-11].
1.1. Technical systems reliability basics as the science
The beginning of scientific and technical research of technical systems reliability for­
mation is attributed back to the 30s of the twentieth century. The development of technical 
systems during the Second World War, in the 50-80 years of the “cold war”, space explora­
tion, implementation of nuclear technology has greatly contributed to the technical systems 
reliability interest growth in various fields of science and technology. During this period were 
published a large number of papers on reliability.
We shall give the following information about the technical systems reliability that 
objectively might be called classic or basic.
In scientific publications, in the state standards, exist diverse definitions of the technical 
systems reliability terms, but in our opinion the most suitable definition is as the following.
Reliability is property to maintain in certain time limits a set of values for all the facili­
ties of system that ensure its ability to perform the required functions in specified modes and 
conditions of use, maintenance, storage and transportation.
Further it can be observed that reliability is a composite property that, depending on the 
purpose and the requirements of its application, may include items of reliability, durability, 
maintainability and preservation or some combination of these properties. This definition is 
used only for general descriptions but not to quantitative specified properties.
We know that today there is no singular particular definition of reliability. So in the 
International Standard IEC 50 (191) the “Reliability” (trustworthiness) is considered as a ge­
neric term that is used to display non quantitative properties of reliability, maintainability, and 
software maintenance. In this case, the property “longevity” (durability) is treated separately
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and is not included in the term “reliability”. In glossary EOKK (EOQC Glossary-Bem, 1988) 
the “reliability” is also considered as a generic term used to describe the non quantitative 
properties such as reliability, durability, maintainability and reliability at preservation and 
transportation of engineering systems.
It should be included several comments to the fundamental works on the reliability that 
are relating to the definition of “reliability”. It follows from these definitions that reliability 
is an intrinsic property of the system embedded in it during the manufacture and manifested 
for the duration of operation. To compute the reliability, as well as any other properties of the 
system, we need this or that quantifying measure which can be its characteristic. Reliability 
yet cannot be reduced to any one of these characteristics.
The similar definitions of reliability are given in other works. For example, the terminol­
ogy of metrology dictionary provides the subsequent definition.
Reliability -  system’s intricate property which in general is reflected in its reliability, 
durability, maintainability and preservation.
These properties in the definition of engineering system reliability are multifaceted; they 
proceed in time and space, appear at all stages of the system life cycle and are dependable 
on the large number factors actions. Therefore, at present, to determine the quantitative reli­
ability characteristics are mainly used probabilistic models and their, based on tests, statistical 
evaluation by means of mathematical statistics methods. Using the normalized probability 
measure to determine the quantitative reliability characteristics formulates the fundamental 
statistical method for the study of reliability.
The reliability characteristics of products that can be called classic and are functions 
of time, include:
-  time to failure probability for a given period,
-  mean time (working hours) in period till the first failure,
-  failure rate,
-  failure flow characteristics, etc.
Here is presented a number of well-known definitions in reliability theory.
The reliability theory -  a modem branch, and as such it has not yet emerged as a science, 
it has arose from the needs of practice due to the rapid technological progress and especially 
due the emergence of sophisticated electronics and automation systems with a large number 
of elements. It studies:
-  reliability criteria and quantitative characteristics,
-  methods of reliability analysis,
-  methods for the synthesis of complex systems according to the criteria 
of reliability,
-  methods to improve reliability,
-  methods of equipment reliability testing,
-  scientific methods of equipment operating creation according to its reliability 
(preventive maintenance modes grounding, spare elements norms, methods of faults 
finding, methods of collection and statistical data analysis in relation to equipment 
failures).
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It should be bome in mind that the reliability theory is an independent science, and 
not a separate section o f the theory o f probability. It is a technical rather than a math­
ematical discipline, and the range o f tasks solved by it is not limited to the probability 
theory problems.
Prominent soviet scientists in the field of reliability Y.K. Belyayev and Gnedenko B.V. 
have given in the mathematical encyclopedia the subsequent definition.
The reliability theory -  engineering itinerary of mathematical methods implementation, 
within which are developed:
-  methods of technical systems reliability calculating,
-  methods for assessing the manufactured products reliability,
-  ways to optimize and improve the efficiency of sophisticated technical systems and their 
constituent elements at its operation, including also such concepts as the storage and 
transportation.
If we consider the reliability principles as a science, then within the denotation of the 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia, such science satisfies all claims attributed to the technical sci­
ences, since reliability principles are:
-  the area of human activity, function of which is to create and theoretically systematize 
the objective knowledge about technical systems in various domains of utilizing,
-  this domain augments to the productive power of society,
-  it is closely related to the natural sciences, including the sectors of economy and, through 
the production which ensures the material life of society, to the social sciences. 
Fundamentals of reliability as of science consist of:
-  the legal structure that ensures the unity of scientific and technical systems reliability 
problems of varying complexity solving at all stages of theirs life cycle,
-  reliability theory,
-  the applied basics of reliability, using numerous natural sciences and engineering meth­
ods to solve technical systems faultlessness, durability, reparability and preservation 
reliability problems.
Slim m ing up, it should be noted that at present the relevance and importance of scien­
tific and technical issues of technical systems reliability did not decline, but had enlarged 
its significance.
Nowadays we have an objective basis of numerous examples of the development and 
effective use of technological systems in different sectors of the economy, science and tech­
nology, making possible to examine the foundations of the technical systems reliability as of 
a science that meets all most wanted requirements.
Fundamentals of reliability -  the science about the subject of technical systems reli­
ability, durability, reparability and preservation of varying complexity technical systems at 
all stages of theirs life cycle.
This definition of technical systems reliability basics as of science, in fact only high­
lights the key strategic research areas of technical systems of whichever complexity; those in 
each particular case determine modeling and using the results of a wide range of theoretical, 
simulation and experimental reliability research problems solution.
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1.2. The primary concepts, terminology 
and definitions of reliability basics
Basics of technical systems reliability, like of any science, use the specific system of 
initial concepts, terms and definitions. It should be noted that at present it is carried out 
the international harmonization of standards regarding the technical systems reliability, 
with active participation of Ukraine, for forming a coherent system of terms, defini­
tions (in some cases such system is called term-systems). In formulating o f these 
definitions mentioned above are used such sources as national standards of Ukraine, fun­
damental works on reliability [1-9].
Object and types of objects. Term “object” is shared in many various complexity 
technical systems.
Object -  system, structure, mechanism, subsystems, equipment, functional units, devices 
or item or any of them, considered in studies of reliability as an independent element.
It is noted also that the object idiom can include hardware, technical personnel, or any 
combination thereof.
A compound of objects, united by a common purpose and the purpose o f an operation, 
may also to be considered as an object.
Therefore, in the further text, the terms object, item, technical system, information 
system will be used interchangeably.
The following definitions together with the definition of an object, in fact make it pos­
sible to carry out the required classification of objects and their properties.
Function (of object) defined function (of object) is performing within an object a process 
that meets its purpose, identifying the desired conditions or properties of an object according 
regulatory requirements and (or) design (construction) documentation.
The primary function, requisite function is a function or set of functions o f the object, 
as its performance is seen as an obligatory condition for matching the object to its assign­
ment.
All functions of an object can be roughly distinguished into primary and secondary. Aux­
iliary functions are functions whose failure does not affect the compliance of an object to 
its assignment.
Among the objects are distinguished the described below item types.
Repairable items; repairable object -  an object whose repair is possible and provided 
by regulatory, repair and (or) design (constructional) documentation.
No repairable object -  an object whose repair is impossible or not anticipated by regula­
tory, repair and (or) design (constructional) documentation.
Renewable object -  repairable item, which after failure and fixing its problem becomes 
once more able to perform the required functions according prescribed quantitative reliability 
characteristics.
Nonrenewable object -  an object whose repair is not possible or its operability cannot 
be recovered according the prescribed quantitative reliability characteristics.
Items restored after the occurrence of failures are renovated and continue to operate. Non­
renewable objects operate until first refusal.
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Serviced object -  the object maintenance for which is provided by specifications and 
technical documentation, and (or) by design (constructional) documentation.
Unserviced object -  the object, maintenance for which is not provided by specifications 
and technical documentation, and (or) design (constructional) documentation.
Properties of objects. Below we consider the basic reliability properties of objects [2,
6, 7, 9].
Earlier it was noted that reliability is a complex property, which, depending on the 
object goal and conditions of its use may include failure-free, durability, maintainability and 
preservation or some combination of these properties.
Reliability as a generic term is used only for general descriptions of nonquantitative 
specified properties. Because of that, below are described some definitions.
Faultlessness -  a property of an object to perform the required functions under certain 
conditions during a specified interval of time or “time to failure”.
Durability -  ability to follow the object functions through the time interval before transi­
tion to the ultimate state during the period of the system maintenance and repair.
Preservation -  ability of object to be retained in the set of values characteristics that 
define an object’s ability to perform the required functions at operation, during and after 
storage and (or) transport.
Maintainability -  ability of an object to be adapted to its technical state maintenance 
and restoration at which it can perform the required functions provided with the adequate 
maintenance and repair.
Readiness -  a property of an object to be able to conduct the required functions at speci­
fied conditions at any time or during a specified time interval, provided that it encompasses 
the required external resources. This property depends on the combination of the maintain­
ability, reparability and software maintenance reliability properties.
State of the object. Commencing from the position of reliability an object can be found 
in the following technical states: operable (functional status), faulty (inoperable), critical 
condition and ultimate condition.
Serviceability -  the state of the object on which it is able to perform all functions specified.
If  one of the demands of the facility does not meet the regulatory, technical and (or) 
design (constructional) documentation, then the state of an object is regarded as a fault.
Fault -  state of an object in which it is unable to perform at least one of the specified 
object functions. The fault is often the result of the object failure, but it may emerge without it.
Working state, efficiency -  the state of an object, which is characterized by its ability 
to perform all required functions.
Inoperable, disabled -  the state of an object on which it is unable to perform at least 
one of the required functions.
Critical state -  the state of an object that may cause injury, significant property damage, 
or other abnormal effects.
The critical condition is not always the result of a critical failure of a particular item it 
should be set the critical condition criteria.
Boundary state -  the state of the object at which its further use is unacceptable or im­
practical and restoring of its operable condition is impossible or impractical.
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The boundary state occurs, when the characteristic failures flows become unacceptable, 
and (or) object becomes non repairable due to a malfunction.
Object transfer into boundary state leads to suspension or complete cessation of facil­
ity operations. At reaching the boundary state the facility is either removed from service, 
or sent to a medium or major repair or is deducted or transferred for the disposal or for 
other purposes.
Vitality (durability) -  a property of an object to maintain limited performance in the 
conditions of external influences that lead to the failures of its components.
Vitality describes the property of an object to resist critical failures at any conditions, 
including those that are not provided by documentation.
Safety -  object property to ensure that there is no risk of damage to human health, 
property or the environment.
Failure modes. Here we will focus on one of the most important definitions of function­
ing, namely according the basics of technical systems reliability [8, 9].
Refusal -  an event which is characterized by the loss of ability to perform the desired 
function as a result of object working state violation.
“Failure” is an event unlike the “malfunction”, which is the prerequisite and the cause 
of failure.
If the object performance is characterized by a set of values of certain technical charac­
teristics and parameters, the indicative of a failure is the value of one o f these parameters exit 
beyond the tolerances. In addition, into the failures criteria should also be included qualitative 
signs that indicate a malfunction of an object.
Failure criteria are to be distinguished from damage criteria. Criteria of damage mean 
a feature, or a set of traits of faulty, but workable state of an object.
Partial rejection -  denial that leads to a failure of a facility to perform the required 
functions.
Complete failure -  failure that results in complete inability to perform any item required 
functions.
Resource denial -  rejection due which the object reaches its ultimate state.
Severity of failure -  a set of functions that characterizes the consequences of failure.
Denial of one the same object can be interpreted as critical, depending on whether the 
object is considered as a single or it is a part of another object. Insignificant refusal of an 
object which is a part of a more responsible object can be seen as an essential and critical, 
depending on the consequences of a composite object failure. For the classification of con­
sequences it needs criteria and causes of failures analysis and then a building of logical and 
functional connection between events of failures.
Classification of failures, according its consequences, is essential for the reliability ra­
tioning (for a reasonable choice of range and numerical values o f the normalized reliability 
characteristics) as well as during warranties setting.
Critical denial -  denial that by judgment could result in personal injury, significant 
property damage or other unacceptable outcomes.
Sudden denial -  refusal that cannot be predicted prior of examination or at technical 
inspection.
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Phasing denial -  failure caused by gradual changes in the values of one or more char­
acteristics of the object.
Phasing denial can be predicted by prior study or inspection; sometimes it can be pre­
vented by maintenance actions.
In some cases it is possible to differentiate the sudden and gradual failures onto such two 
classes that allows, depending on the given possibility, to predict the time of failure. Unlike the 
sudden failure, the dynamics of phasing denial is in continuous and monotonic change of one or 
more characteristics that describe an object’s ability to perform the required functions. This allows 
to prevent the emergence or failure and to take measures to eliminate (locate) its adverse effects.
Malfunction -  self removing type of failure, or temporary refusal regarding that an 
operator can eliminate its interference.
A typical example of malfunction is information system stopping; the eliminating of 
malfunction can be done by restarting the program from its stop or restarting it from the 
beginning.
Constructive failure -  failure caused by imperfections or violations of the set rules and 
of (or) design standards in the facility construction.
Production denial -  rejection, caused by a facility manufacturing mismatch to its design 
or to the standards of the production process rejection, caused by a facility manufacturing 
mismatch to its design or to the standards of the production process.
Classification of causes of failures in relation to production or constructive denial is 
introduced to determine at what the object life cycle stage actions should be taken to prevent 
the malfunctions.
Component element failures can also be as a result of design, as action of both manu­
facture and occurred at operation.
Degradation denial is a refusal caused by degradation process in the system subordinated 
yet to all rules of design, construction and operation.
During the reliability analysis is distinguished initial failure when there found defects 
influences not detected during manufacturing, testing and (or) receiver control, and later or de­
graded failures. The last are revealed at the final stage of a facility service operation as a result 
of natural material fatigue processes, wear etc., or when the object or its component parts are 
approaching the boundary state in case of physical deterioration. The probability of degraded 
failures occurring during the planned and overhaul terms of service (of resource) must be 
sufficiently small. It is provided with the longevity expectation calculations based on the 
physical nature of degraded failures, at proper maintenance condition.
Mechanical, physical and chemical processes that make the causes for refusal usually 
proceed over time rather slowly. Below are given definitions such as fatigue, wear, corrosion, 
aging and degradation:
-  fatigue (of material) -  a process of gradual accumulation of material damages under 
variable stresses that leads to changes in properties, e.g. cracks formation, its develop­
ment and destruction of material,
-  wear -  the destruction at separation of material from the surface of a solid object and 
(or) its accumulation in a residual deformations during friction, which manifests itself 
in a gradual change of size and (or) the form of the object,
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-  corrosion -  the destruction of a metal object surface due to chemical or electrochemical 
interaction with the active medium (aggressive atmosphere, solution of acids, alkalis, 
salts etc.),
-  aging -  gradual irreversible changes in the object properties caused by chemical and 
(or) physical processes that occur spontaneously in materials,
-  degradation, degradation processes -  an action of one, or several natural processes of 
aging, corrosion, wear, fatigue and fracture combination.
Reservation. One of the major ways to improve the technical systems reliability is 
the redundancy (reservation) which as a way of an object reliability ensuring by the use of 
additional tools which are redundant in relation to the certain required with respect to the 
minimal operating functions [2, 8, 9].
As an additional means and (or) capabilities implemented for reservation (reserve) there 
used: backup of elements in the structure of the object (structural redundancy); backup us­
ing reserve time (temporal redundancy); reserving with a use of information reserves data 
(informational backup); backup, which uses the ability of the object elements to perform 
additional functions (functional redundancy); backup, which uses the object elements ability 
to accept more of top nominal load (loading redundancy), etc.
Information technologies. The above mentioned terminology is common in the studies of 
technical systems reliability and mainly describes the hardware systems. In this paper, the major 
object of study is the information system whose composition along with the hardware is a part of 
the so-called “soft hardware”, which include information provisions: physical and mathematical 
models of the system to perform the required functions, algorithms and software. It is known 
that the study results of the hardware reliability were accumulated during the second half of 
the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and it had created a broad base for operating and 
reliability characteristics calculations. Functional reliability of information systems has been 
studied less, and even less studied are general reliability characteristics o f a hardware-software 
complex (HSP), as of the hardware and information utensils interaction results [9, 10].
Briefly we look at the terminology related to the information systems, which today is not 
but so consistently and generally accepted as the presented above for the technical systems.
Information support. We consider this type o f means providing, since research 
information support for system reliability is essentially the major topic. The definition 
of “information support” is hard to formalize, because it consists from a large number of 
dissimilar constituents.
The structure of information support at the systems construction stage contains a variety 
of components, including:
-  physical and mathematical models that homomorphically reflect systems operation 
at the performance of n sequences of the required functions for a given service mode, 
in time and space, taking into account the requirements of usage;
-  basics of calculative and performance parameters and characteristics, including reli­
ability characteristics of technical devices, modules and subsystems, which are used 
at the systems creation etc.;
-  database of testing, measurement, control and diagnosis of an operation, results of its 
processing etc.;
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-  algorithmic provisions for the computer simulation software, including calculative simu­
lation computing tasks solving for the created system structure various options etc.;
-  algorithmic support for the various subsystems system design:
• automated design (CAD),
• statistical data measurement, monitoring and diagnostics,
• automatic control of operation functional modes,
• system dialog management type “system-operator” etc.;
-  software implementation of mathematical and algorithmic provisions.
Informational support for the reliability studies in this work is considered in a broad sense 
and at all stages of a system life cycle. Naturally, such a provision is the part of information 
system software. However, as this part is common, there is no clear topics separation, because 
the reliability o f a system is determined by all without exception its constituent elements, 
components and modules.
It should be also taken into consideration the dynamics of software integrated information 
accumulation; its adjustments and changes within the process of new information introduction 
during the system life cycle development.
Role and content of information provision reflects the general approach to these complex 
information products, theirs information source. It should be also noted that given for the im­
portant role of information provision in research performance, including reliability, it is advis­
able to name the hardware-software complex (HSC) as hardware-information complex (HIC).
The information signal is a physical carrier o f informational content. The results of in­
formation signals action form the databases for measurement, control and diagnostic, results 
treatment, tests protocols, specification and design documents and so on.
The storage media of information content can be electromagnetic, electrical, vibration, 
acoustic, seismic, and signals of other nature. To describe them are used mathematical models 
of deterministic and random functions -  both one-dimensional and multidimensional.
Large part o f  the information signals are the time series obtained by time sampling, 
discretization, quantifying on the levels of continuous (analogous) signals and coded in most 
cases in binary system. Such signals are referred to as digital.
Object’s execution o f n required functions sequence is defined by the specific purpose 
of a system, simultaneously it is defined both with the number of n, and the by the nature of 
these functions performing.
Reliability enhancement programs include a wide range of measures to improve the 
system reliability at all stages of its life cycle, during the design and production; at the use of 
different types of backup; at processing and renewal technology operation phases; at repair; 
upgrade and maintenance.
1.3. The reliability theory mathematical apparatus
Reliability theory mathematical apparatus is fundamentally represented in the consider­
able amount of scientific publications [4-6, 9, 10].
Analysis of publications in the field of engineering systems reliability supports the fact, 
that the reliability theory is the most sophisticated and well-developed area of reliability
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research foundations. This is natural, due to the fact that the methods used in reliability theory 
are also applied in other sciences, such as in probability theory, in mathematical statistics, 
theory of measurement etc. Therefore, the introduction of new research methods into a number 
of sciences and technologies has been, is and will be the source of parallel methods in the 
reliability theory.
It is essential to consider also the following points. The technical systems reliability 
mathematical apparatus incorporates the described below constituencies (components) of 
the research areas:
-  physical and other principles, laws of construction and functioning of specific technical 
systems, examples of which can be mechanics, electronics, nuclear physics etc.,
-  domains of the established systems use, examples of which are transport, energy, space 
research topics etc.,
-  methods of natural sciences and engineering, examples of which are probability theory, 
mathematical statistics, computational mathematics, metrology (measurement), control 
theory etc., all as the subjects of general mathematics.
In Figure 1.1 is presented an illustrative diagram of the above mentioned areas of math­
ematical research interactions.
Fig. 1.1. Major areas o f  technical systems reliability mathematical apparatus research
Naturally, a complete description of technical systems reliability mathematical apparatus 
inducement deserves a monograph, may be more than one. In our paper are considered only 
the major research areas of the general mathematical tools, namely the use of scopes of science 
and technology methods adapted to the life cycle stages of the emerging technical systems.
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1.3.1. The reliability theory axioms
Reliability theory widely uses the methods of various fields of science and technology 
for solving a wide range of different tasks of reliability. At the same time, such diversity of its 
application for the research of technical systems reliability is questioning the very existence 
of “reliability” as of an independent science.
It is known that most sciences possess characteristic functions that distinguish, on the 
one hand, the science specifying among others and on the other, plays an important role in 
the research areas of that science. Examples can be presented as in:
-  chemistry -  Periodic Table of chemical elements by D.I. Mendeleev,
-  geometry -  the axioms (postulates) of Euclid,
-  electrodynamics -  Maxwell’s equations,
-  probability theory -  axioms by A.M. Kolmogorov,
-  propagation of elastic waves in the physical media -  “the wave’s equation” etc.
It can be cited other examples of such characteristic features for the defining of science. 
As for characteristic function in reliability theory it can serve technical systems reliabil­
ity technical characteristics, but a common methodology of its definition does not exist. The 
number of reliability characteristics with the growth of technical systems complexity is in­
creasing, for example, recently was published the analysis o f measuring devices metrological 
reliability. The described below system reliability theory axioms is offered as the characteristic 
element in the technical systems reliability consideration as of a science.
System of reliability theory axioms. Below is presented the variant of the reliability 
theory axioms system. An important aspect in the formulation of axioms was the issue of 
what approach to formalize the reliability theory should to be used? At the proposed variant 
approach it is used a functional definition of reliability (definition provided by the State Stan­
dards). On the basis of a large number of research results regarding the objects of reliability 
obtained at its creation and operation, the mentioned axioms system can be formulated as
die following below [10,11]. __
Axiom 1. Facility provides performance o f j-st (j = l,n) requisite functions from 
a given sequence o f n required functions in time and space at implementing a specific set 
o f conditions i f  the changes o f  values and characteristics o f the information signal, which 
homomorphically reflects the performance o f j-st function o f that object under different 
operating modes, are held within the prescribed limits. Analysis o f changes in the values 
and characteristics o f the information signal is based on the results o f one o f the described 
below options:
a) performing, calculation, including computer simulation, using a mathematical model o f 
an information signal;
b) processing the real measurement data and control over values and characteristics o f the 
information signal;
c) implementation the options a) and b), as well as the comparative analysis o f its results.
Axiom 2. The object is workable (ensures trouble-free operation) within specified time 
mtervals and spatial area, i f  the object while is performing a sequence o f requiredfunctions
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in the specified modes and conditions o f use and the performance o f each o f them satisfies 
the demands o f axiom 1.
Axiom 3. Quantitative or normalized measurements o f object performance o f one, sev­
eral or all the given sequence o f n functions as o f the indispensable reliability characteristics 
is a function o f time. Determination o f reliability characteristic is based on the results o f 
particular option implementation: a) or b) or c) specified in the axiom 1. The major integral 
reliability characteristic ofan object is the quantitative measure — the duration o f the object’s 
fail-free performance (operation) time interval.
Axiom 4. The object does not provide the ability to work from some fixed point in time, 
i f  at the particular set o f object application implementation conditions occurs an event (tur­
moil) type o f the described below: 
d) failure, in narrow sense, at object failure to fulfill, starting from the above mentioned 
point in time, one from the n set sequences essential functions;
d) refusal, broadly speaking it is considered i f  an object refuses to perform, starting from 
the above mentioned point in time, one or more functions from the specified sequence 
o f n requiredfunctions.
Determination the time points periods for the object performance failure type d) or e) is 
made on the results o f one o f performance variants: a) or b) or c) specified in the axiom 1. 
The proposed axioms system is consistent but incomplete:
-  consistent, because the real objects -  technical systems meet the specified axioms;
-  incomplete, as the defined axioms can be used at different life cycle stages of an object, 
for example, during the designing and operation and as a result to get the divergent 
results of studies those will be needed to agree.
In addition, at the application of this axioms system it can be generated different versions 
of tasks for the same object reliability studies.
Concerning the independence of axioms using, it should be noted the following. In 
axiom 1 are formulated almost all requirements for all supplementary axioms implementa­
tion. Therefore, a combination o f every axiom 2, 3 or 4 with axiom 1 can be made indepen­
dently of each other.
1.3.2. Direct and inverse tasks of reliability
For the reliability problem solving is proposed to conduct two-stage analysis of reli­
ability [10, 11]:
-  a priori reliability analysis at theoretical, including simulation, studies,
-  posteriori reliability analysis for the reliability characteristics practical assessments.
This reliability theory problems classification plays a significant role in the groun­
ding tasks settling, at using varied initial data, at choice of direct mathematical research 
tools.
We will focus at the reliability problem statements adapted to the life cycle of industrial 
systems.
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There can be offered the described below definitions.
Direct problems of reliability theory -  grounding the calculative characteristics o f cre­
ated technical systems reliability during the theoretical and simulation (modulating) studies 
of reliability.
Thus, at the technical system designing stage, on the basis of a priori database (the 
knowledge base), according the results of similar systems research, including laboratory and 
experimental during the process of theoretical studies can be grounded:
-  mathematical models,
-  algorithms for determining the reliability characteristics, which allows performing the
appropriate calculations and developing software for modeling.
In general, a simulation form for a particular system can be carried out on models of 
different physical nature. These models can be restricted to geometric dimensions, such as 
the models of airplanes for research in wind tunnels are equivalent to the electrical modeling 
systems in mechanical systems models. But nowadays most powerful method of mathematical 
and computer modeling is in using modem computer technology.
The widespread introduction of computer technology, the use of new information tech­
nologies has greatly enlarged the possibilities for computer simulation, structures of different 
options, performance, reliability characteristics. Rationalization of best options using optimality 
criteria (e.g. minimizing weight, energy and economic performance) enhances the efficiency 
of technical systems in its respective branches of science and technology.
We offer the described below definition.
Inverse problems of reliability at the system creating stage includes obtaining from the 
test and operation trial data its'statistical treatment results, theirs verifying basing on statistical 
methods, such as via the use of statistical hypotheses, matching the technical system reliability 
characteristics with the same design reliability characteristics.
Comparative analysis of direct and inverse problems of reliability methodology allows to 
reconciling the theoretical and experimental studies of scientific and engineering problems of 
technical systems reliability tasks solving. The results of this analysis provides in some cases 
an opportunity to achieve a coordination of the theory and practice, in others -  formulate on 
the basis of inconsistent problems the long-term tasks of theory and practice for the technical 
systems reliability basics.
For the purpose of the statements and methodology for the direct and inverse problems 
of reliability solving disclosure in Figure 1.2 is presented a simplified exemplary diagram of 
the major directions for the direct and inverse problems of the theory of reliability solution 
results obtaining.
We look in more detail at the technical systems reliability mathematical apparatus. Some 
more proficient study of the technical systems usage has contributed at the same time to the 
technical systems reliability mathematical apparatus development, both for the hardware and 
software systems.
This section will contain only the major lines of the mathematical apparatus of the reli­
ability theory researches, which are adapted to the technical systems life cycle.
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Fig. 1.2. Illustrative diagram for the calculated and statistical reliability characteristics directions
determining
In Figure 1.3 is presented a conventional illustrative diagram of an object basic life 
cycle stages reliability research relationship with the fundamentals and techniques of natural 
sciences and engineering for two types of reliability characteristics as shown below:
1) calculative (direct problem),
2) experimental (inverse problem).
Fig. 1.3. Illustrative diagram o f relationship between the objects investigated life cycle stages areas 
using mathematical apparatus for reliability research
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In the subsequent sections are presented, regarding the implementation at the correspond­
ing stages of technical systems life cycle reliability research, the major directions of general 
mathematical apparatus application.
1.3.3. System design stage
Before the technical system design phase is done, it should be conducted much of work 
on its study, development and coordination of the posed specification for the system between 
the client (agency, ministry) and performer -  the developer of the system (design office, 
design or research institutes). In the technical project for the system it should be included 
every single one of specifications, especially concerning the reliability characteristics, time 
deadlines for system development, testing, certification, for system transfer into operating 
and also information about the system development cost.
At the design stage of the system it should be carried out a significant amount of theoreti­
cal, simulation and experimental (laboratory) studies on the basis of which will be developed 
technical and design documentation for the pre-production of sample and serial system items 
and also completion works on preparation of the production.
At this stage are implemented mostly theoretical and simulation studies in order to 
obtain reliable design characteristics for the specifically developed technical system. Calcu­
lated reliability characteristics are the basis, which is used in subsequent life cycle stages of 
a particular system and can be adjusted in the succeeding studies, for example at using data 
of field (experimental) tests of system operation.
Thus the technical systems reliability mathematical apparatus is used completely. At the 
later stages of the theoretical and simulation (modeling) studies life cycle results obtaining, 
they may be supplemented by field testing, operational, adjustment, precision data, confirmed 
by corresponding statistical hypotheses at using approval criteria. Thus, at the drawing phase 
of such mathematical apparatus usage is created the methodology of theoretical, simulation 
and experimental studies concerning all stages of system life cycle.
M athematical models. Mathematical object research model is one of the major com­
ponents of the above types of reliability guarantee, primarily of informational. Below we 
formulate the described definitions.
A mathematical model of an object -  combination of knowledge, assumptions, hypoth­
eses, requirements, built in the form of coherent logical, seasoned and consistent structures 
that reflects homomorphically basic properties and characteristics of the research object, 
relationship, interaction and relationship between its components and modules, written down 
using mathematical symbols and objects, and designed to solve a particular class of problems.
It is known that the major characteristics (parameters) of the examined object is the 
result of large number of factors in time and space actions, physical nature of which is sto­
chastic. Therefore, the probabilistic apparatus have found the most widespread use in the 
creation of reliability theory mathematical models. We consider the following model detailer.
Random variables are probabilistic models, such as the elements uptime term and sys­
tem renewal time, quantities of wear of mechanical parts at a certain time etc. Note that in 
determining the reliability characteristics some certain features are compared to the traditional
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classical setting models of random variables, to the stochastic processes and their distribution 
laws, which are as following:
-  reliability characteristics are the functions of time and comprise physical dimension of 
time (most of the time unit is 1 hour = 60 minutes = 3600 seconds = 3.6 • 109 micro-
1
seconds = 1/24 = day ^  ^  o f the year),
-  in some cases as a unit of object failure rates is used lFit = 10“91/hour,
-  the laws of random variables distribution, namely the probability distribution func­
tion F(t) and the probability distribution density j{t) are also functions of time, that is 
the argument of functions F{t) and_/(0 is time, which in most cases has the domain of 
definition t e [0, oo), unlike the traditional argument along the real axis x e R = ( -  oo, co),
-  as a model of a random variable, in some cases, is used so-called directly given random 
variable i;(o), co e  Q for which the domain of definition is the space of elementary 
events Q and the ranges of values i;(co) -  T coincide with each other, that takes place in 
the case Q = T and for the case Vco e Q, a> = t.
We consider the most ordinary laws of probability distribution of probabilistic models -  
the random variables using within the problems o f technical systems reliability.
The limited distribution laws of the independent random variables summation. Physical 
justification for the use of limit theorems in technical systems reliability problems is based 
on the described below:
-  reliability characteristics of systems are formed at the actions of a large number of fac­
tors, which are stochastic in nature, the intensity of each in the total effect is small, and 
the actions of each of them in space and time are independent,
-  each system consists of many elements (this number reaches tens, hundreds, thousands), 
which are combined with various schemes of connections including serial, parallel and dif­
ferent variants of combinations, so that the operation system is an aggregated set of a large 
number of existing elements, whilst a significant number of them are operating independently.
The first results on the limit laws were obtained in the classical limit theorems by Swiss 
scientist J. Bernoulli in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Central limit 
theorem, which is based on the results of the classical limit theorems has defined the class of 
infinitely divisible distribution laws as the sum of independent random variables and has been 
proven in the 30 years of the twentieth century by the French scientist P. Levy and Soviet 
scientists A. Kolmogorov and A. Khinchin.
Here is the general form of the characteristic function g(u), u e R for the independent 
random variables distribution infinitely divisible sum law:
n
= 2 * ,« » )  w h e n « —>oo 
i
in the form of Levy:
f 2 2 f  'N
d L (y )\,u e R  (1.1)g(u) = exp |  iau -  °  U-  + J   ̂ "my 1 Wy
[ 2 1 + y
where: a -  the real quantity, o2 > 0 -  non negative value, the function L (y) is a no de-
b
creasing function on the intervals (-oo, 0) and (0, oo), and the integral J" y2dL(y) < °° 
for any finite b > 0, and from this integration region is excluded zero. -i>
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Levi’s form (1.1) essentially characterizes infinitely divisible distribution law as the 
sum of Gaussian and Poisson components. Here the function L(y) characterizes the Poisson 
component; it is also called the spectral function of Poisson jumps. The value a  describes 
the Gaussian component. At a  = 0, L(y) ^  0 we have Poisson component, at o > 0, L(y) = 0
-  Gaussian.
Characteristic function g(u) of infinitely divisible laws along with Levi form can be 
represented as the corresponding equivalent forms by:
-  Levy-Khinchin,
-  Kolomohorov (for the case of finite variances).
Below are presented partial cases of limit theorems for the sums of independent random 
variables that are used in the problems of reliability solving.
Poisson’s theorem. If in n independent trials an event A has a low probability p, then 
for the large values of n the probability P„(m) of the event appearing A exactly m times will 
be equal:
where X =pn.
Integral theorem by de Moire-Laplace. If in a sequence of independent trials the prob­
ability of an event A equals to p, whereas 0< p  <1, then the probability that the number (i of 
occurrences of event A in n successive trials satisfies the inequality (a and b, b > a random 
numbers)
and at large n is close to
We consider the typical laws of random variables distribution, which are widely used as 
a mathematical model for the problems of varying complexity technical systems reliability 
study and also used at the appropriate stages of their life cycle.
1. Binomial law of a discrete random variable distribution £,(©) type:
describes a wide range of experimental results conducted according the so-called Bernoulli 
scheme. In reliability theory according Bernoulli scheme are used failure tests of various 
mass production items of technical systems, including elements, links, modules and devices.
In such experiments, the reliability as the random variable £(co) determines a random 
number of k failures in n series of tests carried out under the same conditions and inde­
pendently of each other. The result of each test is the event A -  failure, which occurs with
P{coe n:Z,(a) = k} = Cknpk( l - p ) n-k,k =0,1,2,... (1.2)
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probability P(A) = p  and to which is attributed number 1 or event B -  the no failure, which 
occurs with probability P(B) = 1 - p  and to which is attributed digit 0.
The random variable ^(ra) is of two-parameter («, p) and it has the following first two 
moments:
where the parameter X characterizes the intensity of an event per time unit. Typically, for the 
events that have very low probability of occurrence along the time axis in a series of tests 
n —> oo,p  —► 0, np —> X, it takes place (1.2), i.e.:
In the reliability theory Poisson law is used to describe the flow of random events, such 
as failures in technical systems, and more.
3. Exponential or exponential law of distribution of a continuous random vari­
able £(©) with a range of values (0, oo) is described by the following probability distribution 
density:
The first two moments of the random variable £(co) are defined by the expressions:
In reliability theory, study of such random variable occupies outstanding place. Despite 
the fact that the model of exponentially distributed random variable is used to study the 
technical systems reliability, systems which do not change its characteristics and parameters 
in time and space, do not wear out and are not aging, it is the yet the random variable that 
allows to get in most cases and at the design phase the primary calculative technical systems 
reliability characteristics.
4. Gauss's law or the normal law of a continuous random variable ̂ (co) distribution with 
domain values (-oo, oo) is two-parameterical and is described by the following expressions:
-  probability distribution density:
M^(k>) = np, DÇ(co) = np{ 1 -p ).
2. Poisson law is a one-parameter discrete value (n, p) distribution law type of:
- r  ~  .  , 1  V  -X , -  , „P{co e  Q : ^(©) = k} = — e 'x, k = 0,1,2,... (1.3)
Random variable Ç(ca) has the following first two points
MÇ(co) = DÇ(co) = X.
At) =At> <*) = <* exp(-aO, a  > 0 (1.4)
M4(co) = 1/a, DÇ(a>) = 1/a2.
(1.5)
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-  distribution function:
F{t) = P{coe n : 4(a)) < 4 = |  f{x)dx = < 5 ^  j (1.6)
where the values of the integral probability:
0(*) = ^  J  exp(-z2 / 2 )dz (1.7)
ire calculated and can be found in the tables in the scientific publications on the theory of 
probability and mathematical statistics.
The first two moments of Gaussian random variable are defined as:
M^(cd) = a, D^(co) = a2.
Gauss law belongs to the infinitely division distribution laws, so in a series of tests 
n —* oo and np -*  oo
np —* 00,
where
x _  k np (-oo,«>)
yjnp(l-p) yjnp{l-p)
Despite the fact that Gauss law is also of certain degree idealization, its use in the study 
of technical systems reliability problems is supported by a large number of practical examples. 
Gauss law as a base is used for such distribution laws:
-  truncated normal,
-  log-normal,
-  x2 distribution,
-  Fisher’s distribution etc.
5. Gamma distribution of a continuous random variable i;(co) with a range of values 
(0, 00) and two parameters (a, X) has the following distribution density
f(t) = f(t;a,X) = Y ^ t a~1exp(-Xt), (1.8)
where the a  > 0, X > 0 positive value parameters, a  is called shape parameter, and a -  distri­
bution scale parameter, and
T(a ) = °jya~1e~ydy 
0
is the gamma function, which at integer a = n + I, rt e N  is defined as 
F(n) = (« + 1)!, T(l) = 1.
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5a. At a  = 1 the gamma distribution is described by exponential distribution law (1.5). 
5b. With an integer number a = n e N  the gamma distribution is described by the Er­
langer distribution, i.e.:
= 7  7 ' i " 1 exp(-X/). ( n - 1)!
(1.9)
It should be noted that the use of the gamma distribution law and its particular cases in 
the majority cases is connected with the technical systems failures characteristics.
6. Weibull distribution of continuous random variable £(co) with a range of values 
(0, oo) and the two parameters (a, A,) has the following distribution density function:
A significant number of probabilistic models in problems of reliability studies, mostly 
of mechanical systems, use effectively the Weibull distribution, confirming the real fact, that
of ball bearings reliability.
6a. At the a  = 1 Weibull law is described by exponential law.
6b. At a  = 2 the Weibull law is described by the Riley law.
To the laws of distribution which can be provisionally called modem and which are the 
solutions of stochastic differential equations that describe the physical diffusion processes 
of degradation -  the wear and rupture of engineering systems, belong the following two 
distributions.
7. DM -  diffuse monotonous distribution of so-called random diffusion processes, and 
which, as a mathematical models, are used in the studies of reliability characteristics of me­
chanical systems, where mostly dominate failures caused by the processes of wear, fatigue 
and corrosion are described by:
8. DN -  diffuse non-monotonic distribution models of random processes which are 
used in studies of the electronic systems reliability which consist of electrical equipment
( 1.10)
and therefore:
M ^ ( c o )  =
the appearance and grounding of such distribution study was based on experimental studies
/
/ ( 0 = / mO;h>v)= ----- -exp2vt^2K\it
V /
( l . i i )
MÇ(co) = n(l + y ) ,  
D^(ro) = |iV ( l  + - ^ ) .
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and mechanical components, the major cause of failures in them are processes of aging and 
various cases electrical and fatigue processes are described by the following expression:
/ ( 0 - / v ( ^ v ) - v^ e x p  





In the distribution of 7 (DM-distribution) and 8 (DN-distribution) are used the described 
below parameters:
-  (x is a scale parameter of diffusion distribution laws and its value is inverse to the aver­
age degradation rate a, i.e.:
-  form parameter in the diffusion distributions laws for the degradation processes is the
variation coefficient v, the value of which is determined according the formula:
» Aa
where 8a -  mean square deviation of the degradation process a average rate.
Examples of the random functions (random variables, stochastic processes) with such 
probability distribution laws that were used as models at the study of technical systems reli­
ability problems are presented in a large number of publications.
Random processes. Efficient use o f methods for determining the technical systems 
reliability characteristics is fully dependent on the adequacy of mathematical models of the 
examined systems functioning. These models are stochastic processes that are ordered by time 
sequence of random variables. A large number of factors influencing the operation of technical 
systems have stochastic physical nature, which justifies the use of random processes. Speaking 
on the general class of stochastic processes, it can be concluded that for considerable num­
ber of technical systems functioning models the problems of their reliability characteristics 
determining are described by the class of stochastic processes with independent increments 
and infinitely divisible distribution laws, which are particular cases of distribution laws by 
Gauss, Poisson, Gamma distributions, etc. The structure o f these processes is built with two 
additive components: Gaussian, which describes a continuous process that accumulate in 
the systems, such as the aging process, type of various processes of diffusion nature, and 
Poisson’s which characterize pulse (discrete) processes such as rejection, the instantaneous 
in time disorders of the elements, modules, units and subsystems.
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In the class of stochastic processes with independent increments most often are used 
the described below models:
-  Markov and semi-Markov stochastic processes,
-  homogeneous and nonhomogeneous Poisson processes,
-  renewal process.
Important role in the studies of technical systems reliability characteristics plays the 
result of the described below problem solution:
-  determination of statistical characteristics by crossing trajectories (realizations) the
processes of functioning of a given level (area of permissible intensity levels) that
characterize denials in the frames of the theory of random processes ejections,
-  time moments of characterstics disordering process, parameters of the system operation.
Specifying the type and characteristics of the random process is grounded by the for­
mulation of a particular problem of characteristics solution which determines the examined 
technical system reliability.
Methods of mathematical statistics. It is known that mathematical statistics is based 
on the theory of probability, an accurate description and interpretation of which, in its turn, 
uses the theory of measurement and integration. Mathematical statistics is a branch of 
mathematics devoted to the mathematical methods of systematization, processing and use 
of statistic data at the observations of measurements and tests.
In the problems of engineering systems reliability the methods of mathematical 
statistics are used primarily for the processing of statistical data during the facilities reli­
ability testing.
At the design stage, basing on sound mathematical models of reliability, durability, 
maintainability and preservation of technical systems there were developed methods of such 
test data statistical processing.
More specifically, the methods of mathematical statistics will be considered at the ap­
propriate life cycle stages of technical systems.
In the following section we consider one of the important results of mathematical 
statistics.
The law of large numbers. The major results of the law of large numbers, which occupy 
a leading position in the theory of probability and mathematical statistics and which is used 
in reliability theory, is the fact that at testing of various objects on the reliability there will 
be set out the general conditions at which the tests provide statistical stability of the average 
reliability characteristics. We consider detailer the law of large numbers.
The law of large numbers in the form by Bernoulli. Suppose that in a sequence of 
independent test an event A has a constant appearing probability p and the (x means the num­
ber of occurrences of event A in n successive tests. Then whatever be a positive digit e > 0, 
at n —  ̂co there follows:
where P{-} -  the probability of a random event that is written in curly brackets.
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In the early twentieth century French mathematician E. Borel have proved that:
I n—*00 yi
Bernoulli and Borel theorems are bases for the probability occurrence estimation of an
I k  law of large numbers by Chebyshev. If the sequence o f pairwise independent ran- 
rariables ^(cd), ^2(co),...^„(ra) is such that their mathematical expectation M^(co) = an are 
and variances D^n(<a) = s2n are limited by the same constant C(max D^(©) < Q , then at 
m -r  x  and any kind of positive constant e:
Methods of statistical hypotheses testing. Such methods are essential for the statistical 
characterization of technical systems reliability inverse problems solution validation. In most 
cases for the formulated statistical hypotheses testing: the case of simple hypotheses when 
there presents a core H0 and the alternative H, hypothesis; a case of complex hypotheses, 
when there are more than two hypotheses.
For the case of simple hypotheses are used the described below statistical criteria for 
decision making:
-  by Neyman-Pearson and errors of the first and second type likelihood determining,
-  by Bayes, with known priori probabilities for two simple hypotheses H0 and H, and 
also with the optimal minimizing risk rule for a given matrix of loss at accepting one or 
another hypothesis,
-  sequential Wald criterion, when adopting a suitable statistical hypotheses depends on the 
volume of variable n in the statistical data submitted for decision making (Wald method 
is called a sequential method of statistical analysis).
We consider the well-known statistical criteria used in non-parametric statistical estima­
tion of probability distributions of random variables.
In general, the formulation of this problem is related to the inverse problems of reli­
ability theory.
For the study of a random variable £(gd) the given sample volume n:
of independent tests series.
One must confirm the statistical hypothesis H0 about the selected theoretical distribution 
law F{t) of value £(cd), basing on a sample (1.14) and using statistical consent criteria for 
a given level of significance a. As a rule a e {0,01; 0,02; 0,05, 0,1}.
Mfcnown A by means of its occurrence frequency, i.e. the value —.




Normally it is built a histogram for a statistical estimation of probability distribution 
density^;). There is recommended at a partition of variations number of the sample (1.14) on 
the m intervals, to choose them as at least 10, and the average number of sample units ni in 
each tt{, therefore (i = 1, m) interval also must be at least 10.
For the confirmation of statistical hypotheses H0 with a given significance level a, which 
is formulated as
where FJt) -  empirical and F(i) -  theoretical distribution function, are used the described 
below typical statistical consent hypothesis.
1. Pearson criterion (criterion •£). Statistics species:
as a function of the sample (1.14) has asymptotic x2 distribution with the number of degrees of 
freedom k = n ~ r - 1, where r -  number of parameters o f the theoretical distribution F(t). The 
hypothesis H0 is confirmed if there executes the following inequality:
where U, -  quantile level (1 -  a) x2 -  distribution with n -  r -  1 degrees of freedom.
Pearson criterion is optimistic, that is in practice, decisions based on its use give more 
positive than negative answers. Therefore, at the positive response it is advisable to check 
them with other criteria.
2. Kolomohorov criterion (D-criteriont). Uses the following empirical distribution func­
tion of the sample (1.14):
This criterion is based on the use of the maximum difference between the theoretical 
and the empirical distribution functions Fit) and Fn{t) i.e.:
In his writings, A. Kolmogorov have shown that the random variable dn4n has asymp­
totic distribution:
The boundaries of the critical region -  Kolmogorov allocation quantiles for the equa­











Quantiles by Kolmogorov distribution
a V . a K . a K . a h -
0.30 0.975 0.10 1.235 0.02 1.518 0.005 1.731
0.20 1.072 0.05 1.358 0.01 1.628 0.001 1.950
Kolmogorov criterion for its use in practice can be called pessimistic, it means that it 
can produce rather negative than positive responses values. Thus the D-criterion complements 
Ae Pearson criterion. If both criteria give the same response, such response can be used with 
»high level of probability. If  the Pearson test gives a positive answer, and D-test -  negative, 
ids should be referred to the third criterion.
3. Mises criterion (criterion co2). This criterion uses the empirical distribution function 
<1.16) and metric type standard deviation:
©2 = j(F (* ) -F ,(* ) )2dF(*) (1.17)
Mathematical expectation of a random variable to2 is
Moo2 = J M ( F ( x ) - F n( x ) f d F ( x ) =  j (m Fn( x ) - F 2 (x))f(x) =
= J DFn{x)dF(x)  = ± ] F ( x ) ( l - F ( x ) ) d F { x )  = ± -  ( U 8 )
To meet the requirements of the mathematical expectation independence of the sample 
size, it is required to multiply to2 by n. Then the test result value and its mathematical expec- 
ntion is found according the formulas:
u = not2, m(mco2) = wMco2 = - ,
Similarly can be found variance co2 and wco2:
2 4h- 3Deo2 = ------r
180«
, Dm = d (h(02) =
4 » -3  
180« ‘
(1.19)
With the increase of n the variance criterion tends asymptotically to a value of 1/45. Even 
n > 40 it can be figured out that Dm ~ 1/45. As an example, quantiles of Mises distribu- 
Du ~ 1/45 for the equation p  = 1 -  a  that are required for critical boundary region as- 
Kssment are listed in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2
Quantiles o f  Mises distribution
i l - a a « i- a a
0.30 0.1843 0.10 0.3473 0.03 0.5489 0.01 0.7435
0.20 0.2412 0 ,05 0.4614 0.02 0.6198 0.001 1.1679
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Mises criterion is neutral and it is able to smooth out some large but unlikely ejec-; 
tions. However, it is difficult at calculate the criterion value.
The methods o f renewal theory are basic mathematical apparatus at the problems of 
technical systems backup solving in order to ensure facility reliability.
At the design stage should be grounded direct tasks o f elements, blocks, modules and 
subsystems for the created technical system reserving and for obtaining estimation data about 
the elements redundancy. Use of such redundancy data is inherent to the important stages 
of systems design.
Methods o f the theory ofplanning experiments (studies) at the design stage of a technical 
system are selected depending on the problem. For example, during process of testing have 
to be solved theirs described below tasks:
-  confirmation of the system functioning,
-  compatibility of its modules and subsystems operations,
-  verification of computer models that were used at the design,
-  evaluation and confirmation the required reliability level characteristics for durability
and maintainability of the system.
Also there have to be developed the methods of trials, statistical data testing, coordination 
the calculated design reliability characteristics with the experimental reliability characteristics.
The methods o f queuing theory are used at the.reserving of elements, modules and sub­
systems during the system design problems formulation. There is a whole class of technical 
facilities with similar queuing systems.
Methods o f theory o f measurement (metrology) are used at the subsystems measurement, 
control and diagnostics construction.
Methods o f control theory are used at the created system subsystems controls designing.
Methods o f computable mathematics enable to determine the accuracy of the reliability 
characteristics that has been obtained at computer experiments.
Methods o f mathematical and simulation modeling are key items at the design stage of 
the system. On its basis are created:
-  mathematical software;
-  software for the corresponding computational experiments, carried out a comparative
analysis of the created system structure options.
Methods o f programming and databases creating make possible to create digital tech­
niques technical design documents for the system construction and production using computer 
technologies.
The level o f design automatization. Computer aided design is an important factor that 
affects the reliability of complex technical systems as it allows to solve the following prob­
lems: reduce significantly the number of design errors, improve the quality of design and 
technological documentation, create conditions for a multiple designing and choosing a best 
variant, to shorten design period, thereby freeing up some time for revision of technical solu­
tions, parameters alignment and testing performing.
Essential in order to improve the quality and technical systems reliability is software 
developing by CAD systems, as it allows high-tech programming, advanced testing system
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z e  and, also, independent and comprehensive software testing conducting before engineering 
systems in which those software systems will be installed manufacturing.
According to the level of automation there are three classes of CAD systems: low auto­
mated (25%), medium automated (25 to 50%), highly automated (over 50%).
An integral part of computer-aided system construction is the system reliability de- 
sgn. Such system uses a computational method for the reliability characteristics calculation, 
King the database with reference to components reliability.
1.3.4. Stage of production and testing of prototypes, 
modules and subsystems
At presence of constructional and design documentation for the formulated system there 
Aould be conducted the actions described below:
-  productions preparation for the prototypes of modules and subsystems manufacturing,
-  at the prototypes manufacture stage are conducted operations on components input 
control, electrical schemes elements and structures control,
-  are implemented the developed at the design stage methodologies and plans for testing, 
for using tools for the examined values obtaining at the study of modules and subsystems 
prototypes characteristics and parameters,
-  implemented developed at the design stage techniques for tests statistical data treatment 
and studied experimental modules and subsystems reliability characteristics determining,
-  according the calculated and experimental reliability characteristics comparative analysis 
results, have to be made mandatory adjustments to the project design and in the design 
documentation,
-  according the results of comparative analysis at using statistical consent methods are to 
be made apposite modifications in the estimated reliability characteristics.
In compliance with the results of the investigations are to be carried out adjustments
■  the project and design documentation in order for the serial batch model development.
1.3.5. Stage of batch sample production, 
certification and transmission into operation
At this stage of the life cycle are conducted the described below proceedings:
-  preparation the production for the corresponding to the specified reliability characteristics 
serial sample manufacturing,
-  at the serial samples manufacturing is implemented method, describing the developed at 
the design stage various subsystem modules, checking up its operation in order to carry 
out the predetermined functions,
-  checking up the manufactured serial system item in operation, regarding failure-free 
work, carrying out its certification using the certified metrological measurement, includ­
ing system reliability characteristics certification.
Quality control and entrance reliability control. Product quality is a combination of 
product properties that determine its suitability to meet certain demands in accordance to
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its purpose. The quality is characterized by the absence of defects. The produced items that 
have no defects are called suitable. A product that has at least one fault is called defective.
Analyzing the concept of “reliability and quality” we may note the following. On the 
one hand, reliability is a property, although comprehensive, and the quality is a combination 
of properties. Because of this, reliability is included as part o f the quality of the latter, as the 
property to conduct specified functions identically to the properties required to meet certain 
demands according to the intended. On the other hand, the definition of quality” does not 
include time, therefore quality is determined for a fixed time, while the definition of “reli­
ability” has a supplement -  “to keep the prescribed limits values of all characteristics within 
a time period”. In this sense, the term “reliability” is broader than the concept of “quality”.
From that it follows that under term quality is understood the initial state to the products 
life, and by reliability -  stability of the basic quality properties over time. Obviously, a high 
level of initial quality does not necessarily mean that the product is guaranteed to retain its 
quality for a given operating time, and therefore it will have high reliability. It is true also that 
the reliability depends on the initial product quality. It is not enough to ensure that a facility 
is functional at the initial time. At occurrence in a facility some manifested or implied faults 
(defects) that can be developed in failure, the characteristics of its reliability are smaller than 
of the object in which they are found and removed. Therefore, a major role in reliability 
ensuring plays quality control.
Quality control is the control of quantitative and / or qualitative performance properties 
of a product. The major type of control is to control the output of the finished object just 
came from the manufacturer, on the results of which it shall be taken a decision on its suit­
ability for use. At higher demands regarding reliability a consumer can conduct the quality 
control of most of the items party which were conveyed from the supplier to the user for 
utilizing in the product manufacture, repair or operation. Depending on the quality demands, 
the control may be selective or total. If necessary, the quality control can be supplemented 
by the manufacturing process supervision, the production process control, which includes 
modes, characteristics and technologic process parameters control.
Quality entrance control can be combined with the input reliability control. As the en­
trance the reliability control is typically substantially limited in time, at its organization can 
be applied methods of forced and accelerated testing and also the reliability prognosis based 
on the use of non-destructive testing methods.
1.3.6. Reliability during operation stage
This stage of the system life cycle is the longest in time and includes the following 
operations:
-  transportation, installation and commissioning the system,
-  permanent monitoring of the system functioning at specified modes using subsystems 
measurement, monitoring, diagnosis, and management,
-  creating the system operation measurements database, followed by specifications, op­
tions, information signals measurement data statistical processing,
-  implementation the methodology that was developed at the design phase, at the creation 
of long-term monitoring, at determining the projected system reliability performance,
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-  system repair methods implementation,
-  correction of mathematical software and computer modeling of system upgrade options, 
conducting simulation experiments and forming recommendations for modernization 
of the current system in order to improve the efficiency of the facility use to enhance 
corresponding reliability characteristics,
-  recommendations implementation for the system modernization.
1.3.7. The final stage of a system life cycle
I This stage is of most science-intensive in the technical system life cycle and lies in the 
i implementation of studies at all stages, its systematization and theoretical, using mathematical 
■»Is, results of the reliability study for the specific type of technical systems summarizing. 
Inch generalization of reliability research results provide appropriate scientific, technical, 
■formation, mathematical and software grounds on order to create new highly advanced 
. Kcimical system.
At this stage, an effort is to be made for the utilization of the system that has exhausted 
as service life. In some cases, this system may be used for its not intended purposes.
1.4. Major reliability characteristics
At technical systems-objects reliability research conducting, are mainly used various 
object's mathematical models, that allow to identify particular reliability characteristics.
To the technical systems reliability characteristics belong quantitative reliability character- 
inics, which are determined by the methods of statistical reliability theory. Applications features 
j o f this theory are primarily characterized by mass production facilities research, provided that 
I fn t  the systems were constructed and operated in a statistically homogeneous conditions to 
j «inch can be applied statistical probability assessment. The examples are engineering products 
i o f electrical and electronic industry characterized by the large parties of its production.
Application of statistical reliability theory to the special and small parties of mass- 
produced objects is limited. This theory can be applied to individual renewable (repaired) 
objects, in which, in accordance with the specifications and technical documentation, are 
allowed repeated failures to describe the sequence of which is used the random events flow 
model. This theory is also used to the unique and smaller mass-produced objects, which in 
mm are made from products of mass production. In this case, the calculation of the reliability 
characteristics of the object as of a whole is made according statistical methods of reli- 
I ability theory by known reliability characteristics of components and elements listed in the 
snitable directories of reliability.
Methods of statistical reliability theory can help to establish demands for the compo­
nents reliability and are based on the requirements for the reliability of an object as a whole.
Statistical reliability theory is a part of a more general approach, according which a tech­
nical object refusal design assessment is estimated as a result of a physical object both with 
oiber objects and the environment interaction.
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At the stage of facilities design and constroctioa ike reliability characteristics are inter­
preted as stochastic mathematical models for the created objects probability characteristics. At 
the stage of experimental research, testing and operation the role o f reliability characteristics 
of objects performs statistical probabilistic assessment o f the relevant characteristics.
Reliability characteristics of objects are introduced at certain modes and operating 
conditions written down in the legal, technical and (or) construction (design) documentation. 
Below are given the following reliability characteristics of technical systems objects:
-  reliability -  quantitative characterization of one or more of those properties which together 
constitute the reliability of an object at its performance according required functional sequences,
-  unitary reliability -  reliability characteristics that describes one of those properties which 
together constitute the reliability of the object during its operation,
-  comprehensive reliability—characteristic of reliability that characterizes several proper­
ties in it, which together constitute the reliability of an object at its functioning.
Reliability characteristics are classified according the following criteria:





b) by the number of object properties that are defined by the reliability characteristics they 
are distinguished on:
-  single (characterizes one of the reliability properties),
-  complex (characterized simultaneously several reliability properties, such as failure- 
free and maintainability);
c) on the number of reliability characteristics of objects they are distinguished on:
-  grouping -  which can be defined and posing only for a multitude of objects; the reli­
ability of a single item of such object at the same time is not regulated,
-  individual -  which establishes the standards of reliability for each item of an object 
from the total set in question (or for single object),
-  mixed -  can act as group or individual;




-  extrapolated (prognostic);
there the extrapolated reliability characteristics are reliability characteristics, pointed 
or interval estimation of which is determined on the basis of calculations, tests, and 
(or) from operational data extrapolation (prediction) onto another temporal duration of 
operation and other service conditions;
e) by dimension the reliability characteristics o f objects are distinguished according to:
-  operating time to failure,
-  work during definite time interval,
-  dimensionless (including probability of events).
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1.4.1. Reliability characteristics of non-renewable objects
As it was noted earlier, the major task in determining the reliability characteristics 
• f  objects performs the corresponding mathematical model of the object [1, 5, 8, 9]. 
Is the reliability theory the most objective criterion for the reliability of a complex 
object is the probability. This is due to the following functions of probability in failure- 
fc e  operation:
-  it enters as a function of time into another, more general characteristics of the object, 
such as efficiency and cost,
-  it characterizes the reliability changes over time,
-  it can be obtained by calculation at the design stage of the object, or as a result of its 
rating in the process of testing.
Probability o f failure-free operation R(t) is prospect that for a given operating time 
a refusal o f the object will not happen, that is:
where P{ } -  the probability o f the events specified in brackets, £,(co) -  random variable 
wtth domain of definition and values, the current time t e [0, co) is the object time to 
fchire, co e Q -  elementary random object failure event occurrence within t e[0, oo), 
C. -  space (set) of elementary random events. Probability of frailer-free service R(t) is 
»function of time t and of object time to failure. Function R(t) is considered continuous 
aad differentiated.
Probability of failure-free service is determined at the provision, that in the initial pe- 
m d  of time (the start of the time to the failure deduction) the object has been in working 
w e .  Denote with t the time or the total object time to failure (hereafter we call t simply time 
m  failure). The emergence of the first refusal is a random event, and time to failure (̂co) from 
Ac initial moment of t = 0 until the emergence of this event is a random variable. Probability 
M  failure-free service R(t) of the object ranging from 0 to / is determined exclusively by the 
■qjression (1.20).
For statistics date on the failures, the probability of the object failure-free operation is 
Jaermined according the formula:
■here R[t) -  statistical evaluation of the failure-free operation probability, N -  the number 
r f  objects at the beginning of tests, n(t) -  the number of objects that were failed during the 
lo ts  time period t e [0, /].
If the ability of an object to conduct specified functions is characterized by a single 
Aaracteristic v(t), then instead of (1.20) we have
R(t) = P{co e Q : £((d) > ?}, co e t e[0, oo) (1.20)
. . .  N -n (t)
R ^ = iv
(1.21)
R(t) -  P{Vl( 0  < v ( 0  < v2(;-)}; t' e [0, t\ (1.22)
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where v,(/) and v2(t) -  limited in terms of performance object characteristics values (these 
values generally are the functions of time).
Similarly, it is introduced failure free service probability in a more general case, when 
the object’s state is characterized by a sequence of characteristics (parameters) with the per­
missible, in terms of efficiency, values range of these characteristics.
Probability of failure-free service R(t) is associated with the distribution function F(t) and j 
distribution density of operating time to the first failure !
F(t) = 1 -  R(t); f it)  = ( 1 . 2 3 ) !  
at at
Along with the concept of “probability” it is often used the term “probability of failure”, j 
which is defined as following: it is the probability that an object has a failure at least once at 
a given operating time t, being but able to work at the preceding time. Failure probability in 
the interval from 0 to r is defined according the formula
F{t) = \-R { t)  (1.24)!
Probability of failure-free service R(t) and the failure probability F(t) are equal to the 
area under the curve of distribution density function f i t )  in the interval [0, / J  that graphically 
is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Fig. 1.4. Graphical interpretation o f  the failure-free operation probability and failure probability
With the increasing of failure-free service of a non-renewable object operating, R{t) de­
creases monotonically from 1 at t = 0, asymptotically approaching to 0 at t -»  oo, and the 
failure probability F(t) increases accordingly, from 0 to 1 (Fig. 1.5).
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Fig. 1.5. Graph of the probability of failure-free operation and the failure probability during
the operating time of object
Probability an item’s failure-free servicing till time to failure during the period of (/, 
t ~ At) is the provisional probability that the object is in working state within this operating 
■•erval time, determined by the requirement, that the facility had retained the performance 
moment t from the beginning of this interval:
P (AB)
R(t, t + A?) = P {Ç(œ) > t + At | £(co) > /} = •
P (S )
(1.25)
where P(£) -  the probability of the event B occurrence to be in the operability of the object 
within operating time interval (0, t) (Fig. 1.6); Y(A\B) -  the conditional probability of an 
«rent A, to be in the object operational state in the interval (t, t + At), that is determined by 
die condition of the realization of event B; P (AB) = P(A IJ B) -  the probability of uniting of 
ondom events A and B, i.e. the probability of object operability in the interval (0, t + At).
Fig. 1.6. Graphic illustration of events A and B probability to be presenting in the object performance 
within the operating time in the interval (0, t + At)
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Pointed statistical estimations for the probability of failure-free operation R(t) from 0 to 
t for the operating time to failure F(t) distribution function are given by:
* o - i - * 4 .  a m
w  N  N
(1.26)
where N -  the number of the able to work facilities at the initial time, n(t) -  the number of
objects that were failed during interval from 0 to t.
To obtain reliable estimations the sample size N  should be large enough.
Definition of uptime in accordance with formulas (1.21) and (1.23) is related to the objects 
that encompass to function for some finite period of time. For real-time (discrete) using of 
uptime probability is defined as the probability that during the object operation, a rejection 
does not occur. Similarly, we introduce probability of failure-free switch-in.
Mean time to failure Mi?(f) -  mathematical expectation o f operating time until to the 
first failure.
Mean time to failure is rather an illustrative reliability characteristic. However, the ap­
plication of this criterion in order to assess the reliability of a complex object is limited to 
cases when:
-  the object operation time is much smaller than the average uptime,
-  distribution law of uptime is non monoparametric enough and for a full assessment it
requires determination of higher order moments,
-  there used reservation,
-  operation time of the particular modules and the parts of a complex object are different.
Mean time to failure TQ is calculated according the formula:
Statistical evaluation for the average operating time to failure is determined according 
the formula:
Equation (1.29) corresponds to the test plan, under which all N  objects are tested till 
the first refusal.
Thus, the average time to failure TQ is defined as the mathematically expected value of 
a random variable r(ff>), to e Q:
(1.27)
0
wherey(0 _  density function of operating time to failure.
Using (1.23), Ta is expressed in terms of uptime probability:
T (1.28)
(1.29)
T0 = Mr(co) = jtf(t)d t. (1.30)
0
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Integrating the (1.30) by parts and using objects for which R(0) = 1, F(0) = 0, R(co) = 0, 
;Wx) = 1, that is for the systems that are workable at the initial time t = 0 and also that the 
period of operation time for these systems is finite, we obtain:
T0 = -tR {t) |; + J  R (?) dt = ]R{t)dt. (1.31)
0 0
For example, at X = const
R(f) = e*‘. (1.32)
; Then
r 0 = J e- ^ = I  (1.33)
0 ' __L
In this case, the reliability function has form R(t) = e T\
At deriving formula (1.30) it is assumed that the system operates during time t which var­
ies from 0 to infinity. Much of the technical systems have a specified finite service life Tp for 
ad b  systems T0 should be determined according the formula:
T  oo
To = J  tf{ t)d t+ j tf{t)dt. (1.34)
0  Tp
The second approach considers that when a system will outsource its technical resource,
■ is removed from service.
At t —► oo are R (oo) = 0, so finely:
T
T0 = \R {t)d t (1.35)
0
Below is the definition of the following reliability characteristics:
Failure frequency is the ratio of number of object failures per time unit to the initial 




•here n(At) -  the number of objects that were failed in the time interval from to t +
Failure rate is the probability density (or distribution law) of a facility working till the 
f c t  refusal. Therefore
t
a(t) = R\t) = F'(t), F{t) = \a{t)dt.
0
t
R(t) = \ - ja ( t ) d t  (1.37)
0
The next reliability characteristics -  failure rate X(t) is mainly used in the analysis of 
able projects. For non-renewable facilities such characteristic is used as the relevant
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reliability characteristic till the first refusal. In practice, the failure rate X(t) is used for testing 
the reliability of non-renewable objects of mass production.
Failure intensity X(t) -  conditional density of failure probability of the object which is 
determined according the condition that to definite moment there was no failure.
By this definition we have:
ü->o At At (1.38)
where F(At 11) -  the conditional failure probability of the object in the interval At defined at 
a provision that at the time t the object is in working state; R(At 11) -  corresponded conditional 
failure-free operation probability.




N  + Nwhere Ncp = ' -  the average number of serviceable objects within the time interval At,
Ni -  the number of serviceable objects at the beginning of the interval At; Nt + 1 -  the number 
of serviceable objects at the end of the interval At; n(t) -  the number of objects that rejected 
at the time interval At.





Conditional probability according to the definition of conditional probability is written 
in the form:
R(At 11) = R(t + At) 
R(t)
(1.41)
Substituting the (1.41) into (1.40) we obtain:
X(t) = lim





1 dR(t) _ f( t)  
R(t) dt R(t) dt
We consider the last equation:
X{t) = --[\nR {t)} (1.42)
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Multiplying both sides of (1.42) on dt and integrating in the boundaries from dt to t, 
w e obtain:
t t
- J  k(t)dt = |  d  [In R(t)] = In R(t) = In R(t) -  In R(0) = In R(t) (1.43)
0 0
Potentiating last equation, we obtain the formula called the basic formula o f reliability.
R(t) = e°  (1.44)
In case when X$) = 1 = const, the basic formula of reliability (1.44) represents the ex- 
paaential distribution law, which is widely used for the modeling of random failures:
R(t) = Xe*-, F(t) = l -R ( t )  = l -  e-*;M  = Xe*; T0 = i  (1.45)
The typical failure rate curve (failures flow parameter) for the object’s operating time
•  shown in Figure 1.7.
Fig. 1.7. Dependence of failure rate X(t) from the object time to failure
On this curve there are three characteristic areas:
1. The initial period ofoperation (during debugging). Elevated failure rate in this section
■ due to the presence of hidden manufacturing defects (bad soldering, mounting defects etc.) 
f a t  appear at the initial period of operation and lead to failure of object.
2. During normal operation. During this period, when the rate of accumulation of dam­
ages from wear, is yet not as high as the usual failure rate, it has generally low and stable 
«hie, the level of which is determined by the function of the object type, its original quality 
■ode and operating conditions. At this period of operation it is observed an action of the 
specific for the object types of sudden failures, which together determine the level of failure 
a te  in this area.
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3. The final period o f operation (degradation time). Daring this period of operation 
proceeds the progressive deterioration of the output parameters of the object caused by the ac­
cumulation of wear and degradation damages that generate a monotonic increase of failure rate.
Despite the non-linearity of the failure rate curve vs. object time to failure during time 
intervals on the first and third dependence area in Figure 1.7, in some cases, in practice, at 
calculating will be chosen Ht) = 1 = const. A prerequisite for this is, firstly, a small time 
o f the installation (running-in) of electronic components and the possibility of eliminating 
them altogether while the production improving, quality control and culling of the finished 
product, and, secondly, a significant duration of normal operation. Because of this the unreli­
able elements which are defected are selected by incoming inspection and discarded, and the 
elements that remained have small and constant failure rate. Degradation period (downgrad­
ing) is excluded from consideration because for the electronic components it comes yet after 
a long period of normal operation, when electronic systems become morally obsolete and may 
be written off. If  yet the failure rate curve vs. object time to failure is not typical and does 
not have significant in duration normal operation period, there is a need for approximation 
of unreliability elements functioning using one of theoretical distribution laws for uptime.
1.4.2. Reliability characteristics of renewable facilities
Reliability models for renewable objects on contrary to non-renewable are characterized 
only by a reliability model and include three components: a reliability model, renewal model 
and model of operation control.
For renovated facility timeslot of operation consists of uptime intervals sequence, time 
intervals for renewal ant time intervals to detect latent failures. Briefly we consider these models.
Failure-free operation models
Such model of renewable facility differs from the non-renewable object only that it is 
a summation of reliability models between successive failures. Generally are considered 
cases where the time to failure intervals of renewable facilities are located in the same order 
in which it follow one by one next failures. This allows investigating the reliability model of 
renewable objects using the results of studies of random processes describing the sequence 
of failures. Such processes are referred to, as the streams of random events -  failures flows. In 
the theory of randomness in this case the rejection events are considered as failures flows 
with the described below characteristics.
1. The number of failures N(t) along the time interval (0, t) and, consequently, N(x, x + t) = 
= N(x, t) in the interval (t , x  + t) when the interval of time countdown is taken from the mo­
ment x > 0 on the time axis x e  [0, oo).
2. Probability of exactly n failures appearing at operating time interval t:
Rn(t)= p ( m = «; *„(*, t = t ) = n m  o =«>. ( i -46)
3. The probability that in anticipation of time to failure t there emerge at least n failures:
n, (0 = P(N(t) >«) = X «,(/);k„(x,0 = V(N(x,t) >n) = X * ,(V ). (1.47)
»=1 «=1
48
4. The average number of failures until the given interval of operating time, which is 
afled a leading function of failures flows:
8. The distribution function for the object’s time to failure interval until the w-st failure:
At studies of renewable facilities in each particular case are used the corresponding 
U ures flows.
Models o f renewal -  process of facility rehabilitating consists of following operations:
-  failure detection, which is held either by an operator or by automated operation control 
system,
-  localization and diagnosis of rejection, the decision to repair or replace the corresponding 
element of the module, which were failed,
-  working over the facility rehabilitation,
-  adjustment of functioning and transfer into subsequent service.
Performing the indicated operations is conducted at corresponding intervals of time, the 
n lu e  of which is described by a random variable 7'(ff>),y = 1,4, co e  
The total value of a facility rehabilitation time
A(0 = MN(t) = 5 X ( 0  =
(1.48)
A(x, 0  = MN(i, t) = £ . nRn (x,0  = £ nn (x, 0  = A(t + 0  -  A(x)
n=1
5. The intensity of flow of failures:
(1.49)
= v(x + 0
6. Failure flow parameter:
-  nm--------- = -----------r_ n
-̂>0 At dx (1.50)
= k(x + 1)
7. The variance of the number of failures until the given time to failure t:
DN(t) = A2(0; D ^(x ,0  = X » X ( x , 0 - A 2( t ,0  (1.51)
n = l
F ,0  = P { O 6 Q : 2 ’» « } (1.52)
ra(ffl) = X r y((Dy) (1. 53)
■also a random variable.
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Distribution law of values Td{ca) in each case is justified with a corresponding model, 
based on:
-  elemental composition, construction of the facility,
-  the nature of an element failure,
-  requirements for maintenance and repair.
For example, if from all the components (1.53) the basic is time interval of failure 
liquidation, then it is recommended to use the exponential distribution law with the random 
variable Td(ai):
where n -  the intensity of renewal Td -  the average renewal time.
Subjected to equal intensity of all object’s components renewal it is recommended to 
use the regular distribution law Td{(o):
0,f < a
1 ,t>b
Provided that two or more components are major contributors into (1.53) and they obey 
to exponential distribution law with parameter n and other components are small, then the 
renewal time is described by the Erlang law with parameters k and n:
where n -  the intensity of the major component renewal with exponential distribution law 
and k -  the number of components.
Renewal models at research can be justified for each element, links, group of links, 
module and for all object’s elements.
Operation control models. Control and diagnostics system for a renewed facility at 
failures determining processes in two modes:
-  at realization of failure as of a random event, the system detects, isolates and diagnoses 
failure during the facility rehabilitation,
-  in the mode of functioning, the system makes it possible to identify hidden failures and 
in some cases to stop its realization.
On the one hand control and diagnostics makes it possible to increase the reliability of 
an object, but on the other, for the organization and conducting of monitoring and diagnostics 
it must be spent quite a few of resources, including hardware, software, all of which increase 
the risk of researched object basic hardware and software parts failure. Structure and charac­
teristics of control and diagnostics selection and optimization can be made at the examined 
object complex reliability models study.
To estimate the costs on the hardware monitoring and diagnostics organization at the works 
on the reliability it is offered a number of models, including logarithmic and logarithmic power.
Fd(t) = 1 -  exp(-n/rd) (1.54)
Fa(t) = • (t-a )(b -a ), a<t<b (1.55)
(1.56)
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According to the log-normal model, the coefficient o f comprehensiveness control 
I  £ (0,1) is associated with the coefficient of relative costs on the equipment control system:
S = \A> (1-57)
t f  the following equation:
5 = W  (1-58)
«here Xt and X0 -  failure rates of controlled and basic equipment, and the parameter a  e (5,10) is 
fcennined by the structure and characteristics of the object.
This model is consistent with experimental data at p < 0,98.
The power model is given by:
6 = pm; p = 51/m, m »  1 (1.59)
Such model is consistent with experimental data at p > 0,98.
1. E -  exponential distribution with parameters:
At) = Jte*; R(t) = e ’,J\ X(t) = X-,T0 = r 1 ( 1.60)
9k  systems that does not grow old and do not wear out. Since practically, the systems that 
d i  not grow old, do not exist, a number of standards for reliability recommend using the E- 
«ftmbution only for comparative assessments of reliability.
2. DM -  it is diffuse monotonous distribution for systems, for example for the me­
chanical, where dominate failures caused by the processes of wear, fatigue and corrosion is 
described by (1.11) i.e.:




1 + y l  (1.62)
■here |x and v > 0 -  scale and shape parameters. Function R(t) for DM -  distribution can
_m ^4-m
Ike transformed by replacing the variable — j=  = u. Then for du = ------j=  dx and to the border
Vyfrix 2vxv/|ix
lAnges of x from 0 to t correspond the u changes limits from -  oo to J— therefore:
Vyi\Lt
1 v>/ra7 _û_ (  t — II ^
<L63)
x
«fere <I>(x) = J e 2 du ~ the probability integral.
3. DN -  diffusion for non-monotonic distribution for the electronic circuits and systems, 
■inch consist of electrical equipment and mechanical components, the major cause of failures
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in which are the processes of aging and various processes of electrical nature and the progres­
sion of fatigue is described by (1.12), i.e.
f(t)  = -2 £ = e  2v>u, R(t) = Q - £ =  - e 2v O -----j=-W2 m  J   ̂ v jT t T0 = \i. (1.64)
4. LN -  lognormal distribution for the system where the major cause of failures is fatigue, 
caused by periodic loads: (Inl-lnn) v2
/ ( , ) = W 5 e r.-M «*. (1.65,
5. W -  Weibull distribution is used for systems where reliability is not accurately enough 
described by distributions E, DM, DN and LN:
(1.66)M' \Hv r1
where F(x) = J ux-le"du is the gamma function for x > 0.
0
The considered five divisions of uptime reliability characterize the elements in 
which X eventually decreases, remains constant or increases (monotonically or with maxi­
mum). The composition of the three distributions Weibull (KW):
R(t) = e M  (1.67)
(here exponential distribution with parameter X is a special case of distribution Weibull) can 
describe the reliability elements that have all three stages of “life cycle” (Fig. 1.4), the initial 
period of operation = v2 = 1), period during normal operation (v, = v2 = 1) and the final 
period of operation (v2 >1).
If the facility failure occurs in case of failure of one of its elements, it is noted, that this 
object has a serial connection elements. At calculating of such object it is believed that the 
failure of every element is random and independent event.
Subsequently the probability of the object runtime over time t equals to the probability 
factors of its uptime elements during the same period. Since the probability of elements over 
time t can be expressed in terms of failure rate in the form (1.66), then the formula for the 
failure probability of the object with a series connection of the elements can be written as 
following:
Rc W = Pi M P i (*)•■• Pn W = II Pi (0>
1=1
Rc (t) = exp^-J X{ (f)<*jexp|^-j X2 (t)dt j . .. (1.68)
- exp( - j ^  = e x p ( - l K .
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Tbe expression (1.68) is most common. It allows for determining the object flawless 
probability till first failure at any failure rate change vs. time law. 
ia practice, the most typical object’s failure rates are of constant value. Wherein, the 
■■c so the failure is described by an exponential distribution law, i.e., for the normal period 
tffaqmpmcnt work is fair the condition X = const.
In this case, the expressions for quantitative characteristics take form:
Rc(t) = e-* = e i  Xc = i > „  a , (0  = Xce ^ ‘, tc = ±  (1.69)
/=1 Kc
If all elements of this type are equally reliable, the failure rate of the system will be:
ie = T-  ( 1-7°)
rc V -  the number of elements of i-st type and r -  number of item types.
In practice, very often it has to be calculated the probabilities of highly reliable systems, 
the multiplier Xct is much less than one, and correspondently the probability R(t) is 
to one. In this case, expanding e x<> into a series and limiting its first two members, it is 
fM B bk to calculate R(t) with high accuracy.
Then the major quantitative reliability characteristics can be calculated with a sufficient 
tm  practice accuracy, according the following approximate formula:
c
a ( 0 = M 1 - M -
Calculation of reliability quantitative characteristics according approximate formulas 
i not give large errors for the systems, failure free operation probability for which is 
■er than 0.9.
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2. The information system 
as an object of reliability research
This section contains material that describes characteristics and operation of the infor- 
■■ion systems. The tasks of projection, collection, transmission, processing, preservation, 
pMBcdon (safety) of various purposes information is the major objective of information 
jf BUiis. Today information systems are used in various societes and industries both as 
■dependent objects and subsystems. Detalier here presented an analysis of the systems 
■formation security items.
In this book is considered the classification of information signals used for forming, 
■■Emission and processing of information, which in conjunction with the hardware of in- 
fcmalion systems implement in each case information resources.
Also here are considered materials on computer simulation at modeling of random sig- 
■ h  realizations based on the use of Monte Carlo method in order to perform an appropriate 
«■■puter simulation experiments during the studies of information systems reliability [1-8].
2.1. General information about information systems
In the information systems, the focus of research is information of diverse types of its
laformation. Information is one of the key concepts for many scientific disciplines 
m d  society items. Various natural physical processes, relationships in the communities are 
A k K  related to information.
A well-known scientist in the field of computer science V.M. Glushkov had stated: 
‘"WDnnation in its broadest sense is a measure of the heterogeneity in the distribution of 
BM et and energy in space and time, a measure of changes that accompany all processes in 
world (...) information is carried not only by a filled in with the letters pages of a book 
« t v  sounds of human speech, but it is also in sunlight, crests of mountains, in the splash of 
11k waterfall, in rustling of tree leaves etc.”
; Information as a knowledge about the world, eliminating uncertainty it is the subject 
«faformation theory research; in philosophy it is a reflection of huge diversity of processes 
i a i  objects.
The information in the various fields of science and technology is used both as a concept 
M i i in mi Information, as a concept, has a deeper meaning and to date does not exist its clear
and formalized general definition. But in each case, i.e. adapted to the basics of information 
systems reliability, the definition of information can be resulted as following.
Information -  is knowledge about the properties, characteristics, parameters of the studied 
phenomena and objects evolving in Time and Space, its relationships between each other.
Information in broader sense reflects the natural and social relationships, and in narrow 
sense -  elements of different fields of knowledge (scientific theories of signals and systems 
processing, information management, measurement, coding, transmission, digital signal 
processing etc.).
It has to be classified types of information starting from certain objective functions. In 
terms of engineering, especially of information systems, important role plays the following 
version of information classification that is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
This classification of information plays a major role in grounding of n functions imple­
mentation required by the information systems in order to ensure the reliability of its opera­
tion. Further, such set of n functions will be required to be specified.
Fig. 2.1. Options of information classification
56
At the same time, the information is not something absolute and independent -  it manifests 
its communicative properties only with respect to specific objects, through their interaction 
with the physical media.
Sources of information. We may notice that lately, due to the rapid development of 
■formation technology and improving of collection, creation, coding, transmission, transfor­
mation, processing, protection (security) and information data storage, it has came into being 
a new line of research -  theory of information sources. We give the following definition.
Source of information is in time and space date embodiment into various nature physi­
cal media.
Sources of information in informational systems are: physical processes and natural 
phenomena, signals, storage media and others.
Physical components of information sources are: sensory subsystems, microcontrollers, 
■bscriber points, researchers and operators, microprocessors, personal computers, analog- 
■»-digital and digital-to-analog converters and other hardware-software.
Mathematical and virtual sources of information are: models, signals, algorithms, flow 
dynamics models of information, functional structures of hardware-software etc.
The Civil Code of Ukraine identifies sources of information: provided or prescribed by 
■formation media laws, documents, general material objects that store information -  media 
«ports, public speeches and publications. An important class are documents with limited 
access, determined by the Law of Ukraine “On Information” and other legislative docu­
ments. Such information contains information of confidential and secret character and must 
be protected against various types of breakthrough threats.
In computer science and computer technology is distinguished computer information, as 
Ac information about the objective world and the processes therein, an integrity, accessibility 
aid  confidentiality of which are ensured through computer technology and this information 
las proprietors and price.
We examine definitions which concern the major object of this paper study -  informa­
tion systems.
Information systems. Informational systems belongs to the major classes of technical 
wsiems. Practically, technical systems are either informational in a narrow sense, or have in 
m  construction some kind of information items which correspond to subsystems that provide 
cficient operation of composite modem industrial complexes. For example, the systems of 
■anagement of nuclear power plants, of modem aviation and transportation systems, systems 
of measurement, control and diagnosis, network informational systems. At the studies of the 
■odem information systems functioning they are considered as hardware-software systems. 
Tkese systems are based on the use of the following components [1, 2, 6]:
-  instrumentation for various applications,
-  software items, information basis of its operation are based, in its turn, on the mathemati­
cal and software resources.
In the branch of information systems, as in the objects of research on the reliability, 
.me conducting a wide range of theoretical, simulation (modeling) and experimental (field) 
■sestigations.
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Here are a number of well recognized definitions.
Information system -  information servicing system which is an ordered set of organi­
zational and informational resources, facilities, information technologies, that implements 
information processes in a traditional or automatic mode in order to perform an essential 
sequence of functions.
Information technology -  a combination of methods, processes, software and hardware 
combined with technological sequence that provides collection, storage, processing, output, 
distribution (proved) of information in order to reduce the complexity of information resources 
usage, improving its reliability and efficiency.
Automated system -  organizational and technical system that implements information 
technologies and integrates the computer system, the physical environment, personnel and 
information which is processed.
Due to the modem development of industrial production in various sectors of economy, 
science and technology, which is characterized by the transition from an industrial onto an 
informational stage of development, almost all technical systems are in fact informational.
It is known that the relevance and importance of information systems is confirmed by 
the following facts:
-  high rate of growth of information technology in all domains of society life,
-  dramatic expansion of new information sources and a wide-ranging spectrum of services 
to the users serviced by information systems,
-  significant expansion of information data flow processed and transmitted by communica­
tion channels of information systems,
-  increasing number of databases for various purposes, their standardization and integra­
tion into modem informational space,
-  increasing computing power in modem information systems.
From these definitions, we can conclude that the major object of informational system 
research, that incorporates both hardware (technical means) and software, is information. If 
we look at the information that is investigating in the given information system, then such 
information is also referred to as an informational resource of information or the product. 
For the formation, transmission, processing and storage of information resource (product) 
the system implements information provision (dataware).
The development of information systems has greatly expanded the range of problems 
to be solved regarding the use of such systems. Simultaneously, specificity, properties and 
characteristics of information has caused significant growth of these problems. We consider 
some problems detailer.
In the studies of the information systems reliability, along with the providing traditional 
(basic) hardware-software information systems reliability characteristics it is required to ensure 
the system information resource (product) performance reliability.
Thus, each specific information system and its information resource are considered as 
a single complex at the operation reliability studies.
Below is presented a number of definitions ensuring information system operation at 
performing of n required function sequences determined by the features, properties and 
characteristics of the information resource.
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The following general definitions are related to the various classes of information sys- 
— « including systems of data management, information security, information-measuring 
«fcrices, digital processing and so on.
Integrity -  the unity, connectedness of all parts of the system’s information resource at 
■BBsmitting, processing and storage as a whole.
For integrity ensuring, the information systems have to function reliably at prescribed 
operating modes and usage conditions, have to be repaired in case of hardware failures and 
—earring dataware errors.
Such terms such as system information resource integrity and the integrity of information 
■ a m is can be considered as synonymic.
Accessibility -  access availability, the ability to access the required system information 
mrnrces during its communication, processing and storage.
To ensure the information accessibility means the system operates reliably in a prescribed 
■ode and conditions of use and permits an object (user), which has an appropriate permis- 
I anas, to exploit the system resource in the required volume and time period as it is set by 
^aahorized access permission.
Accessing the system information resource is an interaction of two objects -  a user 
r f  information system and the information system as it is, as a result of that there creates 
aahorized information flow from one object to another and/or changes in the system state.
Such access is an important part of the secured information systems safety policy 
■^ilrmrlititi III
Here can be noted that the security policy is a set of laws, rules, restrictions, guidelines, 
instructions etc., which regulate the procedure of processing and transmissions within the 
iwtems of information security.
Authorized access to information resources is provided by the system performing the 
Mowing operations or procedures.
Identification -  ID assignment procedure (passwording) to the object of information 
macni or establishing a correspondence between an object and its identifier.
Then is performed the following procedure.
Authentication -  verifying procedure for correspondence of a presented to information 
y a u n  object’s identifier, ensuring the object’s convinced reality.
During the authentication the information system makes a decision:
-  ID is valid,
-  ID is null and this entity is not eligible for authorized access to the information system
resource.
However a positive authentication decision is not satisfactory if lacking the subsequent 
pocedure.
Authorization -  a procedure for authorizing access to the specific information resources 
« f a system and its services.
In the information systems is used an audit procedure to ensure an adequate level of 
control in accordance with the prescribed standards, requirements and information system 
Suctions.
59
Audit -  the routine observation and registration processes or other activities taking place 
in the information system.
In systems with limited access to information resources are used more general, a com­
prehensive description, which is called observability. This characteristic is determined as 
following.
Observability -  a sequence of procedures for identification, authentication, authorization 
and control on the information system user’s (object) actions over resources.
At the studies of the information security systems resource operation, it is the resource 
with limited access, which needs a proper protection against internal and external threats. 
Therefore, reliable operation of such systems is defined as one of the major functions of se­
cured information resource system and which is called privacy (confidentiality). It is known 
the following definition of information system confidentiality.
Privacy -  property of a subject (a user) to exploit the information system resources 
only by the authorized access set rules, which makes it possible to preserve secrecy and the 
credibility of the available information data.
Judging by the weight given to the security functions (protection) of information system 
resources from unauthorized access, confidentiality ensuring is one of the most significant in 
comparison with other characteristics. However, the methodology of information security in 
information systems, which, as it was noted earlier, realized through the creation and security 
policy implementation, is based on procuring the basic characteristics of information resources, 
namely confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, observability, including authentication.
Next we consider the block diagrams of typical information system and a list of tasks 
to ensure the security of its information resources as examples.
Systems for information transmission. In Figure 2.2 is shown a simplified block 
diagram of transmissions in information systems. These are radio systems, TV and other 
telecommunications systems.
Fig. 2.2. A typical block diagram of transmissions in information system
These systems transmit both open and classified information. In the latter case, such 
systems are the information security systems in which is to be implemented the stated above 
security policy.
At public information transferring it has to be secured its integrity and accessibility.
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Information measuring system. Important place in the researched quantitative charac- 
uü tics and parameters determining and assessment occupy information-measuring systems, 
•amplified typical structure of which is shown in Figure 2.3.
oy, equipment), means of production and performers, selected to cany out its functions at 
i Ac routine conditions of production and in compliance with the specifications and technical 
Acmnentation.
Technological system, as a safety system object can be found in one of the following 
Macs: operable, defective, workable, unworkable and at borderline state.
The technological system is operable if it provides manufacturing of products with re­
spired quality and the rhythm of production (productivity), according the set specifications 
mmI technical documentation at the regulated costs of material, energy and labor.
Information technology is essentially the major object of technological systems function­
ing in various country industrial production branches.
Typical criteria of failures (abnormal function) of technological systems are:
-  inconsistency of product quality to the characteristics of the established requirements,
-  decrease in performance below the set level,
-  termination of the technological system operation caused by the refusal of one of the 
elements or factors (e.g. power supply),
-  exceeding the standards for labor, cost of materials, parts etc.
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Systems management. Information systems management of more composite hardware- 
software complexes is its integral component which is interacting in the conjunction with the 
other information systems operations. As an example, in Figure 2.4 is shown the simplified 
block diagram of the hardware-software system, which consists of information systems of 
measurement, monitoring, diagnosis and management.
The equivalent
Other systems sources of different
types of effects




Fig. 2.4. The simplified block diagram of the hardware-software complex
Below we turn to the classification of information systems in terms of its reliability 
studies.
Classification of systems. In reliability studies, among information systems (products, 
devices, objects) are traditionally distinguished:
-  non-renewable,
-  renewable.
Non-renewable are called systems, which in the course of its operation and the per­
formance of its functions cannot be repaired. If there occurred a refusal in such a system,
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te n  there stops its functions execution. Only at execution of refusal elimination (case 
«■hout repair), for example by means of control, there proceeds a restoring of system 
fcciioning. Such systems include irretrievable rockets, guided missiles, satellites and 
itffccrc.
Examples of non-renewable systems of repeated actions include air traffic control systems, 
a r  defense systems that are on duty and other reliability characteristics of non-renewable 
; :jj»ems were discussed in section 1.4.1.
Renewable systems are those that in the course of their operations may be repaired. If 
»»stem  failure had occurred, the system stops the functions on the time of repair interval, 
a t i  then the operation resumes. Reliability features of renewable systems are discussed in 
am on  1.4.2.
At the studies on varying complexity technical systems reliability traditionally is used 
Ac following classification.
An element is a device that has no independent use and is not subjected to disassembling 
m d  repair. The elements include the items of mass production, including electronic equip- 
— . such as integrated circuits, resistors, capacitors, relays and others.
A device consists from a set of elements that are integrated into a single structure and 
performs independent service functions. Examples of such devices are video monitors, tele- 
I « b o o s , personal computers, and others. The number of elements in a device can reach up 
m  lens of thousands.
The system consists of a combination of different active devices intended to perform 
: »specific practical problem. Systems, unlike the devices, can perform entirely new functions 
i A k  cannot be solved with the use of any other devices. The number of elements in a system 
; »  kindreds of thousands, and in some cases some more.
The complex consists of a set of systems, combined for a wide range of practical tasks, 
h  a number of modem facilities they are referred to as hardware-software systems.
If the reliability research takes into account the operation specificity, such as the level 
r f  complexity associated with the increasing of number n of functions required to perform,
: it becomes applicable the following classification of devices and systems:
-  items of mass production, which comprise various elements and devices,
-  information systems where the major objects of study are information signals of different 
physical nature, which include systems of measurement, monitoring, diagnostics and 
control,
-  complex (composite) technical systems as the hardware-software systems, which include 
information subsystems.
The proposed classification corresponds to the accepted in reliability theory rule, that 
■n preceding sets of components and devices are included as the components in the follow­
ing next systems classes, since information systems are the subsystems of complex technical 
»stems (of hardware-software systems).
We consider detailer the operation of one of the specific types of information 
»stems that are widely used in various sectors of economy. These are information security 
»stems.
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2.2. Information security systems operation analysis’s 
the object’s reliability research
2.2.1. Problems of information security
Information security systems are parts of systems, networks, information systems 
networks of varying complexity; they are items of modem information systems, the reliabil­
ity of which plays an important role in the formation, transmission, processing, storage and 
distribution of information. Such systems in the studies on reliability are considered in some 
cases as separate items or as relevant subsystem components of larger hardware-software 
systems. Information security in the information systems are provided primarily by the fol­
lowing subsystems:
-  formation, coding (modulation) and transmission,
-  receiving, decoding, processing and distribution of information.
The major objectives of safety at the operation of technical (information) information 
security systems is to provide the following security properties information that were given 
above, namely confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, observability including authentication.
These safety functions of information systems are used by information security systems 
when exposed to aggregate internal and external threats. Among these threats can be distin­
guished the following:
Threats to privacy. Threats related to the unauthorized access of information are threats 
to privacy. If there exist restrictions on the possibility of information reading, then the relevant 
services of the information systems should be evaluated according to the established criteria of 
privacy: confidential privacy, administrative confidentiality, the reuse of objects, the analysis 
of covert channels and confidentiality at the exchange (export / import).
Threats to integrity. Threats related to unauthorized modification of information is 
a threat to integrity. If there are restrictions on the possibility of information modifying, 
then there considered the following items: confidential integrity, administrative integrity, the 
integrity of exchange.
Threats to accessibility. Threats relating to a breach in the possibility of using informa­
tion systems or information processing are a threat to accessibility. If there are requirements 
regarding protection against refusal, of access, or protection against failure, then there are 
the following options for the resource use: resistance to failure, hot-swappable, recovery 
after failure.
Threats to observability. Identification and control over the actions of users, handling 
the information system services are subjected to the observability and handling. If there exist 
requirements for the user actions control or to the legality of access and the ability of the set 
protective security measures to function, then we have the following instruments: registra­
tion; identification; authentication; a trusted channel; segregation of duties; the integrity of 
protection complex remedies; self-testing; exchange of authentications; sender authentication 
(no denial of authorship); authentication of recipient (no denial of receipt).
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In addition to functional criteria that help to assess the security services in information 
wsems security there are the warranty criteria that allow assessing the services implementa­
tion correctness. The criteria of guaranties include requirements to the architecture of complex 
mnedies security, media development and sequence of development, complex testing protec- 
■od remedies, media of operation and maintenance of documentation that are hierarchical.
The levels of hierarchy reflects the incremental warranty as the assurance, that the 
implemented in the information system services, allow to defend specific threats and that the 
■echanisms that was put into operation, are, in turn, correctly implemented and can provide 
Ac expected level of consumer information safety (security) during the information system 
operation.
All of the described services are to some extent independent. If there is such a relation- 
jfcp, that an implementation of some service is not possible without implementing the other, 
it shows that this condition is a prerequisite for this service (or its level).
The order of information system evaluation for compliance with the set criteria is de- 
■mined by the relevant regulations. An expert committee, which evaluates the information 
■ n on, specifies which services and at what level are to be implemented in a given information 
jfaem , and how they are complied with the guarantees requirements. The result of evaluation 
■ a  rating that appears as an ordered series of alpha-numeric combinations denoting the level 
r f  implemented services, coupled with the level of security.
Those combinations are arranged in the order of service descriptions criteria. Consider­
ing that the rating of information system can include a certain level of service or guarantees, 
Acre must be met requirements listed in the criteria for the level of service and the warranties.
The choice of security measures according to the problems and threats to the security 
M  «formation systems can be made in following way:
-  The first step -  to identify and evaluate the safety concerns. It is necessary to consider 
about the requirements for confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, observability, authen­
ticity and reliability. The strength and number of the selected security measures must 
meet the estimated safety concerns.
-  The second step -  for each security problem are defined common challenges and threats, 
t then for each information system in question are offered safety measures. According this
method it is possible to meet the specific needs for security and safety and approach the 
location where they are really required.
-  Evaluation of safety problem -  for the choice of adopted effective security measures it 
must taken into account the problem of security operations supported by the information 
system in question. Using the definition of security issues and taking into account the 
relevant threats that could lead to these problems, safety measures should be selected 
using the security policy implementation.
Evaluation of safety issues should include the information system itself, in the infor- 
■moo stored or processed in it, and at the operations it conducts. The results will set goals 
the selected security measures. Different parts of the information system or information 
M e d  or processed in it, can suffer from different security problems. It is important to link 
Ac security issues directly with the values, since they affect the threats that may be emerged, 
wmi thus influence on the security choice.
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The importance of safety problems can be evaluated basing on whether security viola­
tion cause serious damage to the service, or has it suffered only from light damage, or does 
not effect at all.
If the information processed by the system is diverse, its various types may require special 
consideration. Security, which is provided to the information system, should be sufficient for 
all types of processed information. Thus, if some information requires a high level of safety, 
the entire system must be protected properly. In case when a volume of high security level 
information is small, it makes sense to consider this information transfer to another system, 
provided that it does not interfere with the service processes.
Basing on the analysis of security systems functioning, we consider the problem of 
information systems security loss.
Loss o f privacy. We consider the consequences that can result at loss of confidentiality by 
malicious and/or non malicious actions. The loss of confidentiality could lead, for example, to:
-  loss of public trust or reputation deterioration,
-  legal liability, including liability for infringement of the data security legislation,
-  adverse effects of organizational politics,
-  threats to own security,
-  deception,
-  disruption of business relationship,
-  taking wrong decisions,
-  inability to perform hazardous tasks,
-  financial losses,
-  failure to comply with deadlines, specified in the contract,
-  considerable costs for recovery.
Security policy implementation allows to estimate the losses that may result from 
the loss of privacy, and to decide whether such damages are significant, insignificant 
or zilch.
Loss of integrity. This is a loss of information that can lead to the consequences that 
are similar to the loss of privacy. According the results of analysis of the information in­
tegrity loss consequences, it is decided whether the relevant loss is significant, insignificant 
or negligible.
Loss of accessibility. Here we may consider what kind of losses may emerge due 
to loss of accessibility to the programs or accessibility to information, i.e. interruption of 
service functions which lead to the untimely response to a request or untimely execution. 
Should also be considered an extreme form of accessibility loss, the final loss of data and 
(or) physical destruction of hardware or software. For illustration, the loss of accessibility to 
critical applications or accessibility to critical information can lead to consequences which 
are indicated as a loss of privacy.
It should be noted that the amount of damages due to the loss of accessibility can be­
come quite different in different periods of time. If this is true, then it is suitable to consider 
all losses that can occur in these various time periods, and to evaluate them for each period 
as major, minor or negligible.
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Loss of observability. Corresponding losses may happen due to the loss of observabil- 
ay over system users or over entities (e.g., by programs) that perform user’s missions. For 
illustration, loss of observability can lead to:
-  system manipulation by the users,
-  industrial espionage,
-  not traceable actions,
-  false accusations,
-  to the consequences similar to the indicated above regarding loss of privacy.
Depending on the answers to the above matters it must be resolved whether general 
«fanages that could result from the loss observability are large, small or negligible.
All decisions regarding the loss of information security functions should be documented 
ieing as an information resource system audit mandatory rule.
Making decision on the results of damages analysis in case of information confidentiality, 
integrity and accessibility loss is used at grounding the hardware-software data protection 
: Measures choice.
2.2.2. Threats and safety measures for information protection
Most of information security tools are designed for a number of threats and provide 
i protection via maintaining overall effective information security management. Below we 
consider separately and detailer such threats to information confidentiality, integrity, acces- 
ability and observability for each species.
Privacy policy
Types of threats that affect privacy are listed below, along with the security measures 
against these threats. Selection of specific security measures is grounded according the in- 
fcnnation system type and its characteristics.
Eavesdropping. A way to access the classified media is eavesdropping (interception), 
[ fcr example, at the recording of information on line or telephone tapping. Security measures 
j against this are presented below
Physical measures. These include rooms, walls, buildings etc., making eavesdropping 
impossible or difficult. Another way to do this -  to create noise. When using the phone some 
protection against eavesdropping can be provided by the appropriate cable placing.
Information security policy. Another way to avoid eavesdropping -  to provide rules: 
when, where, and under what requirements it should be allowed information exchange.
Protection o f data privacy. Another way to protect from listening in -  to encrypt the 
i message before sending.
The electromagnetic emission. Electromagnetic emission approach can be used by 
attackers to gain information processed by information system. Safety measures against 
electromagnetic emission are shown below.
Physical measures. It may be the screened rooms, walls etc., that will not allow electro­
magnetic emission penetration through the screening.
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Safety data security. It should be noted that this is applicable to security measures only 
as long as the information is encrypted. For the information processing, display or printing, 
this type of security is not applicable.
Use of information systems with low levels of emission.
Malicious code. Malicious code can lead to a loss of privacy, for example through the 
interception and passwords disclosure. Security measures against it are listed below.
Protection against malicious code. Timely response to the information system disruption. 
Providing the timely reports about any unusual disturbances may reduce losses in the event 
of malicious code breakthrough. Detected code intrusions can be used to reveal attempts to 
gain entry into a system or network.
One of the methods to obtain passwords is an introduction of malicious code to intercept 
them, so it is required to provide security from such programs actions.
Network management. Another way to obtain classified material is in concealing user 
in flow, such as in e-mail.
Privacy data safety. Unless, for some reason, the above type of security is impossible 
to implement or it is insufficient, then there can be implemented additional security for the 
important data encryption.
The user identity concealing. User identity concealing can be introduced to avoid au­
thentication, as well as all services and security features associated with it. As a result, it any 
time when the concealing enables access to the classified information it can lead to problems 
in privacy. Security remedies in this area are listed below.
Authentication. The concealing becomes more difficult when for the identification and 
authentication are used measures based on a combination of something known, something 
existing, and also about internal characteristics of the user.
Logical access control and auditing. Logical access control cannot distinguish between 
authorized users from someone who pretends to be an authorized user, but the use of access 
control mechanisms can narrow the sphere of such influence. Periodic monitoring and analysis 
of audit logs can detect unauthorized activity.
Incorrect direction/redirection o f posts. Incorrect direction is a malicious or nonmalicious 
wrong directing of messages while its forwarding can be used both for good and evil intentions. 
Redirection may be conducted, for example, to maintain the accessibility integrity. Incorrect 
sending and reforwarding messages can lead to the loss of privacy if it allows unauthorized 
access to these messages. Security measures against this are listed below.
Network management. It should be used and also be implemented safety measures against 
incorrect direction and redirection.
Privacy data safety. In case of erroneous redirection, to prevent unauthorized access to 
a message it has to be encrypted.
Failures o f software. Failures of software can affect the privacy security if this software 
protects confidentiality, for example the programs of access control or encryption, or also if 
the software crashes are causing loop, for instance in the operating system. Privacy safety 
measures in this case are shown below.
Responding to violations. Anyone who observes an incorrect operation of software should 
report it to a responsible person as soon as possible.
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Operation. Some software failures can be avoided by testing of software before using 
m i  at utilizing the software change control.
Theft Thefts may endanger privacy if the stolen component of information technology 
pnsesses any classified information that may become available by hijackers. Theft safety 
I iMedies are considered below.
Physical measures. It can be material resistance, the kind of making access in a building, 
a n  or room containing equipment more intricate or it may be a specific security measures 
i^anst theft.
Staff. Safety by personnel (external control ofpersonnel, confidentiality agreements etc.) 
mmt be available to hinder theft.
Privacy security policy. This security tool must be implemented if there exists a potential 
f c  equipment containing the classified information theft.
Control o f information media. Any media containing classified material must be pro- 
M c d  from theft.
Unauthorized access to information systems, data, services and applications.
Unauthorized access to information systems, data, services and applications can 
■k a threat if someone can access any monitored materials. Security measures against 
HBDthorized access cover appropriate identification and authentication, logical access 
oMrol, audit at the level of information system and the separation of the systems at die 
■owork level.
Authentication. To prevent unauthorized access must be used suitable identification and 
■■bentication in conjunction with logical access control.
Logical access control and auditing. Must be used security tools for logical access control 
ifcuugh the use of access control mechanisms. Periodic monitoring and analysis of audit logs 
wm detect unauthorized activities of personnel who have authorized access to the system.
Separation o f networks. To impede unauthorized access it can be done the networks 
■qparation.
Physical access control. Beside logical access control, security can be provided by the 
gfefsical access control.
Control o f information media. If classified data are stored within another media, for 
pMection of these storage media from unauthorized access it should be applied media control.
Safety o f privacy data. Unless, for some reason, the above type of security is impossible 
■»■nplement or it is insufficient, then there may be provided additional security measures at 
■■czypting classified data that are stored.
Unauthorized access to storage media. Unauthorized access to media that store some 
«rfdential material and their use may affect the privacy security. Means for privacy protec- 
tioa arc listed below.
Operation. Controlling of media can be used to ensure, for example by physical secu- 
mtf. media accounting and guaranteed removal of information which was stored, so no one 
iMald get confidential material from pre-cleaned media. Special precautions should be taken 
»portable media such as storage media, and paper copies.
Physical security. Adequate security of walls (strong walls and windows, as well as 
^nsical access control) and safety accessories can protect against unauthorized access.
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Private data safety. Additional classified information stored on data media safety cai 
be achieved by encrypting the material. It required a good key management system for aa 
unperturbed implementation of encryption.
Integrity
Types of threats that can affect the safety integrity are listed below together with the 
safety security measures against these threats. It is known that at the choice of security tools 
it should be considered the information system type and characteristics.
Here can be noted that most security tools provide a “common” security, namely those 
focused on specific threats and provide security by maintaining the overall effective man­
agement of information safety. These measures are not described in detail and they are to be 
implemented for the overall effective security for each specific information system.
Damage o f  storage media. Spoiling the storage media threatens the information integrity 
stored on these media. If integrity is important, we must apply the following safety measures.
Control o f information data media. Adequate control of media should include integrity 
checks to determine whether the saved files were corrupted.
Reservation. Reservations are needed to backup all significant files, business data, etc. If 
were noticed a loss of integrity, for example at media monitoring or at backups testing, then, 
for files integrity it must be used the back-up copy or restoring of previous copy.
Data integrity safety. For the data integrity safety on storage devices can be embedded 
cryptographic methods.
Mistakes in service. If services are conducted irregularly or during maintenance occur 
errors, the integrity of information is threatened. Integrity safety measures in this case are 
shown below.
Service. Proper maintenance is the best way to avoid mistakes in services. It covers 
documented and tested procedures for servicing and proper supervision of the operation.
Reservation. To restore the integrity of damaged data at occurring service errors can be 
used media backup copies.
Data integrity safety. For the information integrity safety there can be used cryptographic 
techniques.
Cogency. Measures for cogency should be used when it is important to have a confirma­
tion that the message was sent and (or) received, and that the network had transmitted the 
message. There are specific cryptographic security tools as a basis of cogency (data integrity 
and cogency).
Failures o f supply (power, air-conditioning. Supply failures can cause integrity problems 
same as if they had caused by other failures. For illustration, supply disruptions can cause 
hardware failures, technical problems or data storage media damage. Safety measures for 
these specific problems can be found in the relevant paragraphs, protection means against 
failure of supply are presented below.
Power and air conditioning. Must be used safety devices for power and air condition­
ing, for example, overvoltage security devices when it is necessary to avoid any problems 
associated with failures of supply.
Reservation. Reservations must be used to restore damaged information.
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Technical damage. Technical damage, for example in the network may destroy the 
■■egrity of any information which is stored or processed in the network. Safety measures 
against technical damages are presented below.
Operation. Configuration and change management, as well as capacity management 
Aould be used to avoid failures in any system or network. Documentation and maintenance 
s c  used to ensure the smooth operation of a system or network.
Network management. To minimize risks of technical damage it is required to use 
tehnical methodic of operation, planning the systems and proper configuration of networks.
Electrical power and air conditioning. Should be used overvoltage safety measures for 
pvwer and air conditioning, for instance protection against voltage fluctuations in order to 
■roid problems associated with the failures of supply.
Reservation. Reservations are used in order to restore damaged information.
Transmission errors. Transmission errors can destroy transmitted information integrity, 
■■egrity safety measures are shown below.
Cabling. Careful planning and scrupulously cabling will help avoid mistakes, such as 
M m  error is caused by overload.
Network management. Network equipment has to be managed properly and maintain it 
M is to avoid errors of transmission.
Data integrity safety. To protect from random errors in the data transmission protocols 
Acre can be used'checksums and cyclic redundant codes. For the safety of data integrity from 
■■tkious attacks during transmission are utilized cryptographic techniques.
| Unauthorized applications and data usage. Unauthorized applications and data endanger 
f lr  information integrity which is stored or processed by the system if the programs and data 
■ere subjected by unauthorized information modification or if programs and data contain 
■rfcious code (such as of the games). Safety measures regarding this are presented below.
Safety awareness and training. All employees must be notified that they should not in- 
■ril or use any software without permission of the Information Security or any person who
•  responsible for the system security.
Reservation. To restore damaged information must be used reservations.
Authentication. To prevent unauthorized access it should be applied appropriate identi-
Logical access control and auditing. Logical access control must ensure that the software 
Wk  processing and modification of information can be used by only authorized individuals, 
ect unauthorized activity can viewing and analyzing the audit logs.
ecurity against malicious code. Before use all applications and data should be checked 
ilicious code.
rser’s error. User errors can destroy the information integrity. Measures of safety re- 
g them are listed below.
Safety consciousness and instruction. All users must be trained properly to avoid errors 
fcring operation. Such training regarding operating safety should include training regarding 
fcfinitions of actions and procedures.
Reservation. Backups, for example created earlier, can be used to restore the integrity 
(be data that has been destroyed as a result of user error.
ion and authentication together with logical access control.
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To the integrity of information, as well as to the privacy, threaten these actions:
-  software failure,
-  unauthorized access to the data media.
Safety of data integrity which are provided by the steps mentioned before, are imple­
mented similarly to the confidentiality security measures that were described above.
Accessibility. Types of threats that may endanger the accessibility are described below 
in conjunction with the security measures adjacent to these threats. The choice of security 
measures is determined by the information system type and characteristics.
Requirements to accessibility may vary from the time non-critical data and the informa­
tion technology systems up to the time-supercritical data and systems items. First it has to 
be protected by redundancy, whereas the latter may require the presence of system backup.
Destructive attacks. Information can be completely destroyed as a result of the destruc­
tive attacks. Security measures against it are listed below.
Disciplinary process. All employees should be warned on the consequences if they 
(maliciously or no maliciously) destroy the information.
Control o f information media. All storage media must be properly protected from unau­
thorized access by using physical protection; this is in account for all information storage media.
Reservation. It should be made backup copies of all important files and business data 
etc. If the file or any other information is not available (for whatever reason), to recover the 
information has to be used a backup or a preceding backup copy.
Financial security. To prevent unauthorized access, to facilitate the unauthorized destruc­
tion of equipment or data, it must be used a physical access control.
Authentication. Suitable identification and authentication to prevent unauthorized access 
should be used along with the logical access control.
Control and audit logical access. Control of logical access must ensure that there is no 
unauthorized access to information, which could destroy it. Viewing and analyzing of the 
audit logs can help to detect unauthorized activity.
Failures o f  communication equipment and services. Crashes of communication equip­
ment and services threaten the information accessibility transmitted through these services. 
Depending on the cause of failure it may be helpful to use to “Software failures”, “Supply 
failures’ or “Technical fault” relevantly to the system technical documentation.
Excessivity and redundancy. Excessive introduction of communicating services com­
ponents may be used to reduce the likelihood of exchanging services failures. Depending on 
the magnitude of the maximum allowable downtime, to meet this requirements, there can 
also be used an additional equipment. In any case, to ensure accessibility in the event of an 
emergency, the configuration data and its location should also to be reserved.
Network management. Network equipment has to be managed properly and maintained 
so as avoid errors.
Cabling. Careful planning and cabling can prevent damages, if it is suspected that 
a contour line may be damaged, such version has to be checked.
Cogency. If there is required network sending or receiving messages confirmation, there 
must be applied cogency, then a damaging of communication utilities or missing information 
can be easily detected.
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Fire, flood. Equipment and information can be destroyed by fire and (or) water. Safety 
measures against fire and water are presented below.
Physical security. All buildings and rooms containing equipment or media that store 
mportant information should be adequately protected from fire and water.
Business continuity plan. For the security of business from the devastating effects of fire 
aid water it should be developed an appropriate plan for the business continuity and made 
affordable backups for the important information.
Misuse o f resources. Misuse of resources may result to an inaccessibility of information 
or service. Safety measures regarding these items are presented below.
Staff. Entire staff should be warned about the consequences of misuse of resources, if 
accessary, there should be imposed disciplinary measures.
Operation. To detect unauthorized activity, the system needs to be supervised, and to 
aimimize the possibilities of privileges abuse it has to be carried out a distribution of re- 
aponsibilities.
Authentication. Suitable identification and authentication should be used alongside with 
logical access control to prevent unauthorized admission.
Logical access monitoring and auditing. It is recommended to use protection for the 
logical access control via the use of access control mechanisms. Viewing and analyzing of 
iie audit logs can detect an unauthorized activity.
Network management. To minimize opportunities regarding the network resources mis- 
■eating there must be implemented an appropriate network configuration and partitioning.
Natural disasters. To provide security against loss of information and services as a result 
of natural disasters it should to be applied the following safety requirements.
Safety regarding natural disasters. All premises should be protected so stem as it pos-. 
able against natural disasters
Business continuity plan. There must be available and fully tested business continuity 
plan for each building-premise, made a backup of all important information, should be avail­
able appropriated services and resources.
Channel congestion. Channel congestions threaten the information accessibility that is 
transmitted through these channels. Accessibility safety requirements are presented below.
Congestion and redundancy. Excessive implementation of communication services can 
be used to reduce the likelihood of communication services failures. Depending on the dimen­
sion of the maximum allowable downtime, auxiliary equipment can also be used to meet the 
prescribed requirements. In any case, to ensure accessibility in the event of an emergency 
Ibe configuration and the location data should be also reserved.
Network management. To avoid overloading there must be implemented an appropriate 
«»figuration, management and administration of networks and communication services.
Safety observability, authenticity and reliability measures. Scopes of observability, 
■ithenticity and reliability applications are very diverse in particular areas. These differ­
ences mean that there can be applied many specialized security measures. So here below are 
general guidelines.
Safety measures that provide “general” security are directed to a number of threats and 
provide protection through maintaining the overall effective information security management.
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For the reason of that, they are not presented here, but their influence should not be underes­
timated and they should be implemented for the effective overall protection.
To the information accessibility, as well as to its confidentiality and integrity can threaten 
the following events:
-  storage medium damages,
-  errors in service,
-  malicious code,
-  concealing the user identity,
-  improper referral / messages redirect,
-  failure of software,
-  disruptions of supply (power supply, air conditioning),
-  technical damage,
-  theft,
-  transmission errors,
-  unauthorized access to information systems, data, services and applications,
-  use of unauthorized applications and data.
Observability. For the information observability protection it must be considered any 
threat that may lead to the inability to associate some event with a specific object or subject. 
Some examples of such threats are: a shared account use, concealing of an individual user, 
software failures, and unauthorized access to information systems, data, services and applica­
tions, as well as weak identity authentication.
There are two types of observability to be considered. One is related to the definition 
of the users responsible for specific actions over information and information systems. This 
function is performed by audit logs. Another type is associated with mutual identification 
between users on the system. This can be completed in the course of the cogency service, by 
splitting knowledge and double control.
Any threat to observability, and therefore the system or process not assuring about the 
object authenticity, can be abridged, For illustration, any hazard that can create this situation 
will contain unclassified data changes together with untested source data and also the data 
source that is not supporting the observability, and therefore the system or process is not 
confident about the object authenticity and can be abridged.
To facilitate implementation of authenticity or its accomplishment there can be used 
a large number of security tools. There can be used a range of measures from the signed refer­
ence data, control and audit of logical access up to the use of digital signatures. The choice of 
specific security measures will depend on the specified use on a particular area authentication.
A large number of security mechanisms can be used for cogency implementation or to 
contribute into its completion. Here can be used tools that depend on the following factors: 
security policy, safety measures for awareness and monitoring, auditing the logical access to 
the one time passwords and control media. Implementation of ownership information policy 
is a prerequisite for observability. The choice of such specific security measures will depend 
on the use of observability defined for a particular area.
Any threat that may lead to inconsistent behavior of systems or processes will reduce 
the reliability level. These threats concern system performance and unreliable service. Loss
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af reliability may occur at low-level customer service quality or at the loss of customer 
confidence.
For implementing the reliability or to contribute into its realization there can be used 
■my remedy measures. There can be used such mechanisms as making business continu­
ity plans, introduction of redundancy in the physical architecture, the system identification, 
■ahentication, audit and logical access control maintenance. A choice of specific security 
measures will depend on the specified use of authentication in a particular area.
2.3. Reliability characteristics classification
Here is presented the following classification of reliability technical characteristics and,
■  view of that, the same for informational systems.
Classification of reliability characteristics. According to the purpose all the reliabil­
ity characteristics of objects are functional because they reflect (define) the object ability to 
perform those functions in its operation. In its essence, each characteristic of particular item 
«liability is an individual one.
At the first stage of the foundation of reliability engineering and information systems as 
a  science, there were established basic theoretical and practical positions using a particular 
■easure for the reliability characteristics, such as the probabilistic assessing approach for 
Ac whole class of technical systems.
Using the probabilistic assessment for any technical systems of varying complexity al­
tars  identify a subset of reliability characteristics for the systems that have been presented
■  the first section of this book.
Such reliability characteristics can be called basic or classic.
In the subsequent stage of the reliability basics development it was required to determine 
a  number of basic specialized reliability features that could perform more effective analysis 
af functioning probability item in order to improve its operation reliability.
Examples of such specialized descriptions are characteristics of metrological reliability 
af measuring instruments; the number of publications on the results of such research recently 
«as significantly increased. There can be predicted special features of research concerning 
aifaer technical systems. Namely, information security systems reliability performance char- 
aaeristics ensure its confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, authenticity and observability.
Based on this we give the following technical systems performance reliability classifica­
tion, as they are:
-  basic for all systems class;
-  specialized for different subsets of systems, each of them incorporate the relevant brands
of operation and definite class of problems solving, including:
a) various sectors of the national industry, science and technology (energy, transport, 
radar equipment, medicine, nuclear physics etc.),
b) various physical principles of operation (acoustic, electromagnetic, optical etc.),
c) operational services of different tasks (detection, identification, spectral correlation, 
measurement, adaptation, management etc.).
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Graphically the demonstrating schemes for the proposed performance reliability of 
technical systems classification are given in Figure 2.5.
a) A  and B are, respectively, basic 
blocks and specialized functions
b) block B corresponding to reliability characteristics 
stages-partitioning scheme
Fig. 2.5. Illustrative classification scheme of functional reliability characteristics
It can be noted, that there are two fundamentally important steps in functional objects 
reliability characteristics determining, and they have been discussed specifically in the first 
chapter:
-  definition of calculative reliability characteristics on the results of theoretical and simula­
tion studies (direct problem of reliability);
-  definition on experimental values and their coordination with the design reliability 
characteristics (inverse problem of reliability).
thus, to ensure highly reliable facilities operation it should be defined a wide range of safety 
measures, such as combining both basic and specialized reliability characteristics. To confirm 
this conclusion, we give below some specific examples.
Example 2.1. Notice that in the information systems reliability studies can be roughly 
distinguished two blocks of reliability characteristics:
A) reliability characteristics of hardware-software systems that reflect the specific modes 
of operation, conditions of the system in use;
B) reliability characteristics of information resources that reflect the collection, creation, 
transmission, processing and information data storage specificities in terms of internal 
and external threats.
Naturally, in the studies of the information systems reliability it has to be conducted 
research of the unit blocks (A) and (B) reliability characteristics simultaneously.
We may concretize block (B) reliability characteristics of information resources.
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Under information reliability in informational systems is meant an ensuring the follow- 
mg characteristics:
-  integrity, i.e. no change, distortions and destructions o f information elements,
-  confidence in the information -  observability, that is no unauthorized modification, no
substitution o f information pieces while maintaining its integrity,
-  information accessibility, which is providing by the system to the authorized users some
looked-for information in the required quantities and time,
-  information security -  reassurance, that there is no its unauthorized obtaining by users
or by processes which do not possess an appropriate legal rights,
-  preventing the information unauthorized reproduction and transmission.
Speaking from the point of view of the information system, in order to ensure the reli­
ability characteristics of block B) the system must perform an appropriate sequence of es- 
ratial functions. Such problem of information resources security is to be solved on a case to 
o se  basis. Here may be noted that for assessing the ability of information system to perform
•  sequence of essential functions will be using appropriate criteria of information security, 
am ely the performance of two types of requirements:
-  functional requirements to the security services provided by the system,
-  requirements to guarantee the information protection.
The named criteria are listed in the official regulations, including the ND TZI 2.5-004-99 
“Criteria for evaluating information security in computer systems from unauthorized access”.
Example 2.2. In the studies of various types of power plants, including nuclear, thermal, 
ijdroelectric, wind, solar and others were defined:
-  standardized basic reliability characteristics for all kinds of power plants;
-  special reliability characteristics:
a) metrological characteristics of electrical power quality reliability parameters, for all 
kind of power plants;
b) specialized parameters in the reliability characteristics for the secure operation for each 
type of power plant -  namely its environmental performance, for example radiation 
emission intensity (level) for the staff, environment and others.
Below we briefly discuss the general properties of information signals, which, as it was 
anted earlier, is the major subject of information systems research.
2.4. Information signals at the system reliability 
characteristics identification
Information signals compose the starting place to determine information system reli­
ability characteristics. To the basic knowledge of this fact and materials is devoted this unit.
In some cases, an information system is the major instrument in the study of the reli­
ability examined objects as it is shown in Figure 2.6.
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Fig. 2.6. Scheme of basic reliability components determining examined object characteristics
relationship
First there can be considered the general case and classifications types (options) for the 
formation and transformation of informational signals in the technical systems:
-  signal is created (generated) by the system itself, with subsequent conversion within the 
corresponding links, modules, and subsystems to form the output signal,
-  signal is fed as an input of the system, following by its transformation in the links of 
the system and output signal formation,
-  signal from excitation source is fed as the input of the system as an excitation signal 
(test signal), which, in turn, generates the corresponding informational signal, formation 
and transformation of which is determined by the characteristics and properties of the 
technical system.
Illustrative scheme of formation and transformation for the specified classes of such sig­
nals within information systems are shown in Figure 2.7 for the corresponding options (a, b, c).
c)
Fig. 2.7. Block diagrams of variants of signals formation and transformation in information systems
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At converting signals inside information systems can be allocated the following tasks:
-  analysis;
-  synthesis.
Objectives of analysis. We consider here the known from the theory of signals and 
^sterns three tasks, regarding signal change analysis in systems, namely the problems:
-  direct,
-  inverse,
-  identification problem or “black box.”
For the problems concerning signal changes in systems specified analysis we use the 
fcllowing illustrative structure which is shown in Figure 2.8.
Fig. 2.8. Scheme of signals change in a system
In Figure 2.8 are used the following notations:
-  x(t) -  input or generated by the system signal (action),
-  XO -  output signal (response),
-  Z[ ] -  operator that describes the system of signal transformation.
We know that as an operator Z[ ] are using linear and nonlinear operators, which re­
spectively characterize the studied system and are in most cases the differential or integral 
operators. For example, a linear system with constant parameters over time and pulse transi­
tion function cp(0 is described by the linear operator:
t
L[] = Jcp(/-T)-rfT (2.1)
0
the response of such system is described by the following expression:
t
yit) + L[x(t)] = J(p(r-  T)x(T)dx. (2.2)
0
Below we formulate more extended set of the said signals conversion analysis problems.
Direct problem: is given x(t) and Z[-], it is required to determine y(t).
Inverse problem: is given y(t) and y{t), it is required to determine Z[],
Identification problem: is given x(t) and Z[-] it is required to determine Z[-].
If we use the general approach of the theory of signals and systems, then the problem 
of determining the reliability characteristics for the examined information systems relates to 
die problems of identification.
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In the majority cases the identification problems are bound to the tasks of the examined 
objects during its reliability characteristics analysis and are being resolved at the subsequent 
stages of the item life cycle:
-  at the design phase of an object, particularly at conducting the theoretical and simulation 
studies of different options during the object construction (building of models, computing 
the reliability characteristics as a result of direct problem solution);
-  at the stage of the objects operation full-scale tests (obtaining reasonable experimental 
reliability characteristics as the result of inverse problems solution)
Synthesis problem. Formulation of technical systems synthesis problem as of research 
goal for the objects reliability is given in Figure 2.8:
-  there is given:
• entrance, or generated by the system itself input signal x(t),
• reliability characteristics of the system,
• optimality criterion (efficiency) which usually provides maximum or minimum value 
of one or more characteristics of the system reliability described with operator Z[-] at 
system performing functions expressed by the response y(t)
-  it is required to find a pattern of the operator Z[-] implementation, for which it could be 
realized the reliability characteristics optimality criterion at the signal x(t) input.
The problems of analysis and synthesis of reliable technical systems are interrelated and 
there take place two cases:
1) at creating a new technical system it is first solved the problem of synthesis -  creating 
a pattern for the operator implementation Z[], after that, there investigated the problem 
of analysis, since optimality criterion does not optimize all reliability characteristics of 
the system, so in many cases, in practice, takes place implementing of so-called system 
quasi-optimal structures;
2) at the study of a formatted, but unknown structure of a system are investigated mainly the 
problems of analysis -  that is, the problems of system reliability characteristics identifying.
Below we consider the information signals and noises problems that occur in the tasks 
of systems performance reliability research.
Distinguishing between data and informational signals and noises is arbitrary, and is 
determined at the measurement problem formulation. Thus, for some problems -  processes of 
thermal, shot and flicker noises generated in electronic systems are the focus of information 
signals research, while for the others just troubles. As an example, here can be presented the 
following classification of signals (noise): the natural, terrestrial, including pulsed atmospheric 
discharges; seismic and geophysical disturbances; hydroacoustic noise fields; electromagnetic 
radiation of diverse terrestrial objects; phenomena of no terrestrial origin -  the cosmic radia­
tion of the Sun, stars and other celestial objects; industrial -  radiation both electromagnetic 
and vibrational, acoustic, optical frequencies in a wide energy range, from avionics to me­
chanical systems etc.
The following example is typical for the problems of electromagnetic compatibility at 
a collective functioning of radar, radio communications and other electronic systems, such
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eg. as in the surface warships, i.e. in the areas of such located systems simultaneous utiliz­
ing. This case of systems operation can serve as a concrete example, as for a certain system
•  signal is informational, but for others -  nuisance.
Physical nature of the signal formation in most cases is stochastic, random and according
•  the classification A.M. Kolmogorov’s there are three possibilities:
-  a signal can be described by deterministic models that are independently determined by 
the initial state of affairs, but the initial requirements itself are random,
-  the signal as a function of time and/or space is a random variable which is described by 
a random process or by a random field,
-  sequential dynamics of a signal for different combinations in most cases is described by 
the additive or multiplicative mixture of deterministic signals and random processes.
These options of random signal are essentially define both the signal itself, and also its 
possible more complex forms as the combinations of signals.
It is known that to the major objects of mathematical modeling belong stochastic pro- 
oesses, and in the process of mathematical modeling it is used triad “model-algorithm-pro- 
pam” named by the soviet scientist A. A. Samara. At the primary stage it has to be grounded
■ mathematical model of a particular signal, and at the subsequent stages are developed 
rfgorithms and created the appropriate software for the computational experiments based on 
Ac computer technology resources. Mathematical modeling has some advantages over the 
■onducted using the system’s existing information experimental base, however it has some 
iBerrelated restrictions.
At using the known signals and noise study results it is proposed to consider, along the 
■t of physical mechanisms, a creation of signals under action of random factors from some 
too generalized sources (generators) for the formation of:
-  a sequence of harmonic oscillations with random parameters, namely random amplitudes 
and phases and, in general, functions of time,
-  a sequence of pulses with random parameters, namely random values of duration, in­
tensity and period of repetition within the observation time interval.
It is believed that a signal is generated and distributed (transmitted) inside a limited spatial 
Kgion, and signal process formation and accumulation is the sum of the said components 
sequences, therefore the signal is forming in the spatial region where applied the principle 
M  superposition.
2.4.1. Classification of information signals
The term “signal” comes from the Latin signum -  sign and has extensively large connota- 
■on. The signal is understood as a process of knowledge about an object or natural phenom­
e n a  physical transfer in time and space. The term “signal” is also used in the mathematical 
■odel of signals, as about a physical process.
The terms “information signal”, “measurements signal” and “signal” are used in this 
p^ier as synonymous terms, and the specific meaning of a “signal” is determined by a prob- 
hm specific formulation.
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In order to specify the assigned signal at the information systems reliability research we 
present initially in Figure 2.9 the following classification of signals.
Fig. 2.9. Classification of signals
At formulating and solving information systems reliability problems it is mainly used 
the following, shown in Figure 2.10, classification of signals mathematical models.
Information signals in the reliability problems. Based on the studies of information 
signals here can be defined the calculated and experimental characteristics for the examined 
system reliability, that is for the solution of direct and inverse reliability problems.
For the formulation and solution of reliability tasks is used an informational background, 
including: mathematical; software.
Informational support -  a summation of observed experimental data base, the results of 
measurement, monitoring, diagnosis and management, file structures and directories together 
with management tools, information security against unauthorized access processing features, 
as well as mathematical and software background.
Mathematical software-an aggregate of mathematical models, methods and algorithms 
upon which a technical system performs its tasks associated with the intended purpose.
The software implements mathematical support and has two major components: the 
system and the functional software.
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fig. 2.10. The major types of the signals mathematical models for the information systems reliability
problem solving
A mathematical model of the examined object is one of the major components of the above 
■rationed types of provisions. In this book first section was given the definition of the math- 
oudca l models as of embodiments of knowledge, associated assumptions, hypotheses and 
conditions which homomorphically reflects object of study major features and characteristics. 
We may consider the stages of mathematical models designing and use:
-  recording, using mathematical objects, symbols and basic laws of facility operation based 
on the study of a priori information about the objects, taking into account the classes of 
problems;
-  conducting theoretical and simulation studies for simulation modeling using mathemati­
cal model (direct problem of reliability);
-  models use to solve application problems, including experiments conducting (direct and 
inverse reliability problems);
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-  coordination of theoretical and simulation studies with the real experiment based on the 
proposed model, which enables to make a decision with respect to the mathematical 
model, selecting one of the following:
• use of the proposed models for future research,
• improvement of the proposed model,
• new model development.
2.4.2. Baseline signals at the information systems reliability 
characteristics identification
Methods for determining the reliability characteristics of engineering systems are de­
scribed in the large number of publications.
Formulating the problems of examined system reliability characteristics identification or 
the problem of “black box” identification was presented in the section 2.4 in following wording:
-  at given input signal x(t) that was fed into the input of the researched system, then the 
output signal of the system y(t) is the response of the system,
-  basing on the given signals x(t) and y{t), t e T to find characteristics of the system.
The general formulation of the information systems reliability characteristics identification 
problem is different from the general problem of identifying the characteristics of a “black 
box”; in essence it is a dissimilar case. This is due to the following:
-  at the design stage and at subsequent stages of the life cycle of the system are to be 
determined calculative and further statistical estimations of a real system operation, 
which have to be determined basing on relevant reliability characteristics;
-  the following properties are defined during simulation, measurement and field experi­
ments, by using the following standard classes of the input information signals:
• harmonic and polyharmonic,
• pulse, including signals type delta functions,
• realizations of stochastic processes, including processes of white noise realizations, 
that adequately describe both the structure and characteristics of the “black box” of 
the examined information system, especially of its hardware.
Programming complex of an information system at the development, debugging and test­
ing processing is also using the mentioned common classes of information signals. Here also, 
as for information signals are used mostly random processes implementations, the formation 
of which will be discussed in the next section.
2.5. Reliability problems stochastic processes modeling
The theory of stochastic processes is used for the study of physical signals, noise, 
technical processes that change over time and therefore are random. The essence of its use 
is, above all, in that a certain random process is considered (usually with a grounding) as
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a mathematical model of real physical or technical process which is used for the technical 
systems reliability problems solution.
Compliance with this model is largely determined by the success of simulation studies. 
This is especially true for the composite technical systems, including aviation and space sys- 
fcms, nuclear energy and others. Test of a system on reliability in some cases is unworkable, 
n  some cases it is due to the significant economic, time and maintenance costs. Therefore, 
simulation experiments, which are, as a rule, computer assisted, play an important role at the 
«ientific and technical systems reliability problems solving. Simulation models of signals are 
■sed at testing of technical systems, at testing and prediction problems solving, in a variety 
of training systems, such as regarding the aviation training apparatus and others.
Simulation of random processes is carried out according the general approach known as 
Ike method of statistical tests (or Monte Carlo method). Technical instrument for simulation 
«f random processes is in the employment of computer technology, including information 
systems. Because of discrete character of information system studies, its usage allows to 
■odeling usually random sequences (processes with discrete time) which, if necessary, can 
be approximated (by analytical method or technical means of digital-to-analog conversion)
■  order to build continuous time random processes models.
Simulation of stochastic process using statistical tests is reduced essentially to the 
constructing of an algorithm for generation with this information system its processes imple­
mentations and it requires the following major problem solutions:
-  generation of implementations, in a sense of the simplest random sequence, that required 
to simulate actual randomness,
-  interpretation of simulated process into constructional (from Latin constructivus -  one 
that is used for building) form in order to obtain it by the above mentioned simplest 
random sequence conversion,
-  verification of coincidence (or at least a certain proximity) of probabilistic characteristics 
of a random process and its simulation model.
In this section we consider the most common in practice applications of methods for 
* e  first two problems solving. The latter problem is solved by the methods of mathematical 
aatistics, which will be discussed in the section three.
2.5.1. Modeling of pseudorandom numbers sequences
Let ^(w),..., (co), co e  £1 is a sequence of independent random variables (white noise
■  the narrow sense); each of them has a uniform distribution with parameters a = 0, b = 1 
and probability distribution density^O
i When using the method of statistical tests the introduced above sequence is called the 
wmtdom numbers.
The major problem of simulation modeling of random numbers (and in general of any 
oodom elements) in the information system is that all modem information systems operate 
according to certain algorithms specified for software or hardware.
■ defined as:
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To implement stochastic experiment for the universal purpose information system us­
ing any algorithm is essentially impossible. Therefore, instead of random numbers are using 
so-called pseudorandom numbers n, that are obtained by entirely coincidental algorithm but 
possessing some properties that are very similar to those of random numbers realizations.
One of the best studied in theoretical terms and used in practical application as a method 
to generate pseudorandom numbers is method o f residues (linear congruent method), according 
to which, at first it is received a sequence of positive integers u0, uv u2, ..., un, ... according 
recurrent algorithm of the form:
un= (un - i^OCmod N),n=  1 , 00, (2.3)
where u0 M, N  — a set of mutually simple natural numbers, ^4(mod B) -  the residue after 
dividing the numbers AJB, for example, 22 (mod 5) = 2, and a sequence of pseudorandom 
numbers a,,, 0̂ , a , , ..., a„,... derived from (2.3) as:
a„ = — ,« = 1,0°, o < a  <l,Vn. (2.4)N
Residue method is also used in a slightly different (more general) form than in (2.3) and 
(2.4), namely, the sequence {«„}} is formed as
un= (“*-\M  + M2)(modN),n = \ , 2 , ..., (2.5)
where Ug, Mx, M2, N  -  positive integers, and the sequence {a„} is computed according to (2.4).
The algorithm obtained at Mx = 69,069, M2= 1, N  = 231 is considered as one of the best 
and is used in the production of well-known companies, manufacturers of software.
How well pseudorandom numbers imitate the implementations of random numbers can 
be checked using the methods of mathematical statistics and special methods of the numbers 
theory.
Sequence of independent, uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1] random variables, 
is in fact the simplest case of random sequence, by corresponding transformations of which 
there can be obtained other, more complex stochastic processes.
2.5.2. Modeling of random processes typical sequences
Solution to the problem of reliability through computer simulation experiments is based 
on the use of a particular methodology: problem statement is based on grounded mathematical 
models for an object, algorithms for development and computational experiments software. 
Modem information technology of computer simulation largely uses the powerful software 
modules such as Mathlab, MathCad etc., within those the formation of random processes 
sequence is a formalized parametric procedure. This formalization on one hand simplifies 
operations at computer simulation problem solving, but in terms of gaining knowledge of dif­
ferent levels for the training of students and researchers, this formalization (using the software 
of the “black box”) does not meet the requirements of the learning process. Therefore, in this
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paper are given the major provisions forming the typical sequence of random processes that 
are used in reliability problems.
Simulation of white noise with continuous distributions. Universal modeling method 
of continuously shared white noise is specified by the following.
Statement Suppose that a(a>) — random variable uniformly distributed in the range of[0, 
1], andF(t) some continuous distribution function. Then the random variable i;(©) = i^ ‘(a(co)) 
(where F '1(t), t e [0,1] -  function inverted to the F  (t) has the distribution function F(t).
The distribution function of a random variable £(<») looks like
F5(0  = P{co e  n : £(oj) < t }  = p { F ( F ' '( a )  < F(f))} = P{a(co) < F(<)}.









So, if to model the sequence {ay(co) ,7  = l,m} then the simulation of sequence { (̂co), 
j  = l,m} of independent random values, each of them is continuously distributed with the 
distribution function F (t), is carried out as following: 4/co)= F '1 (a/ra)), i= 1, m. The described 
algorithm is called the method o f inverse functions. The major problem in this method practi­
cal implementation is to determine the function F~\t) for the given distribution function F(t).
For a number of important distributions, this problem can be solved without much difficulty, 
k  particular, by simple analytic transformations here can be obtained the inverse functions for:
-  uniform distribution F~'(t) = ( b -  a)t + a,
-  exponential distribution F~l(t) = ——,
A,
-  Rayleigh distribution F  '(/) = o^/-2ln(l-0 ,
-  arcsine distribution F~\t) = a cos(tc(1 - 1)).
Thus, an algorithm of modeling of stationary white noise that uniformly distributed in 
e  interval [a, b] has form .̂(co) = { b -  a)a.(ai) + a, i = 1, m.
Here may be noted that the distribution function of a random variable 1 -  a(m)(a((o) is 
m variable with uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1]) and is:
iV a(/) = P{l-a(co)<?} = P{a(a>)>l-*} = l- F a( l- 0  =
=  1-
0,l -< <0; 
l- f ,0 < l- ?  <1;
U>1;
t,0<t<l; = Fa(t). 
0,t < 0
That is, the random variables a(ro) and (1 -  a(co)) have the same distribution.
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Hence we obtain the following algorithm of simulation for stationary white noise with 
an exponential distribution: (to) = ------Rayleigh distribution: (to) = 21na,(co),
distribution of arcsine: ^(co) a cos(7ia,(co)), /' = 1, m.
However, for many distributions to obtain the inverse function in a form of a simple ana­
lytical expression is not possible. In such cases it is attempted to find such an operator A[-], in 
which presents ̂ (co) = A\QY) (®), ^<2) (©),..., if0 (10)], where £,(co) -  white noise, which has to be 
modeled and ̂ ’’(oa), ^ 2)(co),..., -  are white noises (simulation models of which are easy
to obtain by method of inverse functions), or there use the approximate methods of simulation.
An example of the distribution, for which it is impossible to find a simple expression 
of the inverse function, is the Gaussian distribution. To simulate white noise with Gaussian 
distribution can be used the following.
Statement. Let a(co) i r)(co) be independent random variables, while r|(co) is uniformly 
distributed in the interval [0, 1] and t |(c o ) has a Rayleigh distribution with the parameter a. 
Then the random variables ,̂((o) = T|(co)sin(2jra(a))) and §2(cd) = r|(co)cos(27ra((o)) are inde­
pendent and have the same Gaussian distribution N  (0, o).
Thus, the algorithm of simulation of stationary white noise with distribution N  (0,0 ) will 
look like that. We generate sequence a/co), i = \ , m  and divide it into two subsequences, such 
as: a*l>(co) = alt+ ,(co) and aJ2)(co) = a2t+ ,(«}), k = 1, mil (it can certainly generate a sequence 
{aj’̂ co)} and {aj2>(to)} by different algorithms). After that, it can be modeled two sequences 
of independent white noises with distribution N  (a, a) as following:
} (co) = a + Oy/-21ncx!I) (to) sin(27taj2) (to)),
£'2) (®) = a + o^-2 In a f ’ (co) cos(2jtaj2) (m)), i = 1, m.
Approximate method of Gaussian white noise modeling is based on the use of central 
sweeping limit theorem, corollary of which in this case can be expressed as: indepen­
dent random variables a,(co), a2(co), ..., am(co) are distributed identically (uniformly in the
interval [0,1]) with the mathematical expectation M am (co) = ^  and variance Dam (co) =
(conveniently to choose n = 12), so for sufficiently large value m the random variable 
fl2 n j
^„(co) = J —^ ( a t (co)— ) has approximately normal distribution N  (0,1). Sufficient for
V n jt=i 2
most practical applications proximity of distribution £„(a>) to N  (0,1) is achieved already 
when n > 10.
Simulation of stochastic processes with independent increments. Algorithm of 
simulation of random sequences with independent increments follows from its definition. We 
model a sequence of independent random variables ,̂(0 ), i = 1, m (increments) with a given 
distribution (methods described in the previous two paragraphs), and then we get the required 
sequence ti,.(co), / = 1, m with independent increments.
With use of information systems there can be built models and some processes with con­
tinuous time, those that are changing only by jumps. Simulation modeling of such processes
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b reduced to the sequence of points during the simulation time of jumps appearance modeling 
and to the jumps as itself magnitude simulation.
The simplest example is a stochastic process with independent increments, which varies only 
by jumps in nonrandom time moments. Here sequence of points in time 0<x,<x2<... <xt <... 
of jumps occurrence is given (determined), so that we have only simulate a sequence of inde­
pendent increments §,((b), i;2(a>), ^3(ff>), — with a predetermined distribution.
Modeling of random time points sequence 0 < x, < x2 < ... < xt_, < xt < ... at which take 
place jumps of homogeneous Poisson process is based on its property that magnitudes Ax, = x„ 
At, = x2 -  x,, Ai3 = x3 -  x2 and Axt = xt -  xt _, time intervals between jumps are independent 
oodom variables with a single exponential distribution and the parameter X. Magnitude of 
each homogeneous Poisson process 7i(co, t), t e [0,00) jump equals one. Therefore, its model- 
ng  algorithm will look like this: we simulate a sequence of independent random variables 
A t ,, Ax2, ..., Axt , ... of identical exponential distribution with the parameter form a sequence 
of points in time xk = xt_, + Axt , £=1 ,2 ,  3,..., in which there are jumps (x0 = 0); the process
^co, t) and we obtain so: 71(00,0) = 0,jt(co,/) = ,t> 0.
t <1
To build a model of a generalized homogeneous Poisson process it should be modeled 
ly  means of the above mentioned method a simple homogeneous Poisson process -  an 
iadependent sequence of increments ^(co), ^2(co), 43(ra)> — with the specified distribution.
Simulation of Markov processes. Markov process of w-st order is completely deter­
mined by the first m + 1 distribution functions. Therefore, the method of modeling using 
conditional distribution function gives the exact algorithm of Markov’s for the m-st order 
Kquence simulation at the predetermined first m + 1 functions.
Markov’s sequence ,̂(co), i = i, m (of first order), is completely determined by the dis­
tribution function F(x0; 0) of the “initial” state ^(co) and by the function of distribution of 
aae-step transitions F(y; t\x\ t -  1), t = 2, 3,..., m. If these distribution functions are known, 
Ac simulation of Markov sequences 1 = 1, m is made as it shown below.
First, we should model the random variable ,̂(co) (here we get realization y,) with the 
#stribution function F(x,; 1), after that -  random variable ^2(ro), (realization y2) with dis- 
nbution function F(y; 2|y,; 1) (y, -  fixed), then -  the random variables £3(co), ^(a), ^5(ra), 
_  (realizations -  yv y4, y5, ...), respectively, with the distribution functions F(y; 3[y,; 2), 
/?_>- 4\yt; 3), F(y; 5[y,; 4) etc. If 4/®) is no interrupted meaning Markov sequence, then it is entirely 
verified by distribution density function f x Q; 0) of the “initial” state ,̂(co) and by distribution 
density of one-step transitions fly, t\x\ t -  1). Obviously, the core algorithm of the simulation 
t i ling in this case is not changed (for simulation modeling of random variables £,(<b), ^2(e>), 
i ^ e ) , ... with distribution density, r e s p e c t i v e ly \),fly\ 2[y0; 1), p(y, 3 ^  2),p(y; 4[y2; 3).
2.6. Characteristics of information systems reliability 
as of the hardware-software system
Nowadays, research methodology regarding complex technical systems reliability, 
iachiding informational are based on the study of reliability of hardware-software systems
consist of:
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-  hardware facilities constructed from the corresponding elements, components, modules, 
sub-systems of varying complexity and also of diverse nature physical functioning 
(acoustics, nuclear physics, optics, mechanics, radio physics, electronics, geophysics, 
hydromechanics etc.) for a wide range of subject areas use (machinery, transport, energy, 
telecommunication systems etc.);
-  software package, or rather an aggregate of:
• mathematical software in the form of mathematical models, methods and algorithms 
within those the hardware-software systems perform the required tasks in accordance 
with intended purposes;
• ensuring in the forms of databases enabled with controlling functions, the file struc­
tures provided with management systems, the conditionally-permanent constants or 
variable data, the protection devices against unauthorized access (information security 
device), the data input control devices and other devices that determine the formation 
(measurement), training, processing of the various subsystems and hardware-software 
systems operation control in general (position lights, sensors and sensor devices signals, 
control signals etc.);
• software that implements the mathematical provision of hardware-software systems 
and consists of a software system and functional (application) software.
Programming hardware-software systems complex is.also called “soft hardware”. Failures 
of “software” and these errors at the operation of complex software are of no difference from 
the failures of hardware complex. Therefore, the most reasonable approach is when “soft 
hardware” reliability is estimated by the degree of influence on the reliability characteristics 
of the whole hardware-software systems complex. It is very important that the failure of 
hardware instruments and software complex are essentially interrelated events. Examples of 
such interactions can be found in a significant amount. But due to the complexity of this task 
accomplishing, today’s problems of reliability identification characteristics in the hardware- 
software systems have to be done according the following scheme:
-  evaluation of software-hardware complex tools characteristics has to be determined 
separately for each of the complexes as for independent events,
-  principal characteristics of hardware-software system have to be determined by combin­
ing both characteristics of hardware circuit means and soft complex as of independent 
proceedings.
It should be also taken into account the following features of reliability characteristics 
of the hardware-software complex. Namely to characterize the reliability of hardware devices 
it is important to insure the following items:
-  collected large calculation database, experimentally verified by testing and operation in 
similar technical devices, in the systems characterizing reliability along a considerable 
period of time (up to several tens of years),
-  for grounding the characteristics of hardware means reliability it can be used the statisti­
cal data processing method by means of averaging the data obtained at operation and 
service tests on an appropriate number of similar devices,
-  on the time interval the hardware resources operation are “aging” system.
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To characterize the reliability of software system it must be taken into account the fol­
lowing:
-  to identify the software errors there cannot be used the method of statistical averaging, 
because apposite copies of the software reproduce the same error,
-  during testing, commissioning and operation the number of software errors can be de­
tected and then diminished, suggesting to the fact about operation of software system 
as of “revitalized” system,
-  software system has no timing period of wear and in practice it virtually does not contain 
manufacturing errors (of copying).
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3. Factors affecting the information systems 
reliability and failures
This section is related to the analysis of factors, which encompass effects on the perfor­
mance reliability of information systems. The materials reflect significant results gained during 
the last decades of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, experience with technical 
systems of varying complexity in almost all domains of scientific and technological sectors 
of economy. These results can be used at all stages of the information systems life cycle both 
in the study of its reliability characteristics.
Below are presented materials regarding classification of failures and also some illustra­
tive examples of failures formation in information systems [1-7].
3.1. General classification of factors
During the analysis of modem information systems functioning as of hardware-software 
systems it is taken into account the influence of a large number of factors. This section de­
scribes the major factors that affect the operation of such systems.
The major stage factors influencing the systems reliability can be divided into three 
groups [1,4]:
-  at project,
-  at production,
-  at operation,
these emerge at various stages of a system life cycle.
The project stage includes factors the action of which at the design and construction 
stage determines circumstances of subsequent hardware and software failures. These factors 
include the selection of element types (chips base), selection of principles, electrical, hydrau­
lic, structural, logical and other schemes, operational modes of elements choice, adoption of 
designing automatization, selection of programming techniques, manufacturing of parts and 
modules; methodology of manufacturing processes; system functioning software development
Production stage includes factors arising during the production of the systems and 
affecting theirs reliability. These factors include the quality control of materials and items 
received from suppliers, the incoming inspection of components at manufacture, preparation 
and organization of production processes, organization of the set-up process, adjustment of; 
equipment and processes, the.
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Operational stage includes the external affecting factors and activities that earned out 
m equipment maintenance. Depending on the nature of the system all possible external fac­
tors are divided into six groups: mechanical, climatic and other natural, radiation, thermal, 
electromagnetic fields, specific external factors, particularly -  aggressive environs.
To the maintenance regulation activities belong regulation, prophylactic works including 
Kheduled preventive maintenance, the training, the testing, preoperational testing, performance 
■onitoring, collection and analysis of data related failures.
It can be characterized now in detail the major factors affecting the reliability of infor­
mation systems as of a hardware-software system, which include climatic, electrical, elec- 
•omagnetic radiation, shock, vibration, and other factors that affect the software reliability.
3.2. Climatic factors
Climatic conditions influence on the change of work characteristics and parameters of 
■rformation systems mainly due to the environ temperature, pressure and humidity changes.
| Technical, including informational, systems operate in diverse temperature surroundings. 
Seasonal and diurnal variations in temperature T  [°C] in various climatic zones are given in 
T * le3 .1 .
Table 3.1
Seasonal and diurnal temperature r[°C ] variations in diverse climatic zones
Climatic zone Seasonal fluctuations T  [°C] Daily fluctuations T  [°C]
[Desert from -20  to +50 40
' The temperate zone from -20 to +40 25
Arctic zone from -50 to +35 20
These temperature changes also affect the equipment characteristics during its control, 
florage and service.
3.2.1. Characteristics of climatic factors influence
Among the climatic factors are the following: pressure, ambient temperature, humidity 
a f  air and other gases, precipitations, dust and sand, solar radiation (insolation), the flow of 
v  and other gases, corrosive medium with active ingredients including biological milieu 
m i  ice-soil surroundings.
Effects of heat and cold. The action o f these factors is determined with the type of instal- 
fenoo mode (on the ground in residential areas, in a vehicle, in a ship, in an aircraft), climatic 
eaegory of equipment performance, regarding the distance from the external thermal actions.
There are three types of thermal action: continuous, periodic, and aperiodic. The first type 
■faction occurs when operating equipment is installed in residential areas. At stationary condi­
tions thermal influence the damage emerges mainly as a result of the operation at temperature
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values exceeding the maximum allowable. The largest part of ground equipment, ship and 
aircraft is affected by periodic thermal influence. It occurs mostly at intermittent switching 
under load, at sharp fluctuations in operating conditions (deep immersion, at space flights 
conditions, at radiation, at takeoff, flight, landing), at daily changes in ambient temperature. 
Temperature jumps in ground equipment can reach 60°C, for the aviation equipment up to 
80°C. Aperiodic thermal action is observed in the process of rocketry equipment operation 
and at spacecrafts -  at launch and at entering the atmosphere. The result of heat shock can be 
a sudden failure of equipment. High rate of temperature change (thermal shocks) leads to the 
rapid changes (expansion or compression) in the sizes of materials. At elevated temperatures 
the filling materials soften and materials that interact with them expand. At supercooling, in 
contrary, potting materials are compressed at their contacts with the metal start cracking; at 
the output of electric appliances are created volumes not completely filled with materials and 
that increase the likelihood of electrical discharge.
Temperature greatly affects the electrical parameters of the electrical circuit equipment. 
Changing the temperature alter the geometric dimensions, relative positions of the parts of 
constructional and structure elements. This causes a change in the capacitance, inductance and 
electrical resistance, eventually lead to a change in its output parameters and characteristics.
Especially dangerous are temperature transitions “through the zero” (from positive to 
negative values) because the moisture presenting in the gaps and cracks freezes, thus increas­
ing its volume, reducing gaps.
Elevated temperature degrades insulating properties of fillers, straightness and mechanical 
properties of some polymers, leading to deformation of parts. Variation in the characteristics 
and parameters values at temperature change can be reversible or irreversible.
Effects of moisture. Elevated humidity can cause changes in the superficial and volumet­
ric insulation resistance, reducing the electric strength of the material; changing the physical 
properties of materials, theirs density, melting points; resizing and warping individual parts, 
accelerates aging, oxidation and corrosion of materials, reducing resistance to damage by 
fungus, increasing the intensity of wear of coatings, insulation, parts etc. High humidity ac­
celerates the rate of corrosion processes in time, for example, for oxide film formation takes 
place the following equation:
y(t) -  the thickness of the oxide film,
Cp(t) -  concentration of the reactant (water, oxygen, aggressive mediums),
EK(t) -  activation energy of the corrosion process,
R  -  the universal gas constant,
T -  temperature [°C],
kp -  the rate of corrosion processes.
The rate of corrosion processes and the development of cracks do not depend only on 
the humidity and temperature, but also on the quality of materials, construction equipment, 
manufacturing technology and corrosion protection means. Here are some examples.
where:
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1. Copper -  one of the most important materials in electrical engineering and electronics
-  it has good resistance against corrosion. Under the influence of oxygen, carbon dioxide and 
moisture of the air on the surface of solid copper forms a protective layer of copper carbon­
ate. Typically for winding of inductors is used enameled copper wire. In low-quality enamel 
coating often occur cracks. Through these cracks the electrolyte (water) can penetrate into 
contact with metallic copper, which due to current flow, becomes an electrode with a distinct 
polarity and in case of the anodic load metal rapidly passes into solution. Experimentally it 
was established that the service life of the coils at 75% relative humidity make about three 
years, and at the relative humidity of 100% -  only 5 days (at 45°C). It can be noted that in 
Kiev and its environs an average relative humidity almost all year rounds for more than 80% 
and in July and September -  more than 85%.
2. Soldering. Soldering of components is made with tin-lead alloy. At elevated humidity 
and temperature alloys containing less than 60% tin corrode quickly. At low temperatures, 
pure tin or tin alloys with aluminum or zinc are degraded into an amorphous modification. 
Content more than 50% of lead in the alloy prevents this phenomenon, the so-called tin plague.
Humidity most strongly influences the parameters of electronic equipment. To the growth 
of humidity significantly contribute precipitation and sudden changes in temperature. At the 
temperature change in equipment occurs a partial condensation of humidity. The condensed 
moisture fills cracks and leaks in the insulators and coatings, deteriorating its electroinsulating 
properties. The presence of moisture leads to the change of superficial insulation resistance. 
As a result, there occur deviations in the electric parameters due to the emergence of current 
leakage, growth o f electrical circuit capacity and reducing the inductors quality factor.
Effects of moisture on the equipment are mostly irreversible.
The action of sunlight. At operating of equipment outdoors its surface is exposed to 
direct sunlight. Solar radiation is the major source of heat. It greatly depends on climatic 
region, atmospheric circulation and characteristics of the underlying surface. Thus, in the 
sunny areas (Central Asia) the average integrated flux density of the direct -  S and sum­
mary -  Q solar radiation at 12:30 A.M. regardless to the clouding had reached in June, 
S = 719 W/m2, Q = 900 W/m2; in September S = 824 W/m2, Q = 810 W/m2. The same month 
m die north Russia these characteristics were: June, S = 356 W/m2, Q = 537 W/m2, September, 
S = 377 W/m2, Q = 349 W/m2. The occurrence of maximum positive temperature is directly 
related to the level of solar radiation.
Effects of solar radiation on the variety of equipment is determined by the length of 
&e electromagnetic waves that reach its surface and radiation balance distribution, taking 
into account the receipt and outgo of solar radiation energy. The ultraviolet waves part 
of the spectrum accounts for about 9% o f solar radiation energy, the visible part of the 
spectrum -  nearly 41%, the infrared waves -  approximately 50%. The presence of clouds 
reduces the amount o f solar energy reaching the Earth by about 75% compared to bright 
<iays. Thus, measurement o f surface heat flux radiation density at various total cloud 
coverage, which was held in Odessa in the summer months, has shown the following: at 
h e  height o f the Sim o f 44.9° the flow varies from 784 W/m2 during cloudless weather 
a> 259 W/m2 at the thick cloud coverage and at the height of the Sun 9° -  respectively, 
from 126 W/m2 to 42 W/m2.
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Integral heat flux is a function of an altitude, at altitude of 15 km it makes 1,125 W/m2, 
including ultraviolet part -  42 W/m2, and at an altitude of more than 15 km -  1,380 W/m2 
and 100 W/m2 respectively.
The presence of dust and water vapor in the air significantly reduces the heat flux of solar 
radiation. The most severe effects on materials and equipment are provided by the sunlight 
falling perpendicular to the surface. Land is a poor conductor of heat, so the solar radiation 
affects mostly the temperature of the upper surface layer. Here is an example to illustrate 
this statement: while the morning temperature at the surface of the asphalt and at the ground 
slightly away from the asphalt and at 30 and 120 cm above the ground was 30°C, then at 
15:00 the temperature at the surface of the asphalt grows up to 52°C and at 30 and 120 cm 
above up to 43°C and 40°C respectively, while at the ground away from the asphalt -  only up 
to 34°C.
The major factor of solar radiation action on the surface of an appliance is a heating of 
device apparatus casing and the consequent rise of temperature inside the appliance. Heat 
absorbed by the upper cover lid is emitted into the device and reaches the bottom surface of 
the casing, which then gives off the heat to the ground. After reaching thermal equilibrium 
there can be calculated the extent of heating of a black case jacket with the sunlight for dif­
ferent geographical latitudes. Calculations show that the temperature at the lid and bottom of 
a casing at 4° latitude they can reach 81°C and 64°C respectively, and at latitude of 60° some 
64°C and 52°C. A color o f painting of a device casing into appropriate colors can reduce its 
heating, compared to the blackbody surface onto 10-15°C.
Material damages by sunlight can be divided into photolytic and photooxidative. Pho- 
tolytic processes occur at such radiation frequency when the photon energy is sufficient to 
break up the intermolecular bonds. The simultaneous action of oxygen and moisture create 
via photooxidative processes a greater damage effect. Ultraviolet irradiation activates the 
metals surfaces and can eventually lead to corrosion.
The energy of ultraviolet irradiation is strong enough to break the chemical bonds be­
tween carbon and hydrogen. Consequently, polyethylene, ethyl cellulose, lacquers and paints 
become brittle and lose strength, which eventually leads to the failure of a device.
Pressure. Operating at Earth surface technical devices should maintain reliability and 
the specified performance at changing air pressure in the range from 550 to 1,080 hPa. The 
upper limit corresponds to the pressure at sea leveL, the lower -to the pressure, designed for 
maximum height (4.6 km), at which may proceed the use, storage and transportation of techni­
cal devices. With increase the altitude decreases dielectric strength of air, so that it is needed 
to reduce the allowable values of breakdown voltage in the electrically insulated items. The 
coefficient of relative electric strength in air gaps relative to the electric strength at 1 km is
0.9 at altitude 2 km; 0.62 at altitude 5 km; 035 at altitude 10 km and 0 .10 -  at altitude 20 km.
Effect of atmospheric pressure is mainly manifested at its influence on the hardware 
installed in non-hermetic compartments (blocks) o f u p b u s .  The influence of atmospheric 
pressure depends on the altitude of the airplane. With die change in pressure changes the insu­
lating properties of air and the dielectric constant, »inch safcsequotth leads to the change in 
electrical capacity of air-filled capacitors as wefl as in the characteristics of other elements, in 
which air is used as an insulator. With decrease o f presa ge daaicnce the cooling surroundings
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af elements, as well as reduces the heat transfer efficiency due to convection. This leads to 
&e overheating of elements, especially at elevated altitudes.
Effects of pressure on the equipment characteristics can be reversible and irreversible. In 
many cases dominates the reversible process. For example, with the airplane mounting to an 
altitude where the pressure decreases sharply it can be observed arcing, breakdown of equip­
ment elements, changing frequency of klystrons generation etc. With decrease of height the 
settings of equipment restored.
Effects of sand and dust. Action of sand and dust degrade the appearance of the 
> equipment. Dust and sand get into lubricants and stick to the surface of protection layers. As 
a result, there increased binding or “dead fly” in the bearings (printers, drivers etc.). A thin 
layer of soot absorbs gases, such as sulphurous, that act on the equipment destructively. An- 
: «her type dust, which is caked, contributes to the accumulation of moisture and reduces 
■ resistance of insulation. Deposition of dust facilitates the emergence of leakage currents in 
j the solid insulating materials. Characteristic damage which is caused by dust is a bad opera- 
! tkm of switching contacts. About 40% of all equipment damage is due to not good enough 
\ fimctioning of contacts.
Effects of biological factors. Most dangerous among biological factors is the effect of 
Bold on the insulation materials based on organic (glass press pan, textolite, vulcanized fiber 
dc.). Under the action of molds there decreases mechanical strength of materials and devices 
containing them. Mould fungi often grow in the devices that are stored in dusty areas. In the 
mold damaged electronic equipment which has the printing, registration and other devices it 
becomes possible a malfunction of electrical connections. Effects of organic acids secreted 
by mold accelerate contacts corrosion. The damage by a mold often begins at cotton braid 
cord cable connections and then it spreads onto the wire with silk lacquer insulation.
The biological surrounding most strongly influences the electronic equipment of aircraft 
during storage, especially outside the hangars, at airfields. Warm and humid ambiance leads 
to the mold or fungal covering of equipment.
In some cases, on the equipment at storage may also affect insects, such as termites, 
red ants and others. Among most dangerous rodents are rats, mice, squirrels etc., damaging 
the insulation. The biological medium often leads to irreversible changes in the electronic 
equipment characteristics.
The action of wind and ice. On the equipment located outdoors act wind and ice. At icing 
is increased size and weight of equipment, which leads to the aerodynamics and mechanical 
stress growth. Assessment the influence of ice and wind process, which is caused by random 
meteorological factors, can be made according probabilistic and statistical methods. The study 
of statistical relationships between the equivalent icing thickness and maximum wind speeds 
have shown that they are insignificant and the correlation coefficients are close to zero. The 
distributions of these random variables are well described by the laws of distribution such 
as by Weibull.
Classification by climatic regions. Taking into account the external factors affecting the 
reliability requirements and system operation conditions normalizing there were differentiated 
macroclimatic areas and systems -  namely they were divided onto climatic regions and types 
of premises for the hardware operation.
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There are four microclimatic zones: cold, moderate, hot and dry tropical. There are 
moderately warm, humid (Lviv, Temopil), moderately warm with wet winters (Odessa, 
Kherson, Nikolaev).
Classification of climatic equipment performance according the type of premises. It
were distinguished 5 categories of systems for operation in premises of different types: 1 -  the 
systems designed to work outdoors, on open air, 2 -  the systems designed to operate indoors, 
3 -  systems designed for operation in enclosed spaces with natural ventilation, 4 -  the systems 
designed to operate in areas with artificially regulated climatic conditions, and 5 -  the sys­
tems designed to operate in areas with high humidity (e.g., unventilated underground areas).
Climatic design of equipment classification by the type of climatic regions. Distin­
guished are ten classes of devices by the types o f climatic regions: L, XL, P H L - for climatic 
regions with temperate, cold, and moderately cold climates, T, TV -  climatic regions of tropi­
cal and humid tropical average temperatures, O -  for all regions, M -  for the ships working 
in areas with moderate to moderately cold climates, TM -  for ships operating in areas with 
tropical climates, Y -  for all areas; OM -  for unrestricted navigation areas.
3.2.2. Hardware protecting from climatic influences
Security of equipment can be done in two modes: selection of high quality materials and 
components and the use of special means of protection. Relation between them is determined 
by the mass-size device characteristics, with the requirements for reliability, performance 
cost and other factors. At choosing of protection it can be used highly hygroscopic materials 
that tend to concentrate moisture. Therefore its surface must be as airtight as possible. These 
requirements meet mostly thermoplastic materials.
The majority of faults and failures at the operation of equipment occur at the contacts 
o f  different metals and metals with plastics. Therefore, a reliable method of its protection is 
a utilizing of suitable and exclusion of improper contacts. In the common manuals for equip­
ment manufacture normally are specified acceptable and unacceptable contacts of various 
materials and their alloys in medium, tough and very demanding environs.
From corrosion contacts are protected with electrical insulation (electrical disconnec­
tion) of contacting metals; by electrochemical methods (cathode protection and protective 
anodic coating); excluding or reducing the aggressive action of corrosive media (introduction 
of inhibitors, desalination, deoxygenating). Contacts should be positioned where operating 
conditions are less aggressive, where absents both effect of electrolyte and periodic wetting.
Electrochemical protection against contact corrosion is used in cases when it is possible 
to carry out electrical separation of the contacting metals with the help of active metals protec­
tors (magnesium alloys, zinc, steel, aluminum alloys and zinc) attached to the contact pair.
Equipment protection from combination o f  moisture and heat is one of the major mea­
sures for reliability ensuring at the equipment designing stage. Methods of such protection 
are varied. To attain a protection level close to absolute are used various hermetic devices 
housings. Methods of protection of metallic elements are provided by exclusion of corro­
sion, and one of the simplest methods is grinding and polishing of surfaces. The same goal is 
achieved by blocking the chemical reaction between metal and media, using anodic coating,
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electrochemical potential of which is lower than of basic metal (e.g. for steel parts is used 
the three-layer coating: copper-nickel-chromium) also in use are lacquer paint coatings. To 
coat electronic components widely used are epoxy and silicone varnishes and enamels. They 
possess high electroinsulating properties, are moisture resistant and can operate at elevated 
temperatures. In radio engineering practice in use is also a number of methods for moisture 
protection: surface hydrophobization; soaking with insulating materials, impregnation with 
resin and epoxy compounding and vacuum hermetization.
One of the major methods to protect equipment from damage by mold is a chemical 
method -  the usage of special toxic compounds such as fungicides, i.e. substances that kill 
mold and fungistatic substances to prevent mold growth. Inorganic fungicides are salts of 
copper, mercury, zinc, and chromium. Organic fungicides are mostly chlorinated phenol and 
■itrophenol. Organometallic fungicides are compounds of copper, zinc, mercury.
3.3. Electrical, electromagnetic and radiation factors
Electrical modes of operation can change characteristics of electronic equipment due to 
iie  changes in supply voltages, in current loads, in electrical input signals changing, and so on. 
Electrical equipment running modes at the equipment operation change in a relatively large range.
At operating of electronic equipment may emerge fluctuations in the supply voltage, up 
to ± 10-15%, as well as changing the shape of the variable voltage curve -  with clear factor 
: op to 15%. Levels of signal input of receivers may vary in tens, hundreds or more times. The 
dependence of the apparatus parameters from change of supply voltages and signal levels 
b  determined by the presence of nonlinear elements in the equipment. Changes in electric 
regimes, as a rule, lead to reversible changes in the equipment characteristics.
Electromagnetic interference into operational conditions gives rise to fluctuations in the 
dectronic equipment characteristics.
The sources of electromagnetic fields are various industrial electrical installations, light- 
■gs, radio stations radiation, electrostatic discharges that occur at electrisation during air 
fiction against lining of aircraft etc.
Particularly strong effect of electromagnetic disturbances is manifested at their direct 
irfuence on the input of amplifying devices. It changes the amplifying gain and distorts the 
received signals.
The influence of electromagnetic interference usually results into reversible changes in 
i Ac electronic devices characteristics.
Nuclear radiation -  one of the worst acting factors that affect the parameters of electronic 
■pipment. Changes of equipment characteristics largely depend on the type of radiation (ir- 
ndiation by neutrons or gamma rays) and on the intensively of irradiation.
At the action of nuclear radiation sharply decreases insulation resistance. In electrolytic 
opacitors exposed to radiation changes the structure of electrolyte.
At irradiation with fast neutrons inside germanium and silicon diodes and triodes, photo 
resistors, thermistors etc. occurs displacement of atoms in the crystal lattice. Resistors with 
Ugh resistance (over 108 ohms) at irradiation fundamentally change their characteristics.
a) irreversible changes that take b) reverse changes that take c) mixed change, remaining
place when exposed place with the exposure some time period after
to a certain dose of irradiation and stops with its termination exposure
Fig. 3.1. Diagrams (a-c) of materials characteristics change x(t) over time when exposed to nuclear 
radiation: 1 -  pulse irradiation, 2 -  changes in the substances
Changes in materials x(t) over time when exposed to nuclear radiation occur in three 
modes:
-  irreversible changes that take place when exposed to a certain dose of irradiation
(Fig. 3.1a),
-  reverse changes that take place with the exposure and stops with its termination (Fig. 3.1b),
-  mixed change, remaining some time period after exposure (Fig. 3.1c).
Often all three types of change take place simultaneously.
3.4. Shock-vibration factors
Mechanical effects are caused by shocks and vibrations that occur during the operation 
of equipment, the sources of mechanical stress can be fans, mechanical switches, pulse rate 
monitors and other mechanical and electromechanical equipment. The major source of vibra­
tion during a flight is an aircraft engine.
In aircrafts occur vibrations with a frequency from units of Hz up to several kHz. The 
highest change of settings in electronic equipment emerges at resonance conditions in blocks, 
in electro vacuum elements, in semiconductor devices and micromodules. In practice, the 
resonance frequencies of the blocks are in the range of 5-20 Hz, at elements of electronic 
tubes -  0.3-1.5 kHz, at elements of semiconductor devices and micromodules -  unites of 
kHz. At the resonance emergence on electronic equipment construction can affect overload­
ing 15-20 g.
Effect of mechanical stress leads to a formation of accidental variable contacts, to change 
of geometrical dimensions and relative positioning of components which causes deviations 
in capacitance and inductance of an installation.
In most cases mechanical effects lead to the reversible changes.
Vibration loads are divided into random and nonrandom. Accidental loads, in turn, are 
periodic and non-periodic and random loads -  stationary or non-stationary.
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3.4.1. Characteristics of vibration factors
The real vibrations are those which can be described by the classical functions: harmonic, 
<pasiharmonic with continuous change in frequency within a broadband or narrowband ran­
dom process. Quasiharmonic vibration with a continuous change in frequency occurs during 
acceleration and slowing down the mechanisms with rotating parts. Broadband random vibra- 
noa is an idealization of random vibration which affects the equipment at actual operation. 
Narrowband random vibration occurs at vibrations of elastic systems under the influence of 
fcroadband vibration.
Shock loads are divided into non-random (periodic and nonperiodic) and random. Periodic 
dbock satisfies condition x(t) = x(t + kT), k=  1,2, 3,..., T -  repetition period.
By the form shocks can be rectangular, sinusoidal, cosinusoidal, saw-tooth alike and 
complex form shock loads. The above mentioned forms of influence are determined by the 
: dependence of acceleration.
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«here:
x0 -  the peak value of acceleration, 
t  -  the time length of impact.
Characteristics of shock-vibration factor are determined at taking into account equipment 
operating conditions classification. According such criterions all diversity of technical equip­
ment can be divided into five classes: ground equipment, marine (ship) technique, airborne 
aviation electronics and rocketry and space technology. The levels of shock-vibration loads 
depend on the type of carrier equipment and the location of its accommodation on a car­
rier. All objects of ground equipment, depending on the operating conditions, can be divided 
iato stationary, moving and those that are vehicle borne. Moving objects can be wheeled or 
Backed. The causes of equipment vibration on a mobile carrier are shaky gadgets in construc­
tion, vibration of engine, road surface roughness.
Vibration acceleration m • s-2 can vary from 10-20 m • s-2 at the springing vibrations at 
driving on the road with a smooth surface at a speed o f90-120 km/h up to 300-400 m • s-2 at 
non springed vibrations when driving on cobbler-stone roads at a speed of 45-75 km/h. Me­
chanical shocks have the following characteristics: repeated blows actions give peak shock 
acceleration up to 1,500 m • s-2 with action duration 2-5 ms, a single action shocks have peak 
acceleration up to 30,000 m • s'2, duration up to 5 ms. Ground equipment that is placed on 
die trucks or on caterpillar type tractors experience acceleration at strikes up to 1,000 m • s"2, 
located on the panzers -  1,500 m • s-2.
At designing of equipment which is placed on the earth moving vehicle is used the clas­
sification of the International Electrotechnical Commission by Mechanical Conditions (Tab. 3.2).
In marine engineering equipment on ships of small tonnage are carried on vibration 
frequencies up to 2,000 Hz, amplitude of 1-2.5 mm and acceleration at collisions up to 
500 m ■ s-2. The ships of large tonnage generate vibration up to 60 Hz, amplitude 0.5-2.5 mm 
and at collisions acceleration up to 1,500 m • s-2.
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Table 3.2
Groups o f mechanical requirements of vehicles classification and levels
External influencing factors
Class
5M1 5M2 5 \13
Sinysoidal vibration: 1.5 3.3 7.5
-  amplitude o f displacement [mm] 5 10,15 20,40
-  amplitude o f acceleration 2-9 2-9 2-8




Stationary random vibration: 0.3, 0.1 1,0.3 3,1
-  density o f the acceleration [m • s'2] 10-200 10-200 10-200
-  frequency range [Hz] 200-500 200-500 200-500
Non-stationary random vibration, including shock
-  impact range of deviation type 1 peak accelera­
tion [m • s"2] 50 100 300
-  impact range o f deviation type 2 peak accelera­
tion [m • s“2] 300 100
During the facilities development and manufacturing are to be assigned the so-called 
“normal” operating conditions:
-  temperature +25 ± 10°C,
-  relative humidity 60 ± 20%,
-  relative mechanical loads etc.
In the apparatus of aviation equipment take place vibration frequencies up to 200 Hz 
with amplitude about 1 mm at aircrafts with piston engine, 500 Hz and 0.5 mm at turboprop 
aircraft, up to 2,000 Hz and 0,025 mm in the jets. Shock accelerations (up to 500 m • s~2) are 
about the same for all types of aircraft. During takeoff and landing the apparatus encompasses 
considerable overload. Thus, the vibrations in the jets are created by sound frequency vibra­
tions caused by jet flow and fuel combustion turbulence, having the following characteristics: 
500-10,000 Hz frequency, amplitude at frequencies 500 Hz up to 0,025 mm. The major source 
of vibration at items of missile technology is the work of a rocket engine, control system 
and aerodynamic effects. Rocket engines operating on liquid fuel create a vibration with 
a frequency of several hundred Hz and acceleration up to 500 m • s~2. Stronger vibration is 
exposed to equipment, which is located nearer the engine. At the moment of launch and the 
stages separation the shock levels reach 5,000 m • s'2.
3.4.2. The effects of mechanical stresses
There are two mechanisms of mechanical loads actions influencing the equipment reli­
ability. The mechanism of first type is characterized by the absence of disturbances accumula­
tion. During any time a definite option is a function of the current state of the equipment and
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a  is independent of the preceding background of operation. The major feature of the second 
type mechanism is the existence of disturbances effects accumulation, such as an accumula­
tion of fatigue damage in the assembly of equipment.
At assessing the first type mechanical stress effects are used methods for no inertial 
fractional transformation of random processes.
At assessing the effects of second type mechanical stress, probability of equipment failure 
is determined as a probability of fatigue breakage caused by periodic variable loads with the 
known parameters or as the complex dependences of the stress in the materials on time. At 
die same time there actively used the results o f materials fatigue tests.
3.4.3. Protecting equipment from exposure to mechanical stress
For the protection against mechanical stress are widely used special vibroinsulation de­
vices -  vibroinsulators, installed between the appliance and the vibrating support. By the nature 
of protection from the applied external loads are distinguished active and passive insulations.
If  a unit itself is the source of fluctuations, from which it is needed to isolate a support­
ing base, then it is defined as an active isolation. If it is desirable to protect the device from 
vibrating support -  it is passive isolation. Means of isolation in both cases are the same, but 
the requirements for vibroinsulations are different, depending of the nature of the applied 
external loads and the kind of enforced oscillations.
Vibration protection measures during operation and during transportation are different. At 
transportation the equipment can be subjected to dynamic loads. In this case, the vibroinsula- 
tors are needed to provide protection of equipment from accidental bumps and jolts of large 
amplitude. In such case vibroinsulator must meet serious demands to weaken accidental bumps 
and shocks of large amplitude. Attenuation of shock loads as of sudden impulses, in which 
develops acceleration values to tens of thousands of milliseconds in the minus second degree 
is achieved by using of specialized vibroinsulators. At vibroinsulator designing or selecting 
it must be taken into account the fact that more deforming is vibroinsulator (vibroinsulator 
softer), less acceleration shock acquires the apparatus.
The effectiveness of vibroisolation depends on the damping factor and on the ratio of 
excitatory and natural vibration frequencies. Equipment construction may have its own oscil­
lations frequency, which is different from the frequency of excitatory shock.
3.5. Factors affecting the reliability of software
Information systems that consist of software- hardware facilities use various functional 
software systems that can be classified as software systems with long duration of use. The 
magnitude of functional capacity of software system may vary over a wide range (from 
a few thousand to several million instructions). It allows modification, duplication, can be 
documented as industrial products and therefore it is the correspondent software.
The life cycle of functionally software systems, including the modifications may reach 
10-20 years, therefore these systems are considered as highly reliable. Namely the cycle
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consists of four major stages: system analysis and pre-defined preparation, design (develop­
ment), operation and maintenance. To the last two stages belong 70-90% of the life cycles 
time. During the system analysis and at the pre-defined preparation are determined the pur­
pose and basic functional performances of the software system, evaluated the effectiveness 
of its possible applications, established requirements for reliability and forms a concretized 
technical specification for its development
The major factors that determine the occurrence o f errors in software development and 
affect the reliability of the functional complex software are as following.
1. The scale and complexity of the systems of automated processing and management 
as a result of the diversity of objectives and management criteria, the influence of 
the feedback loop in the control circuit onto dynamic performance, the complexity of 
temporal characteristics, the dynamics of changes of some data measurement accuracy, 
large volumes of treated and transmitted information, versatility and variety of modes;
2. Inability of confident prediction of calculations accuracy, time of reaction on the change 
from the outside, the degree of influence of surrounded (especially informational) milieu 
on the results of functional software operation;
3. The intricacy of specialists of various professions communication involved in the de­
velopment of common requirements and their interpretations of special requirements 
regarding informational, mathematical and programming media.
Years of experience of various groups of highly skilled software developers (software) 
for hardware-software systems (information systems) has shown that if there has been made 
any kind of error at this stage then it will significantly reduce the functional reliability of 
a software system. Errors at the development of software requirements and its structure 
selection are major faults that possess considerable persistence at all stages of the life cycle 
and also engages a property to change largely the structure of the software at the trials to 
remove these faults.
At the design phase of software it could be selected the following steps:
-  development and debugging of algorithms,
-  implementation of algorithms in a programming language,
-  debugging of modules, blocks of software and system functional software as a whole 
(integrated debugging),
-  creating documentation for software.
The major factors that determine the correctness of programs, and therefore, the level 
of reliability of software design are as following.
1. Technology ofdevelopment, including programming technology. At technologies vari­
ants selecting should prefer options for the enforcement of various simulation (computational) 
experiments for debugging software still on the stage of algorithms development. Significant 
influence on the accuracy of programming have methodological factors that are provided by 
design technology, the level of mastering and actual applicability of the software team at the 
designing process. At algorithms and mathematical software developing it is important to 
have the object management model. This allows conducting active computation modeling 
experiments for debugging software even before creating the actual control algorithm.
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2. Structural ordering o f  programs and data. Structuring of software and its hierarchy in 
the block diagram, standardization of software structure units (modules) and variables help to 
reduce the number of errors during software development. The size of each software module 
at the autonomous modular development must meet the requirements of correct designing 
of complex functional software systems, particularly from the standpoint of programming 
methodology.
3. Level o f  and design and testing automation. Faultless systems of functional soft­
ware system automatic design include a set of programming languages, compilers, tools 
for monitoring and verification of programs, advanced tools for conduction of planning 
and debugging, particularly languages of debugging, means of software documentation, 
specifications and programming software tools: operating environ, programming languages, 
software means for processes dynamics modeling in the controls object, signal generators and 
other simulators of outer surroundings, high performance computing networks. Computer- 
aided systems for software programming are not only the means o f speeding up the design 
process, but also the means of ensuring a high level of accuracy of applications since they 
use a programming language of higher level compared with direct programming which 
use problem-oriented languages. Automated software programming system also makes 
it possible to conduct operations with more efficient debugging and to modify programs 
where detected errors.
4. Choosing methods and criteria fo r  debugging. Multi-staging and structurization 
of debugging process enhances its effectiveness and reduces the amount of residual errors 
in the software design. An important factor is also the presence of debugging programs at 
each stage, choice and a clear formulation the debugging completion stages criteria as well 
as documentation for the processes and the debugging results, while also keeping up to the 
technologies of programs modification to eliminate design errors.
5. Creation o f  instrumental milieu as close as possible to realistic. Creating such a mi­
lieu, which is essentially a test software control module, plays a significant role at all stages 
of debugging since it allows tracing at the run of active computer numerical experiments, 
some types of errors that can be detected only during real operation while the consequences 
of such errors are certainly serious.
6. Organizational and human factors. This group of factors includes the number and 
expertise of specialists, the team structure and organizational interaction within it. The ef­
ficiency of such group is surely difficult to quantify, therefore it’s is often used qualitymeric 
methods and expert opinions according a certain scale. It includes assessment of technical 
capabilities (knowledge, skills), level of initiative, degree of responsibility of programmers, 
parameters of results, degree of comfort at working conditions, taking into account the 
recommendations on the programmer psychology. In addition, the programmers interaction 
should be considered within the team performing common tasks, the degree of parallel-
j ism of development, role of project manager and executives at other levels in operational 
planning and performance evaluating, understandable organization, overall task of software 
development splitting into independent modules, an evaluation of technological stages of 
the development completion.
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At the operational stage of software design reliability defining characteristics are com­
pleteness and accuracy of specifications; noise proof programs level, detection, diagnosis 
and documentation of abnormalities in the functioning of algorithms specific to the actual 
conditions, software function safe response for a deflection of algorithm (rejections, mal­
function), full documentation of each change in programs caused by design errors that were 
detected. Direct consequence of the factors that complete the design stage and affect the 
reliability of software is the level of programming languages grade, programs adjusting and 
completeness of testing. Degree of these factors influence depends on the quality of design 
and debugging duration.
During support of programs are eliminated detected design errors and also the er­
rors found during testing and debugging of software, programs are copied, adapted to the 
configuration of technical means in the new versions of system software, expanding the 
software complex functions. The major factor affecting the reliability or function of the 
software during this stage is its adaptation to the complex functional software upgrading 
in correlation with the expanded functions, compliance with the changes in configuration 
and other characteristics of hardware system; the complexity of the programs modification; 
effectiveness of upgrading control, programs modifications, status of the versions, their 
reproduction and operation.
It should be noted that during the software operation, as far as its errors are removed, 
relates them to the so-called “getting -  young” systems, while the hardware at operation 
refers to as the “aging” systems.
3.6. Sources of formation and failure modes of systems
Changes that occur in time and space in any technological, including information sys­
tems lead to the loss of its efficiency due to external and internal sources of energy influence 
which act on the system during its operation. Concerning the effects of factors changing the 
reliability of the system, which were described in the previous sections of this chapter, there 
are three major sources of influence:
-  energy of the environ action, including human, which serves as the operator and repair­
man,
-  internal energy associated with workflows that occur in the system,
-  accumulation of potential energy of materials from which is made the system.
A variety of forms of energy (mechanical, thermal, chemical, electromagnetic, nuclear 
etc.), which run in the system, induce within its constituent links and modules processes that 
change items state and properties of materials, that causes a change in their characteristics 
and parameters. These processes are associated usually with complex physical and chemical 
phenomena and lead to deformation, wear and other types of damage (deviation of control 
properties from their initial levels). The accumulation of such damage, in turn, leads to changes 
in initial system quality characteristics, which eventually lead to a failure.
Processes that reduce the efficiency of the system, by the value of its flow rate can be 
divided into three groups.
106
1. Fleeting processes have such changes periodicity that makes a small time fraction 
during the system operating cycle. These might include:
-  vibration of parts and components,
-  friction forces changes in moving joints,
-  fluctuations in the level of operation, including electric, mode loads and other processes
that change or make obstacles to the full-time duty cycle of a system.
2. Processes of medium speed, characterized with a periodicity which is compared with 
the duration of the system operating cycle. They lead to a monotonic change in the system 
characteristic output. These may include: reverse processes of thermal deformation caused 
by energy dissipation as workflows and daily fluctuations at ambient temperature.
The reverse processes (in contrary to irreversible) temporarily change the system char­
acteristics output without progressive deterioration trend. It should be noted that in some 
cases reversible processes can initiate irreversible process that leads to damage accumulation.
3. Slow process is characterized by periodicity, which is compared with the duration of 
the overhaul period. They are:
-  processes of parts wear,
-  redistribution of internal stresses in details due to the materials aging process,
-  creep of materials,
-  corrosion processes,
-  elements surface contamination.
Common methods to combat the effects of slow processes are periodic repairs and 
maintenance.
Damage and defects. Here we consider the damages and defects in the information 
systems classification. It is known that there is a following definition.
Damage -  an incident that at the serviceable state of the system the disturbance still 
residues at its operation.
Types of objects damages, its components and corresponding failures can be divided 
into two groups.
1. Allowable damages occur during normal operation in a number of cases. Eliminate 
this type of damage is impossible, but it can be taken measures to slow down their emerging.
2. Not allowable damage outcomes from the presence of defects or random uncontrol­
lable external factors that nondirectly related to the technical condition of the system under 
consideration (accidents, natural disasters etc.).
As a defect is understood every single discrepancy to the system established normative 
or design (project) documentation requirements, which reduce this system level of reliability.
It should be noted that the system which has a defect may be in working condition. The 
shortcoming is considered as a possible cause of failure, but the defect does not mean that 
a failure had occurred.
According the stage of origin, defects can be divided into three groups.
1. Defects (errors) o f  projecting. These might include:
-  presence of stress concentrators in the details,
-  incorrect calculation of basic details strength,
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-  wrong choice of materials,
-  incorrect definition of operational loads etc.
2. Defects o f  manufacturing (production). These include defects of:
-  components,
-  machining,
-  assembling of units, modules, subsystems during the creation of the system.
3. Defects o f  operation. These might include:
-  breach in applications,
-  incorrect maintenance and repair,
-  existence of different, varying intensity and unexpected loads,
-  use of substandard performance components.
We may consider one of the most important concepts in the fundamentals of information 
systems reliability -  failures.
3.7. Classification of failures
In the reliability basics of information systems included classification of failures accord­
ing the following number of features.
1) Nature o f  failure occurrence'.
-  reason fo r  refusal -  circumstances during design, manufacture or system use, which led 
to a failure;
-  failure mechanism, failure occurrence characteristics -  physical, chemical or other 
process that led to a rejection.
2) Nature o f  failure considerations:
-  accounted failure -  failure that has to be accounted in the explanatory note about testing, 
operation or calculative reliability values consequences; there also should be considered 
the criteria for failures accounting;
-  unaccounted failure -  refusal, which shall be excluded from the explanatory note of the 
testing consequences, operation and calculation of values of reliability; there should be 
set the criteria of such failure removal.
3) Nature o f  system characteristics changes until the commencement offailure:
-  sudden failure -  refusal that impossible to predict at the prior studies or at technical 
inspection;
-  phasing failure -  failure caused by gradual changes in the values of one or more sys­
tem characteristics. Phasing failure can be foreseen at initial examining or at technical 
inspection, sometimes it can be prevented at maintenance proceedings.
4) Opportunities o f  subsequent system use after failure occurrence:
-  partial failure -  refusal that results in the inability of a system to conduct a part of the 
required functions;
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-  complete failure -  refusal that leads to complete inability of the system to implement 
any of the required functions.
5) Communication between system failures'.
-  dependant failure -  refusal of a system directly or indirectly caused by a failure or by 
malfunction of other system;
-  independent failure -  refusal of a system not caused directly or indirectly by a refusal 
or failure of another system.
6) Availability o f  failure external manifestations:
-  an obvious failure -  refusal which is manifested visually or by an authorized method o f  
monitoring and diagnosing at preparation o f  a system to operation or in the course 
o f its intended use;
-  hidden failure -  refusal that cannot be detected visually or by regular methods of monitor­
ing and diagnosis, but diagnosed at operation, at maintenance or by the special methods 
of diagnosis.
7) Causes o f  failure:
-  engineering failure -  refusal, caused by imperfections or connivance of the set rules and 
(or) design standards and construction of systems;
-  production failure -  refusal caused by a mismatch of productions to its design or to the 
norms of the production process;
-  degradedfailure -  refusal, caused by degradation processes in the system, subjected but 
to all the rules and (or) the standards of design, construction and operation that were 
executed;
-  rejection because overload- failure caused at using in the system some loads that exceed 
its established capacity;
-  rejection due to incorrect handling -  failure caused by improper or careless system use;
-  rejection as a result o f  fragility -  failure caused by frailty of the system, when the load 
on system does not exceed the system installed capacity.
8) Ability to eliminate failure:
-  systematic refusal -  refusal, clearly linked to a specific reason, which can be resolved 
only after modification the project or production process, rules of operation, documenta­
tion and other factors that are taken into account;
-  malfunction -  self-healing refusal or one-time refusal, which can be eliminated at opera­
tor intervention;
-  repetitive refusal -  self-healing refusal the same nature that occurs repeatedly.
9) Severity o f  failure:
-  resource refusal -  failure at which the system reaches the critical condition;
-  critical failure -  refusal that by estimations can result in personal injury or substantial 
property damage or other negative consequences.
Continuing further classification of failures, we can note the following.
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In the technical systems reliability publications terminology are used terms “parameter”, 
“characteristics” of system performance or reliability and also “reliability index”. In this paper, 
these terms have the following interpretation:
-  parameter o f  performance or reliability o f the system, which changes over time, is 
a corresponding function of time, and is referred to as the characteristic o f  perfor­
mance or reliability, and at a fixed time t value of the characteristic parameter it can 
be called relevantly parameter of operation or reliability. In other words, the term 
“parameter” in the theory of reliability of engineering systems is of limited meaning as 
an independent term, while more methodologically sound is the term “characteristic”, 
which reflects the functional change of a parameter in general case and in time and 
space;
-  reliability index is a well known common term (interpretation of which is quite practical, 
but at the same time it has no scientific justification for implementation in mathemati­
cal or technical terminology) and used as functional value, defined in the space of time 
reliability characteristics functions, and determined by the corresponding integral or 
differential operator.
It is known that the technical arrangements of hardware information systems are described 
by a large number of parameters and characteristics. Reliability functions of such facilities 
constitute a subset of them to possess specific properties. One of these features is character­
istic of failures formation (accumulation) in the investigated technical facility. This may be 
an element, link, module, unit, and in some cases the entire technical system. In the follow­
ing description such characteristic will be described generally by a random process A(at, t). 
For each examined case such general model will be specified closely. Implementation of 
a random process A(a, t) at fixed w = co, random event co e  Q from the space of elementary 
events Q will be defined as A(a>, ?)/co = co, =A(t), and at fixed time moment t = t{ we will 
have a random variable i;,(co).
In order to illustrate better the overall process of system or some of its constituents 
(components, assemblies, parts, modules, devices etc.) failure forming, according to one of 
the areas of reliability study in Figure 3.2 we present the following algorithm scheme that 
reflects the operation control sequence over the system operation characteristic A(t) changing 
as the failures formation characteristic.
The following graphs of realizations A(t) of process A(00, t) are illustrative, but they 
reflect the dynamics, the nature of changes and are confirmed by actual results of technical 
means research during operation.
Progressive (worn out) failures result from the gradual process of damage that leads 
to progressive deterioration of the system characteristics output. An example of such 
change implementation for the process A(t) is illustrated on graph in Figure 3.3, where 
td -  time of failure, and AmdX -  the value of characteristic A(t), at which had happened the 
refusal.
Thus, it is accepted, that the major feature of phasing failure formation is monotonic 
increase of process of failures characteristic dependence from the system time to failure:
\( t2) > A(?,) at t2 > tv
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Fig. 3.3. Graph of gradual formation o f failure process (wear out)
To this stipulation, corresponds for instance the normal distribution law -  operating age 
to failure with a mathematical expectation and variance c2 which is widely used to simulate 
the phase-out of a system:
To the phasing failures belong failures associated with the processes of wear, corrosion, 
fatigue and creep of materials.
With regard to information systems, the calculation of the phase-out reliability is 
conducted usually only for the technical resources and it is aiming to solve two problems, 
namely: optimal mode of electrical equipment choice, determination the technical resources 
reliability characteristics.
Calculation of information system hardware facilities reliability characteristics for phas­
ing failure is conducted assuming that the gradual failure of individual elements of technical 
facilities are independent random events.
Sudden failures are results of unfavorable factors and random external influences com­
bining exceeding the allowability of its perception. Sudden failures are characterized by 
spasmodic mode of the system damage degree dependence from time to failure (Fig. 3.4).
The major feature of sudden failure is independence of failure rate on operating time of 
the system, i.e., the probability of failure at a small range of time to failure depends only on 
the length of the interval, but does not depend on the previous time to failure of the system 
(is not related to the gradual accumulation of damages). Failures intensity serves as a mixed 
measure of both the random external factors intensity acting on the system during its opera­
tion and of the system’s ability to withstand such actions. For simulation the sudden failures 
is applicable an exponential distribution law.
Failure which is the composite, that is the sum of the gradual and sudden failures, is 
called a complex failure.
As an example of a complex failure formation in Figure 3.5 is given the illustrative graph.
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Fig. 3.4. Graph of the sudden failure process formation
Complex failure formation rate is greater than the rate of phasing failure and therefore 
less than the rate of a sudden failure. The latter can be significant, and in some cases it in­
creases to infinity.
3.8. Examples of failure flows models
In the first chapter section 1.4.2 it was noted that the model of renewable systems 
reliability includes three constituents: the model of reliability, model of recovery and the 
operation control model.
In the models of renewable systems reliability are used appropriate models of flow 
failures. We consider these in detail.
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Model o f  flow failures. In reliability theory is accepted the convention of the following 
types of failure flows as of random processes.
1. The simplest failures flow  is stationary ordinary flow without aftereffects, which is 
described by Markov random process 7i,((o, /).
The number of failures n of this process 7t,((o, t) in the time interval (0, t) is Poisson 
distribution with parameter a = Xt type
F„(t) = ^ f e ~ > '.  (3.1)
n\
Mean (expected value) and variance of flow failures 71,(0), t) at the time to failure t equal 
to each other:
M ^co, t) = D7t,(a), t) = Xt. (3.2)
At t = 1 for a steady failures flow 7t,(co, t) have
A (0L , = >u
The distribution function of time to failure till the n-st failure is described by the Erlang 
distribution with parameters n and X.
It is known that the Erlang distribution describes the distribution of n independent ran­
dom variables with exponential distributions, each of which has a parameter X, and the time 
to failure between failures per one failure has distribution:
Fn(t) = P{co e £1: jr^oa, t) < } = 1 -  e'x. (3.3)
So it comes, that to determine all characteristics of (3.1)—(3.3) for the simplest flow 
failures, we need to know the numerical value of parameter X.
Non-stationary Poisson stream o f  failures is ordinary failures flow without after-action 
which is described by Markov random process n2(m, t). Basing on the two properties of the 
process 7t2(co, t) and namely:
-  ordinariness of it means, that the probability of two or more events appearing on a small 
time interval (t, t + At) is the value of a higher order of smallness (denoted o(A/) small), 
then the value of this interval At:
lim 712 ^  = lim o(At) = 0, (3.4)
A /-» 0  At A' - >0
-  aftereffect absence means that the probability of a certain number of failures appearing 
at a given time interval (x, t  + t) does not depend on how many refusals and in what 
time periods were appeared before a specified moment of time, while the conditional 
distribution function of a number of failures occurrence in the interval (t, t  + t) is un­
conditional distribution function, i.e.
Fn t  + 0  = Fb(t, t)
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for the specified average number of flow failures function or for a corresponding failures 
flow leading function A(t, t) we have:
At t  = 0 the leading function of flow failures is A(o, t) = A(t), and in case when A(/) = It, 
die processes 7t2(a), t) are the simplest failures flow 71,(0), t).
Generalized Poisson stream of failures is described by a random process n3(t) which, in 
contrary to a simple failure flow parameter, is described by parameter X as of random vari­
able I(co) with distribution function F}(x). For the random variable ^(co) the first two points 
are equal to:
Probability of n failures in the process jt3(t) during time to failure t is determined by 
the formula:
Basing on (3.7) we find the failures flow rate %J(i) and number of failures variance:
(3.5)
where:
A(t, t ) = Dji2 (to, /) = A (t + 1) -  A(t).
a, = MÀ(co) = J  xdFk(x)
0
a2 =MA,2(cû) = J x2ûF à(x)
0
when n = 0 we have:
0
Differentiating the last expression we obtain the following relation:
(3.6)
For n = 1 and n = 2 of (3.6) we obtain:
A (t) = J xtdFk(x) = a{t
0
(3.7)
Mtc3(co,0 = J(x/ + x 2t2)dFx(x) = axt + a2t2
0
X(t) = — M7t3(o\ t )  = a„
dt
Djc3(o y ) = a /  + (a2 - a , 2)?2.
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Thus for the process ji3(/) it takes place:
-  flow rate of failures is independent of time and equals to the first initial moment a1 which
proves the stationary process 7t3(co, t),
-  process 7 t3( o ,  t) is also ordinary.
The presented examples of flow failure models which are used in the research of reli­
ability models of renewable systems are typical, but they do not exhaust the set of random 
processes used in the technical systems reliability problems solution.
3.9. Illustrative graphic schemes 
of system failure formation
In general case, analysis of stochastic process of failures formation A(<a, t) is very com­
plex, especially at the use of various mathematical models and their transformations in order 
to determine reliability characteristics. To specify these research results below will be shown 
graphic pictures of illustrative diagrams that describe the relevant examples.
As an example, it is presented a general scheme of system failure formation, using 
implementations and characteristics of the random process A(co, t) which are illustrated with 
the corresponding curves in Figure 3.6. We discuss the description of graphs in this figure.
1. At t = 0 takes place a scattering of the initial values of the random process A(co,t)l=,0 = 
= A(o3, 0) = ^(co) which is described by a random variable i (̂a>) with the truncated nor­
mal density probability distribution f g(x) and by the corresponding mathematical expecta­
tion M^0(co) = a0. At the time interval t e  [0, f j  expectation process A(co, t) is constant and 
unchanging, therefore IVL4(co, t) = const = o0.
Fig. 3.6. Illustrated graphic scheme of the random process of failures formation A(to, t) implementa­
tions and reliability characteristics
The presence of the initial values ^(ra) scattering is associated with the production of 
elements of software errors and with the influence of random factors that occur at the initial 
phase of operation or during the test.
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2. At / = tx start actions of various processes of medium speed, which in general begin 
to manifest itself after a certain time delay t = The denotation of the moment of delay is 
described by the random variable A(co, = ^(co) with mathematical expectation M^2(co) = 
with cutted off normal density distribution/^/), and with М4(ю, /,) = a0. For the complex or 
sudden failures the delay time is determined by the starting of sudden random (unpredictable) 
factors that substantially accelerate system failure time emerging.
3. Moment in time t = t2 is considered as the current time moment t in the system 
time to failure interval. Since the initial period of time to failure was considered earlier, i.e. 
zt t e {/„, t{}, moment of time t2 was selected at the final period of system time to failure 
interval. The variation of the values in the random process A(co, t) which describes the process
of system failure forming can be defined by its derivative g A (to,t) = por a flxe(j
dt
time t2 the speed value gA(со, t2) is described by a random variable £й(ю), probability distri­
bution density of which is described by truncated normal law and is shown in Figure 3.6 as 
the graph of function f g2(x).
In Figure 3.6 is given a graph of the density distribution fit)  for distribution function of 
system failure F(t) of the examined system, described by normal distribution.
4. Moment of time t = te at which the mathematical expectation of a random process 
МЛ(со, /j)/, = Ie = Amax occurs a random event -  failure of the studied system. In Figure 3.6 is 
given the graph of the reliability function/(0 distribution densityy(/) which is described with 
the normal distribution law. As for the realization of a random process A(a>, t) in Figure 3.6 
is presented the graph of mathematical expectation ]VL4(co, t) as of an implementation of 
non-stationary random process. Using the model of non-stationary random process A(со, t) 
enables, on the one hand, to consider a wide range of models of failures formation that occur 
in studies of system reliability characteristics, but on the other it substantially complicates 
the methodology of the study.
For example, for dynamics control of the process A(co, t) in time, it is necessary to 
increase the number of tests, measurements, controlled values and characteristics of the 
process A(со, /)with subsequent experimental data for the following statistical processing. In 
other words, the results of solving the inverse problem of the theory of reliability in order to 
justify a system experimental reliability characteristics is relevant and important task in the 
modem theory of reliability and it requires considerable effort at using theoretical, simulation 
and experimental studies.
3.10. Examples of phasing failure typical models
To the known results of phasing failure study can be attributed a number of studies of 
the following phase-out models [2, 7].
1. We first consider the case where the values of the random process of failures forma­
tion P {со e Q : A(to, 0) = 0} = 1 at P{ca e £2 : A(to, 0) = 0} = 1 can be even to zero, i.e. at the 
beginning of the studied systems operation there is no rejection. Formally, this requirement 
can be written down as
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P{co e  Q  : A (co, 0) =  0} =  1.
In practice, such requirement corresponds to a case when the scattering of values for 
process A(co, t) realizations ,4(0) is negligible and can be ignored in the studies. A common 
model for this case is as following,
A(to, 0  = gA(cd) • t, t > 0, A(co, 0  e  [0, / ( „ ] (3.8)
therefore the process of failures formation is a linear function of time -  time to failure of 
the studied system.
Random variable gA((o) characterizes the rate of the process values change A(co, t) and 
depends on a large number of random factors (operating load, regime and operating conditions), 
so the most typical case when g,(co) is described by the normal distribution law with density:
( x - a j
/*(*) = - exp 2 a l
(3.9)
where aq and o 2 -  corresponding mathematically expected values and random variable dis­
persion gA{ co).
On the basis of (3.8) and (3.9) we obtain the following expression for the one-dimensional 
density distribution of a random process A(co, t) in the form:
( * ~ ai 0"1
a ty f ln
exp —
2 a l t2
Thus we have:
function of the failures probability distribution
t~ a qt 
v <V ,
-  distribution function of failure-free operation probability
In Figure 3.7 are presented illustrative graphs of realizations A(t) of random process of 
failure formation A(co, t), which leads to a failure of studied system.
Graphs of process A(co, t) implementations that are shown in Figure 3.7 describe the 
following types of failures:
-  realization A y{t) illustrates very unlikely failure at time with R(te) > F (0  where fit) -  
failures probability distribution density (a),
-  mathematical expectation lVL4(co, t), if this curve is seen as its appropriate implementa­
tion, then to it corresponds F(t0) = R(t0) = 0,5 (b),
-  realization A2(t) has a higher probability of occurrence in practice, > 0.7, i.e. imple­
mentation of such model (3.8) more adequately reflects the character of failures, 
while F ( 0  > R ( 0  (c).
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A(f)
F ( t ' \ At)
6
Fig. 3.7. Graphs of implementation AJJ), A2(t), MA((o, t) and relevant characteristics o f system 
reliability at time of failures points: a) at time b) at time t0; c) at time t"
2. Below we consider a more complex compared to (3.8) following model
which takes into account the initial scattering values of the process A( co, t) at time /= 0 , there-
In the model (3.10) for most practical cases are chosen following expressions for the 
random variables distribution density:
-  for the random variable i^(co)
From the theory of probability it is known that the linear function (3.10) of two inde­
pendent random variables distributed by the normal law also has a normal distribution with 
the parameters:
-  mathematical expectation МЛ(со, t) = a0 + agt\ t > 0,
-  variance D/1(gV) = o„ + a 2gt2\t > 0.
The process A(a, t) probabilities distribution univariable density
Л(ю,г) = £0(со) + ̂ (со)-* , t>  0, i4(<D,/)6[0,4B„ ]  (3.10)
fore Л(йМ) = £0(ю )+£л(ю )-/, t>  0, ^(cM )e[0,A,ax]-
-  for the random variable g/f(co)
V /
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Probability of a failure-free system operation at a definite time period (time to fail­
ure) t equals to the probability that the process of failures formation value A(a, t) of a system 
at this point will fall in the range [0, J  and it is given by the equation:
In Figure 3.8 is given illustrative graph for the accidental failures formation process 
A((», /)•
Fig. 3.8. Model o f phasing failure based on initial parameters of a system scattering
The linear model of failures formation in the system A(a, t) type (3.10) gives an opportunity 
to examine the contribution of different variants of two random variables Ç0(o>) and g_/e>) that 
describe different practical cases of failures formation, various operating conditions, effects 
of a variety of factors on the reliability characteristics.
Here presented a particular case of the following two:
2.1. Dispersion of process Ш(св, /) < e, s > 0 in the time interval of time to failure / of a system 
is small and can be ignored at the subsequent reliability characteristics calculations. In 
this case, the average time to failure of a system is
2.2. Values changing of the process A(a, t) at a given time interval is small, and the initial 
dispersion, i.e. D^0(co) is significant. In this case, to ensure the operability of a system at 
a given time interval it is required to take measures to increase the probability of system 
failure at the initial stage.






3.11. Modeling of sudden failures 
based on the exponential law
It is known that the origin of sudden failure is not related to those caused by gradual 
accumulation of damage system change over time but rather to the probability of sudden 
breakage within some interval (time) of time to failure and depends only on the length of this 
interval and on the failure rate. The ground for a sudden failure is a random adverse action of 
uncontrollable factors and external factors in excess to system perception opportunities. The 
characteristic of random external influences that can act on the system in operation and the 
possibility o f its perception is the failure rate X(t) which, in case of sudden failures, is signifi­
cant but constant X(t) = const value, and it is the major sign of a sudden failure.
a) b)
Fig. 3.9. Exponential law o f a system major functions for reliability (a), and its approximation 
into the region o f high reliability (b)
It is known that at using the exponential distribution law for the basic functions of reli­
ability R(t) and F(t) we have:
R{t) = e \ F ( t ) = 1 -  R(t) = 1 = e \ M  = Xex (3.12)
and this is the very case of research that is widely used to simulate sudden failures.
The characteristics of reliability exponential law are:
1) mathematically expected value (first initial time moment, the average time to failure):
T0 = M ^(co) = ] t f ( t )d t  = x]te~>Jdt = - te -k‘ 1“ + ] e x' d t = \ e ' u |~ = ±
o o  o A A
2) variance (second central moment squared standard deviation):





a  = > ( ^ ( c o ) ) = i  = ro. (3.13)
Taking into account (3.13), the formula for the failure-free operation probability can be 
represented as:
1
R(t) = e * = e  T° ■
At transformation the last formula onto McLaren series:
' '  '  '  d! dt1 2! d f  3! 2!
solution can be restricted to the two terms of the expansion and we obtain a linear ap­
proximation of the exponential law, which can be used for the calculations in the area of high 
reliability R(t) > 0,9 (Fig. 3.9b):
^ , ( 0  =  i - t o  =  i ~ r .
0
Expression of probability distribution density for approximated law is described by:
Jo dt T0
From these equations it follows that in the area of high reliability (low values of time 
to failure), it can be figured out that the random variable i;(co) -  time to failure to the failure 
of a system is uniformly distributed with the density X = const.
The cause of sudden failure is not due to the change of the system, but determined with 
unfavorable combinations of operating factors, therefore it is required to build a model of 
sudden failure to evaluate the conditions which can lead to a failure and to estimate the prob­
ability of this event. Building a model of sudden failure is related to the analysis of operating 
conditions, operating mode, possibility of extreme loads and active influence of environment 
on the system performance.
In some cases, for the description of sudden failures is used a stationary stochastic 
process, whose characteristics IVL4(co, t) = const; D^(co, t) = const, and one-dimensional 
density probability distribution/^, 0  =ftx) is independent on time, that is independent of the 
time to system failure. For example, the patterns of change of individual realizations Aff)\ 
Ak(t) for the z-st and k-st systems of the same species are characterized by various changes 
in the conditions and modes of operation, the random nature of operating loads and external 
influences on the i-st and k-st system in operation. Because of actions of various reasons 
there are observed different time moments tx, t 2-  moments of failure corresponding to the z-st 
and k-st systems. Thus, in general case it is needed to use a special device for the emission 
of random processes realizations over the preset limits (borders), determining the likelihood
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of process A(со, t) at implementation of crossing the confidence interval values limits bor­
ders for the process A(a, t), therefore the departure of corresponding implementations At(t); 
A //) out of interval of process confidence variables(process A(co, t) tolerance values within 
a definite probability).
It should be mentioned here the restrictions in the use of stationary random process 
models for a sudden system failures.
For renewable systems in which proceeds a sudden failure under the action of random 
events, periods of serviceability alternate with time-lapse of recovery time.
For a simplest (Poisson) flow, the number of failures that occur within the time to failure 
interval length Ms a random variable distributed according to the Poisson law. In this case, 
die probability of m failures in the interval length t is:
P{5(CB) = m } = (?U) e , 
ml
and the times to failure between each adjacent failure obey to the exponential distribution law:
Д(0 = Р{£(а>)>/} = е-я',
where the parameter X has denotation of failure rate.
Mean time to failure in this case of simplest (Poisson) failure flow is T0 = 1/A..
Failures flows can be simple -  when occur identical or similar system components 
rejections, and complex. In the latter case occurs a complex failures flow, which is the sum 
of n independent simple flows and corresponds to the chosen types of heterogeneous system 
components failures. The leading function of such complex failures flow, as of the mathemati­
cally expected values for the number of failures of the total operating time interval t, is the 
sum of the leading functions of simple flows components:
л ( о = £ л , ( о .
/=i
Differentiating the last expression for t, we obtain an expression for the total intensity 
of type:
A.(0 = 1 > , ( 0 ,
/=1
therefore it characterizes the complex failures flows as the sum of the simple failures flows 
intensities.
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